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INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 1972, a new form of municipal government known as Unicity came into existence in 
the Greater Winnipeg area. This innovative experiment in local government reform officially established the 
City of Winnipeg as one unified city which incorporated the former municipalities of Winnipeg, St. James-
Assiniboia, St. Boniface, Transcona, St. Vital, West Kildonan, East Kildonan, Tuxedo, Old Kildonan, North 
Kildonan, Fort Garry and Charleswood, and replaced the two-tier metropolitan system established in 1960. 
Winnipeg's Unicity was to centralize service delivery and administration while equalizing mill rates and 
decentralizing the political process to bring local government closer to the people. Unicity captured the 
attention of cities and city reformers across Canada and North America for this unique combination of goals 
as well as for its key features: a large Council with 51 members (50 Councillors and a Mayor elected-at-large), 
small wards, 13 Community Committees, an Executive Policy Committee, a Board of Commissioners, and 
the formation of Resident Advisory Groups (RAGs). Now 25 years later, how has the Unicity experiment 
turned out, and where are we going as the future presents even greater challenges? 
To mark the 25th anniversary of Winnipeg's unified civic government, the Institute of Urban Studies 
organized "The State of Unicity-25 Years Later Conference," held at The University of Winnipeg, October 
3-4, 1997. The 25th anniversary of Unicity presented a unique opportunity to revisit this important event in 
post-war Canadian urban reform, but more importantly, to examine the present state of local government in 
Winnipeg and other municipalities, and the future of urban governance. The conference was funded by The 
Winnipeg Foundation, the City of Winnipeg and The University of Winnipeg Department of Political Science, 
and was well attended by a diverse audience made up of current and former elected officials and civic 
administrators (local and regional), community group representatives, academics, students and interested 
citizens. 
Her Worship Mayor Susan Thompson delivered the conference opening remarks on the evening of 
October 3 and introduced Andrew Sancton, who provided "An Outsider's View" of Unicity in a public keynote 
address. Local and national experts and practitioners in urban affairs and government (see pp. 142-44) were 
invited to participate on four panels held on October 4 which discussed Unicity-25 Years Later, Municipal 
Democracy and Citizen Participation, Amalgamation in the 1990s, and Urban Governance for the twenty-first 
Century. The conference also included two luncheon addresses. Warren Magnusson spoke about 
"Politicizing the Global City" on October 3 as part of the "Building Urban Community Lecture Series" in 
association with the Department of Political Science, while Bernie Wolfe provided his personal "Reflections 
on Unicity and Local Government in Winnipeg" for conference registrants on October 4. Special recognition 
was given at the conference to Saul Cherniack, former Metropolitan councillor and the first Manitoba Minister 
of Urban Affairs. 
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This volume contains the papers presented by the 12 panellists as well as the keynote and luncheon 
speakers over the two days of the conference: The papers reflect the varied backgrounds of the authors, at 
least eight of whom have held political office or have worked at the local or provincial government level. Due 
to a time limit imposed on panellists, the majority of the papers are brief in length,- although each makes 
important observations about local government which have practical and theoretical significance for Winnipeg 
and other Canadian municipalities. The papers presented here contribute to our understanding of the impact 
of the Unicity experiment and municipal amalgamation, and provide insights to help inform plans for the next 
25 years of local government in Winnipeg. 
Many of the comments made by the panellists and speakers, as well as by members of the audience, 
suggest a prevailing admiration for the vision of the original Unicity designers, despite the ongoing debate over 
the success or failure of unification. While the debate will continue, it is evident that a vision for the next 25 
years cannot exclude the citizens of Winnipeg, neighbourhood initiative and the growing urban Aboriginal 
community in particular-plans are currently underway for Aboriginal community revitalization in the North 
Main Street district which will have a major impact on the district, the Aboriginal community and the city.-
Key points raised during the conference and in these proceedings are briefly highlighted below. 
Citizen Participation. At the heart of the Unicity concept was the need to create a climate for active 
citizen participation in local government, but 25 years later, the original mechanisms for greater 
participation have been frustrated: RAGs are almost non-existent; ward boundaries and community 
committee areas have increased in size while the size of City Council has decreased. The Winnipeg 
experience has, however, demonstrated that municipal government structures have not curtailed 
neighbourhood involvement and citizen participation, although we could do better. A decline may be 
explained in part by larger societal trends and political circumstances (Diamant, Levin), and even 
basic satisfaction with government performance (Thomas). Interestingly, recent figures indicate that 
Winnipeggers have a higher rate of municipal voting compared to some other Canadian urban 
centres, although voter turnout at municipal elections remains well below provincial and federal 
election percentages (Levin). Among the major challenges facing the City of Winnipeg is how to 
involve the burgeoning urban Aboriginal population, and encourage as well as strengthen community 
*These proceedings include a paper submitted by lan Wight, but do not include the pre-conference 
address at The University of Winnipeg by Warren Magnusson. 
**The papers by Greg Selinger and Christopher Leo represent an expanded version of their 
presentations. The paper by Bernie Wolfe is an edited version of the recording made of his luncheon address. 
***Unfortunately, Wayne Helgason's discussion of Aboriginal self-government and Neeginan were not 
recorded for these proceedings. 
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"owned" processes of renewal (Helgason, Selinger, Wight). 
Provincial/Municipal Relations. One simple fact is central in provincial/municipal relations: 
municipalities are the creatures of the provinces. Provincial reforms at the local level have fallen short 
of transferring the powers and resources needed to respond to increasingly complex urban problems 
(Diamant, Levin, Selinger). Indeed, what might be required is a constitutional amendment giving larger 
urban centres constitutional status (Levin). What is necessary for the future of Unicity is a co-
operative approach and efforts to find consensus (Smith), not more of the "two solitudes" that 
characterize the present province-city relationship (Wolfe). 
Municipal Amalgamation. Twenty-five years ago, the Manitoba Government, equipped with its 
constitutional powers over local government, significantly altered municipal powers and 
responsibilities, and municipal boundaries and structures, to create Winnipeg's unified civic 
government against, at times, fierce opposition. Unicity was unique, but municipal amalgamation was 
not. Provincial approaches to municipal amalgamation vary across time and circumstance, although 
massive change continues to provoke similar responses to those that arose in the Greater Winnipeg 
area. Today, municipal amalgamation is largely motivated by economic arguments (Sancton, 
Cournoyer, Mclaren). Rural areas in particular face immediate challenges: as a result of rural 
depopulation and declining fiscal resources, a growing number of rural municipalities have chosen 
to merge for survival (Rounds). Municipal reform is difficult, universally challenging and constantly 
evolving (Mclaren). The impact of municipal structures on urban functioning cannot be 
underestimated or overestimated, in the case of Winnipeg and in other municipalities (Artibise, 
Sancton). 
Representative, Accountable Government. The need for a representative and accountable 
government was well understood by the original designers of Unicity. The previous two-tier 
metropolitan system fragmented authority for services, planning and decision-making, and was a 
source of internal conflict as well as citizen confusion. Compared to two-tiered systems, Unicity is 
more easily understood (Artibise) and arguably cheaper, with substantially lower increases in 
expenditures (Diamant). Still, reforms over the past 25 years aimed at reductions in the number of 
Councillors have resulted in a Council that is not as representative of the community of interests, 
including Winnipeg's Aboriginal and diverse ethnic community (Selinger), and inevitably dominated 
by suburban perspectives at the expense of the inner city (Helgason, Thomas). Local government 
is run as if it were a business; the corporatization of civic government and the pursuit of private sector 
management solutions and business models have continued despite the fundamental differences 
between markets and communities (Selinger, Magnusson, Wight, Sancton, Wolfe). The new 
approach has reduced the status of citizen to that of client/customer, implying a reactive rather than 
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active role (Thomas). Local political parties, distinct from federal and provincial parties, could help 
to address municipal issues and accountability within local government, bringing Winnipeg closer to 
the original plan envisioned by those Unicity designers (levin, Selinger). 
The Winnipeg Region. The fragmentation of planning authority over the Greater Winnipeg area was 
one of the key problems that ultimately led to the creation of Unicity, as well as the appointment of 
a provincial minister responsible for urban affairs. As described in the Proposals for Urban 
Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area (1971), confusion and ambiguity in authority and 
jurisdiction had frustrated planning and development of the area as a whole, and measures to control 
urban sprawl and haphazard fringe growth. Twenty-five years later, Unicity has not been the solution 
to the outward expansion of the city, but rather is faced with similar pre-amalgamation issues and the 
same need for "genuinely effective" planning and development of the Winnipeg region (Sancton, 
Diamant, Selinger, Wight). Population growth in neighbouring municipalities has mushroomed in some 
cases, but, overall, is substantially higher than the rate of growth in the City of Winnipeg, while 
conditions in Winnipeg's inner city have deteriorated; residents in Headingley have successfully 
seceded from Winnipeg and formed their own municipality, while efforts by residents in St. Germaine-
Vermette have been unsuccessful (for now); the Provincial Government eliminated the additional zone 
which gave Winnipeg some control over exurban development, while establishing an urban limit line 
to restrict outward growth within the city boundaries (Leo eta/., Diamant, Wight, Selinger). 
The City has offered a tax break to new home buyers within the city, but alternative solutions 
could be pursued: a regional tax in addition to other new forms of taxation and the reinstatement of 
Winnipeg's additional zone powers (Selinger). Christopher Leo eta/. argue that the health of the city 
and the region rests on an important realization that Winnipeg is a slow-growth rather than a fast-
growth centre, and in the pursuit of programs and policies for housing, infrastructure and services, 
economic development and immigration that reflect our present slow-growth reality, not the North 
American obsession with rapid growth. For example, the city has much to gain from compact urban 
development, increased immigration, and housing programs that encourage affordable housing and 
housing reinvestment in the inner city, as well as efforts aimed at the cultivation of the local economy. 
The next 25 years will present even greater challenges to Winnipeg and its region, demanding a much 
more proactive approach by the city and the province, and moreover, will require new post-modern 
interpretations of regions, neighbourhoods and municipalities. The alternative vision of Unicity may 
be represented as a "citistate" comprising the area closely resembling the original "postage stamp" 
province. Steps include a reformulated Ministry of Urban Affairs as a Ministry of Capital Region 
Affairs, greater responsibility for regional servicing vested in this Ministry, increased governance 
responsibilities for Capital Region MLAs, and municipal government reorganization within the Capital 
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Region (Wight). 
The Downtown and the Inner City. The advent of the new unified local government in 1972 was 
intended to benefit the downtown and central area residents, namely through structural reforms aimed 
at increased citizen participation and access as well as through the equalization of mill rates and 
services, and greater equity across the Greater Winnipeg area. Twenty five years later, conditions 
in the downtown and the inner city cast doubt on the impact of Unicity on Winnipeg's downtown and 
on inner-city residents (Sancton, Helgason). The Unicity structure may have enabled the City of 
Winnipeg to work with the other levels of government in establishing the innovative, tri-partite Core 
Area Initiative (Artibise), but the undeniable need to respond to inner-city decline and strong federal 
support from Lloyd Axworthy for action may have been at least as important (Sancton, Selinger, 
Wolfe). Without the resources to respond itself, the City required the participation of the province and 
the federal government, while citizen participation played a relatively minor role (Levin). Increasingly, 
the revitalization of inner city neighbourhoods is being undertaken by residents and communities 
themselves (Helgason). Key urban issues include ecological sustainability, aging infrastructure, 
growing unemployment and social costs, the provision of low-cost housing, safety, and urban sprawl 
(Smith). 
Unicity-A Success or Failure? Many of the early concerns and issues expressed about the new 
system of government for Greater Winnipeg persist, despite significant changes since 1972, to 
fundamentally challenge the present and future state of Unicity. Winnipeg's Unicity may have been 
able to equalize the tax base, centralize administration and co-ordinate regional service delivery, but 
it fell short of improving participation and failed to provide strong government (Diamant). Citizen 
participation is the most oft-mentioned casualty of the original Unicity concept, although expectations 
of the changes proposed for local government in Greater Winnipeg seemed to greatly exceed the 
capacity of new structures and old politics. Conference participants were reminded that structural 
change is no panacea and to be mindful of negative unintended consequences; we ought to work on 
improvements to the functioning of Unicity and move beyond debates over structures to the task of 
governing (Sancton, Artibise). There is no accurate way to predict what would have occurred in the 
absence of Unicity, although there is support for the view that the city would have been worse off 
without it, and moreover that its failures have little to do with organization (Artibise). But, again, there 
were no doubts that an overhaul is in order (Selinger). 
Interestingly, as it moves further away from the original Unicity model, the City of Winnipeg 
has come closer to Canadian norms, at the same time that other cities have sought to copy such 
Unicity innovations as RAGs and Community Committees (Sancton). After 25 years, the need to 
focus on communities and the people who make them continues to be integral to the city's future and 
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is evident in repeated calls for "community building" (Helgason, Selinger, Wight, Sancton). The post-
modern transformation of Unicity advocated by lan Wight is instructive: "Winnipeg and its associated 
environs . . . reconstituted as a network of new millennium municipalities, confederated in a 
provincial/municipal blended citistate of sorts-bringing together public authority, private enterprise, 
and community service in a new post-modern governance collaborative ... in accord with ecological 
principles" (p.137-38). The future of urban governance will not be contained by geographical 
boundaries and outdated conceptions of the urban world; the urban is a mode of human life that 
transcends such boundaries on a global basis (and beyond) in which the identification of new 
processes of governance is the real challenge for the twenty-first century (Magnusson). 
After 25 years, Winnipeg's unified civic government has reached an important crossroads which 
demands much closer analysis as we approach the next century. By bringing together both urban theorists 
and practitioners, this conference has contributed to the discussion of key issues and concerns about local 
government in Winnipeg that must be addressed in planning for the city's future. 
The City of Winnipeg has undertaken a major reorganization since the conference, however, with 
minimal prior public consultation or deliberation, while more changes have recently been approved by the 
provincial government. The changes are based on recommendations from the Fall 1997 report by consultant 
George Cuff, who was hired by the City of Winnipeg to conduct an organizational review and performance 
assessment of the existing political and administrative structure, aimed at improving city hall. As a result of 
the report, the City has appointed a Chief Administrative Officer (GAO) to replace the Board of Commissioners 
and has revamped the senior management and departmental structure; proposed amendments to the City 
of Winnipeg Act include four-year terms for Winnipeg City Councillors and the Mayor, a tie-breaking vote for 
the Mayor along with greater appointment powers, and Council authority to chose vehicles for citizen 
participation (not restricted to Resident Advisory Groups). Understandably, the changes have increased the 
debate over the city's future and the weaknesses of Unicity, and will figure prominently in the upcoming civic 
elections in October as the Winnipeg electorate prepares to decide who will lead the city into the twenty-first 
century. 
Nancy Klos 
Institute of Urban Studies 
PART ONE 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
Figure 1: Saul Cherniack and calf Winnipeg, after successfully steering the Bill that resulted in the 
amalgamation of Winnipeg and surrounding areas through the Legislature (Credit: Peter 
Kuch, Source: Winnipeg Free Press, July 23, 1971). 
WHY UNICITY MATTERS: AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW 
Andrew Sancton 
It would be an honour for anyone to be invited to give a keynote address at an important conference 
such as this. But, for me, a student of Canadian local government, the occasion is truly special. Nineteen 
seventy-two was the year in which I decided to pursue a doctorate in political science with a specialty in local 
government. What was going on in Winnipeg at that time was one of the factors that influenced my decision. 
Winnipeg was significant to me for at least three reasons: 
1. By pursuing Unicity, the Government of Manitoba was saying that the structure of municipal 
government was important; 
2. By taking an innovative approach to Unicity's structures, the province was indicating that municipal 
government need not always be the same, that change in our institutions of representative local 
democracy was genuinely possible; and 
3. By taking seriously the views of prominent academics, the government was demonstrating that life 
as a university professor need not mean isolation from active involvement in the issues one studies. 
I hope you will forgive this temporary autobiographical focus. I do not really mean to imply that the 
main importance of Unicity has been its effect on my career. I mention the importance of Unicity to me 
personally because I doubt that many people in Winnipeg realize how central their city's experience has been 
for the study of local government in Canada and because I want to structure much of my talk around the three 
important reasons I just referred to. 
You will be pleased to learn, I hope, that my views on local government have changed somewhat over 
the past 25 years. Part of what I want to do tonight is to explain how the Unicity experience has changed 
these views and how Unicity remains even today as a central part of any informed debate about municipal 
government in Canada. 
I want now to turn to the first of the three points I just raised. The question is this: In what respects 
did the NDP Government of Manitoba consider municipal government to be important? In its White Paper 
preceding the Unicity legislation, the government outlined the problems caused by the contemporary state of 
affairs: there was little or no connection between regional planning and municipal policies concerning land 
development; service and tax levels varied dramatically from one municipality to another; central-city 
taxpayers were unfairly bearing the burden of core-area problems; and citizens were confused and alienated 
from a municipal system that was unduly complex and fragmented. 
In the context of current debates about municipal restructuring, it is important to note the one 
reference to economic concerns. The White Paper stated that: 'With control of services divided, and the 
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power to make decisions and carry them out fragmented, the community's human resources are dissipated, 
and its economic abilities to a considerable extent squandered." I don't know if this is a reference to the kind 
of "waste and duplication" so often cited in Ontario as the reason for dramatic municipal restructuring. I do 
know that the Unicity planners made no attempt to quantify the alleged savings from amalgamation. By no 
stretch of the imagination was Unicity ever about reducing the size of government or about cutting costs by 
having one fire chief instead of twelve. 
Unicity was about increasing the capacity of municipal government to control and shape urban 
development and about promoting greater social and economic equality. Unicity was, after all, the creation 
of an NDP government in the 1970s, not a neo-conservative government in the 1990s. 
After 25 years we are entitled to ask whether Unicity has achieved the objectives set for it. There is 
unlikely to be much agreement on the answers. We shall never know what Winnipeg would be like now if 
Unicity had not been created. Those of you who live here are far better qualified than I to make judgments. 
Nevertheless, I cannot resist comment. There can be no question that Unicity has promoted equality 
in terms of taxes and services. Unlike some Canadian cities, and most American ones, Winnipeg simply does 
not have wealthy suburban enclaves with low taxes and high service levels. Nor does it have the reverse. 
Of this, Manitobans and Winnipeggers, I believe, should be proud. It is possible, of course, that not all people 
living in particular areas are receiving the level of services they collectively desire. Some might willingly pay 
more for more, others would prefer less for less. The attempt to find a middle ground for a city as large as 
Winnipeg is, in my view, inherently wasteful. In short, I believe Unicity probably costs more than it would if 
it were still possible to vary service and taxation levels in response to local demand in various parts of the city. 
The planners of Unicity believed that the creation of the new structure would itself lead to a better 
urban environment, in terms of both suburban development and the city core. Here I believe they were 
probably mistaken. Like urban reformers a hundred years ago (such as that famous Winnipegger J.S. 
Woodsworth), they assumed that new structures would attract new participants or at least change the 
behaviour of the existing ones. But just because everyone now shares a common tax base does not mean 
that elected members of council divert a disproportionate share of tax resources to the city core. I doubt that 
anyone would want to claim that Unicity has dramatically benefitted the core. Indeed, it is interesting to think 
about whether the core might be better off today if it had been directly controlled over the last 25 years by a 
municipality whose base of political power was clearly associated with core interests, rather than suburban 
interests. 
Such a core-based municipality would have needed considerable outside financial support-from the 
suburbs, from the province, and from the federal government. But such assistance could have been arranged 
-even from the suburbs-without the creation of Unicity. Some will want to argue that the Unicity structure 
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enabled the municipal sector to negotiate more effectively. They might be right. But I ask you to think about 
these questions: Would Winnipeg's tri-level Core Area Initiative have been possible without Unicity? Or was 
the presence of a strong Winnipeg-based federal cabinet minister with a strong interest in urban affairs more 
important than the structural arrangements of municipal government? Would the Province of Manitoba have 
paid so much attention to Winnipeg through its Ministry of Urban Affairs without Unicity? Or is it now the case 
that Winnipeg is now so important to the province that direct provincial involvement is inevitable whether the 
municipal governments are amalgamated or not? 
Even if we acknowledge that Unicity is really based in the suburbs, can anyone claim that it has been 
especially innovative in its plans for new suburban development? I genuinely don't know the answer. I do 
know that, in general on such matters I agree with Jane Jacobs (whose life and work is to be celebrated at 
a conference in Toronto in mid-October, 1997). In opposing the megacity in Toronto, Jacobs argued that 
having a single municipal government for a large urban area makes innovation more difficult because there 
is no opportunity for one municipality to advance a policy in one part of the city before others copy it or reject 
it. 
The designers of Unicity wanted it to be able to control outward urban growth. For it to do so now, 
its boundaries would now have to be expanded because the rate of population growth in the Winnipeg census 
metropolitan area is higher in the area outside the City of Winnipeg than within it. But the political pressure, 
as I understand it, is to further reduce the City's boundaries, not to expand them. Indeed, the fact that Unicity 
has experienced the Headingley secession merits close study, not the least by those outside Manitoba who 
are still advocating massive amalgamations combining both urban and rural areas. 
There are many reasons to celebrate Unicity's accomplishments. Finding the ultimate solution for 
planning the outward expansion of the city is, unfortunately, not one of them. 
Twenty-five years ago I think we all tended to believe that, by making significant changes in our 
governmental structures, we could bring about significant changes in the way our society works. In my view 
(but not in everybody's), the creation of Unicity was a significant structural change. Nevertheless, the changes 
it brought to urban life in Winnipeg were not as great as many expected. 
Amalgamating municipalities was not in itself innovative. Such amalgamations were a common 
feature of nineteenth-century North American urban history, the great New York amalgamation of 1898 being 
the most important. But Unicity was not meant to be just another amalgamation; it was supposed to be an 
especially innovative one. It is to the discussion of Unicity as innovation that I now turn. 
The perceived needs were to dramatically expand both the policy-making capacity of municipal 
government and the opportunities for citizen involvement. The consultants who designed Unicity tended to 
believe that the first objective could be achieved by encouraging a form of local parliamentary government, 
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which implied the emergence of coherent municipal political parties. They proposed that the mayor be elected 
not by the direct vote of citizens but by members of council, the idea being that potential mayors would 
effectively have to organize parties to get elected. A party holding a majority on council could then be held 
directly accountable, through the mayor, for what it did and did not accomplish. This idea was ultimately 
rejected by the government in part because it was opposed by Winnipeg's popular mayor, Stephen Juba, 
whose support the government badly needed but also because the government thought that a directly elected 
mayor (such as Juba) would be more likely to favour the city core than a mayor who owed his or her election 
to councillors whose wards were mainly suburban. 
On the subject of increasing citizen participation, one consultant, James Larimer-now a prominent 
Canadian publisher-believed that the Unicity should contain local community councils or corporations that 
would control urban development within their areas, have the authority to instruct local Unicity councillors how 
to vote on particular issues, and be able to set local tax rates so as to hire staff, including community 
organizers. When the cabinet rejected these ideas, Lorimer quit, thus insuring that the eventual mechanisms 
for citizen participation were much more conventional. 
Once Lorimer had gone, the consensus was relatively clear. Unicity was to have a single source of 
political and administrative authority but citizens would be given new mechanisms through which to make their 
views known. One such mechanism was a large 50-person city council elected from small single-member 
wards. Others were the Community Committees and Residents' Advisory Groups. Members of the 
Residents' Advisory Groups were to be elected at open public meetings, stirring visions among some of 
Athenian city democracy or New England town meetings. Notwithstanding Lorimer's position, these were 
heady times. Everything seemed possible. Winnipeg was to be the laboratory in which a new kind of 
municipal government was to be fostered. 
Once again-what has happened in Winnipeg since Unicity is at least as important as what happened 
at the time Unicity was created. On the subject of open party politics, my suspicion is that they are probably 
now less relevant to municipal elections in Winnipeg than they were in the 1970s (perhaps parties at a// levels 
of government are now less relevant). There has certainly been no serious attempt, to my knowledge at least, 
to resurrect the idea that the mayor should be elected by the councillors. 
There has, however, been a dramatic reduction in the size of city council. With 16 members, the size 
of the Winnipeg city council is now well within Canadian norms. Except for the mayor's authority to name 
Executive Policy Committee members and the fact that the mayor does not preside over council, there is little 
to distinguish Winnipeg's council from those in Canada's other English-language provinces. Indeed, making 
Winnipeg's council more like other ones is what the post-Unicity changes have been all about. 
While I am attending this conference I want to learn more about what has happened to the Community 
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Committees and the Residents' Advisory Groups. It is you who are the experts on this, not I. I think I am 
justified in concluding, however, that this experiment in citizen participation has not lived up to expectations. 
Such evaluations were appearing within months of Unicity's creation and I know of nothing that has happened 
since then to change these first impressions. Maybe most of Winnipeg's citizens have ended up agreeing with 
Lorimer that these new institutions of participation were mere tokenism. Would Winnipeggers have become 
passionately involved in genuine neighbourhood governments of the kind advocated by Lorimer? Perhaps 
the issue will be debated at subsequent sessions of this conference. 
Despite the disappointments that resulted from Unicity's institutional innovations, they have been 
copied elsewhere. The new City of Toronto is to have a council comprising a mayor and 56 members. I 
believe I have been the only megacity commentator to point out that Winnipeg once had a large council and 
then chose to reduce its membership dramatically. I noted that, if Toronto were to do this on the same scale 
as Winnipeg, then Torontonians would end up with the highest ratio of residents to councillors in the entire 
country. Winnipeg was able to cut its council and still not have an unusually high ratio because in the original 
system established for Unicity the ratio of residents to councillors was unusually low. 
Judging from attempts to copy them elsewhere in Canada, one would think that the Community 
Committees and Residents' Advisory Groups had been an unambiguous victory for citizen empowerment. 
In three different cities with which I am familiar-Halifax, Toronto, and Hamilton-government reorganization 
proposals have involved a massive municipal amalgamation combined with the establishment of Unicity-style 
mechanisms for citizen participation. They have been established in Halifax, are to be established in Toronto, 
but do not exist in Hamilton because the whole amalgamation scheme has been blocked. 
There is no evidence that the authors of these various schemes really knew much about the Winnipeg 
experience. I wrote a paper for the Hamilton-Wentworth Constituent Assembly pointing out that the 
mechanisms for citizen participation in Winnipeg did not live up to original expectations, but that did not 
prevent that same body from recommending that they be established. 
Today's advocates of municipal amalgamation turn to community committees and councils for the 
same reason the Unicity planners did: they appear as a way of cushioning the harsh effects of eliminating local 
councils. They have less to do with enhancing citizen participation and more to do with neutralizing opposition 
at the time of the amalgamation. The Toronto plan is especially obvious. Unlike Unicity, the Toronto 
community councils are to be based on the boundaries of the old municipalities. 
At least the designers of Unicity demonstrated some originality. They had limited international 
experience-and none from Canada-on which to draw. I believe they were genuinely convinced that Unicity 
could capture the benefits of size while avoiding most of the costs. In my view such innovators deserve the 
benefit of the doubt. The people who deserve criticism are those who copy from elsewhere without making 
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any effort to understand what it is they are copying. 
The last issue I want to address is the role of the consultants hired by the Schreyer government to 
design Unicity. Four of them (not counting James Lorimer) were based outside Manitoba (three in Ontario), 
although one, Meyer Brownstone, was a native of Winnipeg who had been Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs 
in Saskatchewan before becoming a professor of political science at the University of Toronto. Would it now 
be politically possible for any provincial government to bring in so many experts from outside the province? 
What does it say about the nature of our country to suggest that provincial governments now rarely seek 
advice openly from outside their borders? 
None of these consultants were experts on management. None of them worked for global trans-
national management consulting companies. The problem in the early 1970s was not seen as a management 
one. The issue was municipal government how best to set up a system so that equal citizens (not customers) 
could be in charge of their own urban environment. The consultants were experts on municipal government. 
This was before the days when it was assumed that governments could learn only from the latest 
management trend in the private sector. 
So far in this part of the discussion, I have looked back somewhat nostalgically to the days when out-
of-province municipal experts were viewed with favour. I realize that, because I am an out-of-province expert, 
these comments might be seen as either ungrateful or self-serving. I hasten to add, however, that, if I am an 
"expert" at all, I am quite different from the people who designed Unicity. The experts of the early 1970s 
drifted back and forth between the university and government. They might not have known much about 
structural Marxism or public-choice theory but they knew how government worked in Canada because they 
had been there. They knew what was going on in universities because they had been there too. I have never 
drawn a regular pay cheque from any institution other than a college or a university. Much of what I have 
learned about the practical aspects of municipal management in Canada I have learned from those of my 
students who are municipal managers, some of whom have been employed by Unicity and are here tonight. 
But I have not been there myself. 
I would suggest that we now have various kinds of "experts" in Canadian local government, but none 
of them have the wide-ranging experience of the people who designed Unicity. We have the academics such 
as myself and others on tomorrow's conference program. We have provincial civil servants, most of whom 
now have to be professional managers rather than experts on the subject matter of the department they are 
currently working in. Then there are the management consultants, the people who convinced provincial 
governments in the first place that the civil service requires experts on management, not experts on the 
various facets of government policy. For such consultants, designing structures of municipal government is 
much the same as designing the management structure of a branch-plant company. Finally, there is a 
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growing army of retired and displaced provincial and municipal senior managers who sell their own particular 
experience in the consulting marketplace. Only a very few have the broader knowledge that was brought to 
Unicity by the municipal consultants of the 1970s. 
I think the role of consultants was important in the creation of Unicity, but not as important as the 
conviction of members of the Schreyer NDP government that creating Unicity would lead to a city that was 
better and more fair. Indeed, the only reason the consultants had any influence at all was that they shared 
the fundamental values of the government. In other words nobody at the time believed that there was any 
such thing as neutral, apolitical expert advice on the subject of organizing municipal government. 
Unicity was created so as to promote equality within the province's largest city. Notwithstanding all 
its shortcomings, Unicity remains, in my view, a noble experiment. Had I been a Winnipeg citizen in 1972, 
I have no doubt that I would have supported it. In some respects, the actual experience of Unicity has been 
part of the reason why I have become a critic of large-scale municipal amalgamations. But the most important 
reason I am a critic is that amalgamation is usually sold today on the grounds that it will save money and/or 
promote economic development. These are both important objectives-but there is no evidence that 
amalgamation promotes them. 
Indeed, today's opponents of amalgamation often use Winnipeg's experience in making their case. 
Despite the most dramatic and comprehensive amalgamation in North America since 1898, few in Winnipeg 
would accept the notion that amalgamation led to cost savings and lower taxes. Few would point to Unicity 
as the catalyst for dynamic economic growth in the era of globalization. I return to one of my original themes: 
Unicity was born at a different time for different reasons. 
Whatever we might think of that time or those reasons, the Unicity is now an integral part of 
Winnipeg's make-up. Just as I would counsel residents of other cities not to sacrifice existing municipal 
institutions at the altar of amalgamation, I would counsel Winnipeggers to celebrate the motivations for Unicity; 
to exploit its institutional advantages; and to work around the disadvantages. We have learned in the past 25 
years that structural change is no panacea and that negative unintended consequences are inevitable. It is 
better therefore to get on with the business of governing and building our communities rather than constantly 
squabbling about structures. 
In 2022 we shall be celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Unicity and the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
Toronto's megacity. I predict that both will survive at least until then (although I warn you that I have made 
my share of wildly inaccurate predictions). I hope I never feel that I can celebrate the motivations for megacity 
in the way that I feel now I can genuinely celebrate the motivations behind Winnipeg's Unicity. Megacity is 
based on the bizarre notion that one big urban government is more efficient than a few small ones. Unicity 
is based on the more uplifting principle that one big urban government facilitates sharing and promotes 
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equality. 
Even though I now believe there are better ways to achieve Unicity's original objectives, I continue 
to admire and support them. The challenge for those of us who are paid to think about local government is 
to work out ways whereby these objectives can be promoted without at the same time destroying the 
municipal institutions that enable residents of territorial communities to govern themselves within our 
increasingly complex cities and regions. 
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PART TWO 
UNICITY-25 YEARS LATER 
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"STAY THE COURSE": REFLECTIONS ON UNICITY 
Alan F.J. Artibise 
INTRODUCTION 
My reflections on Unicity grow out of over two decades of writing about urban governance issues and 
a good deal of close analysis of municipal government at work-here in Winnipeg, across Canada, and 
internationally. This experience includes five years as Director of the Institute of Urban Studies, three years 
as Director of the International Centre for Sustainable Cities, service as a founding board member of the Forks 
Renewal Corporation, and over two decades as an active consultant and academic. Most recently, I 
completed a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of the Greater Vancouver Regional District, the current 
favourite of urban governance analysts. 
My comments are also based upon my role as a member of the City of Winnipeg Act Review 
Committee that sat between 1984 and 1986 and conducted some 29 public hearings and received over 300 
submissions. 
I should also note, at the outset, that my comments stem from a strong belief that governmental 
structures can make a difference. As Gilbert Stelter and I noted over 15 years ago, cities can be analyzed in 
a variety of ways. The most common, unfortunately, is the concept of "urban as product" in which cities are 
viewed as places whose form and structure are determined by large scale, external, economic, social and 
political forces. The city is thus regarded as a dependent variable, the simple product of these forces. 
A far more important approach-and one that I want to focus on at this conference-is "urban as 
process." In this approach, the city is an independent variable that influences social organization, behaviour 
and form and structure, depending in large measure on how it organizes itself. In this mode of analysis it is 
possible to begin to see the complex feedback loops and the unanticipated consequences that emanate from 
changes within the urban community, be they changes in leadership, demography, or political organization. 
In short, organization does make a difference. 
OBSERVATIONS 
With this as background, I will share with you four observations that I trust are of some importance 
in this reflective examination of Unicity experience. 
1. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
First, from an international perspective, it is clear that urban governance issues are increasingly seen 
as fundamental in the success or failure of urban regions, and only those areas that are up to task will be able 
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to prosper in the twenty-first century. It is necessary, as environmentalists and economists tell us, to 'THINK 
GLOBALLY" but we must "ACT LOCALLY." And "locally" in this context means on a city-region basis. 
Notably, however, the acceptance of city regions as the dynamic motors of economic and social 
change in the global economy is seriously recognized more in Europe than in North America, be it in the 
Netherlands, France, Italy or the U.K. The new governmental structures being put in place in Europe are like 
nothing else in North America, except Unicity. The goal is to undertake-on a city-region basis-economic 
development, planning, infrastructure and the needs of human capital development and training, ensuring 
coherent development and seeing that the benefits are equitably distributed. 
, 
The fact is that Unicity was about these same things. Has it succeeded? Like all organizations, it has 
had both successes and failures, but by and large the answer is yes. Or, to put it another way, its failures have 
little to do with organization; indeed, without the organization of Unicity, the challenges facing Winnipeg today 
would be far greater. 
To repeat, structures do matter. In and of themselves they do not cause change, but they certainly 
provide a context in which change can take place. 
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
My second point continues on this theme. One of the most important experiments of the post-war era 
in Canada was Winnipeg's Core Area Initiative, an undertaking-interestingly-that is far better known in 
Europe than it is in North America. It is inconceivable to me that the CAl could have been put in place and 
been able to continue to operate for a decade without Unicity, since it required-in a de facto if not de jure 
sense-the recognition of urban government as an equal at the table. Despite the fact that in a simple 
constitutional sense the City of Winnipeg was a creature of the Province, the City was also a full and equal 
partner of the CAl-it signed the original agreement, it had equal representation on all decision-making bodies, 
and it delivered many of the programs. There was, in short, an overriding principle of equality in decision-
making and cost sharing. Of equal importance is the fact that this tri-level model was replicated in other 
agreements in Manitoba-such as the Forks Renewal Corporation. 
In an era in Canada when constitutional arrangements are in desperate need of renewal, here in 
Winnipeg, we have successful experiments that indicate clearly that there is another way. 
3. ACCOUNT ABILITY 
My third point relates to the principle that in a democracy all governments must be accountable, open 
and accessible. Above all, it must be understood by the citizens it governs. 
Unicity meets this test very well, particularly when compared to other jurisdictions, including my own 
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in Vancouver where, I venture to say, virtually no citizen could explain how the system works. 
Indeed, in Vancouver and across the country a great deal of nonsense has been written and exposed 
about local vs. regional governance. Many seem to believe that somehow local or neighbourhood 
constituencies are more important than regional ones, and that any attempt to govern on a regional basis must 
be resisted at all costs. Hence the absurdity of the public-choice arguments that lead-in the case of many 
American metropolitan areas-to city regions with, literally, hundreds of local governments. The fact is that 
city-regions are governable, and a single tier system can work. To be sure-as Unicity advocates recognized 
at the outset-local interests must be recognized and understood. Hence, through mechanisms like Resident 
Advisory Groups, local and regional interests can be defined. But we must not believe the analysts who wax 
eloquent about the clash between local and regional, and who argue that consolidated governments cannot 
work. 
It is, I believe, exceptionally notable that during the City of Winnipeg Act Review in the mid-1980s, not 
one of the 300 submissions suggested a return to a two tier system of local governments and a regional 
government. The fact is that citizens are way ahead of our politicians; they intuitively understand that there 
is something called an urban region and that it should be governed accordingly. Change, however, is difficult 
when the beneficiaries of the fragmented systems-hundreds of local politicians and bureaucrats and 
provincial administrators that want to "divide and conquer''-are in charge. 
The achievement of Unicity was that it cut through this rhetoric (I was going to call it something else), 
and forged ahead with a bold, innovative and far-reaching experiment with urban governance. 
4. GETTING ON WITH THE TASK 
My final point looks to the future rather than the past or present. I do not believe that there is some 
magic formula that can be discovered and applied to any situation and-presto-nirvana. I do believe, 
however, that in the coming years, city-regions must address issues of governance realistically if they are to 
survive and-more importantly-thrive. In addressing these issues, certain tests must be passed; tests that 
are clear and precise even though passing them will mean different answers in different places. In this respect, 
Unicity is far ahead of other Canadian jurisdictions. Consider the following issues. Any effective government 
system must meet three process tests and three substantive tests. 
Under process, it must be: 
Democratic, with clear lines of representation, accessibility and accountability. 
Jurisdictional, with clear lines of responsibility, for both forming policy and implementing policy. 
Geographic, with appropriate boundaries to deal with the effective urban region. 
Under substantive issues, it must be: 
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Economically Competent 
Socially Effective 
Environmentally Capable 
"Stay the Course": Reflections on Unicity 
In applying these tests to Unicity, one would have to give Winnipeg a high grade. This is not to say 
that continued evolution is not needed, or that there has not been slippage in some of the categories over the 
past quarter century. There has, and I trust that a renewed interest in these issues might lead to new energy 
in bringing the Unicity system of governance back into balance. 
In contrast, when I apply these same tests to Greater Vancouver, it fails virtually every test. Indeed, 
as one political scientist recently noted, the much vaunted, flexible GVRD system is really a case of the 
emperor having no clothes. 
CONCLUSION 
If Unicity had not been instituted in 1972, it would need to be today. The fact is that Winnipeg-by dint 
of character and circumstance-was at the forefront of governmental reform in 1972. For the past 25 years, 
other jurisdictions have messed and fussed over institutional arrangements and consumed inordinate amounts 
of precious energy discussing processes and structures, instead of getting on with the task of governing. Here 
in Winnipeg, you have had the distinct advantage of having in place a system that works. To be sure, 
problems exist. But I am convinced that a significant degree of the city's success is the result of the Unicity 
organization. 
For those of us who live elsewhere, let me suggest to you that perhaps it is time for Winnipeg and 
Manitoba to lead the way again by making the functioning of Unicity as effective as the fundamental design. 
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Peter Diamant 
It is a pleasure to be on this panel and to have the opportunity to reflect on some of the successes 
and failures of the Unicity experience that many of us here today sometimes participated in and sometimes 
just watched. 
In sitting down to organize my thoughts for today, my working title for this presentation was, 
"Bureaucratic Success, Political Nightmare." What is it about local government in Winnipeg that causes many 
to dismiss it as inefficient, out of touch with what the citizens of Winnipeg want and incapable of making a 
decision? True, the same commentary could be applied to the other two levels of government-and to other 
cities. But it does reflect how many Winnipeggers view their city. Interestingly, they do not blame 
amalgamation for the problems. After 25 years it is doubtful that people even relate the two. But after 25 years 
Winnipeggers do note that: 
the province is still tinkering with the City of Winnipeg Act and the structure of local government in 
Winnipeg; 
the province is still in constant conflict with Winnipeg over differing positions on planning and exurban 
sprawl; and 
the province is still complaining about Winnipeg's mismanagement of its financial resources and its 
high level of property taxes. 
This presentation is not intended to discuss local government structures, amalgamation trends, citizen 
participation and access to local government decision-making. What it will focus on is the political relationships 
between Winnipeg and Manitoba, and the political difficulties that have arisen since amalgamation. The 
comments will be directed towards the political conflicts that have resulted from: 
creating a unicity that is 60 percent of the province's population; 
creating a mayor that is elected by 60 percent of the province's population; and 
creating a council that, if structured as a strong local government, has the potential to be a political 
threat to a provincial government, regardless of which party is in power. 
In short, it will be argued, that to a significant extent, the apparent weakness of Unicity has little to do 
with the amalgamation 25 years ago, and less to do with structure. In fact, the Unicity concept as it has 
evolved over the past 25 years in Winnipeg, is a significant step forward in the reform of local government in 
Canada. Cities such as Halifax and Toronto could avoid some of the pitfalls if they look at the Winnipeg 
experience. Winnipeg's failures are most closely related to the unwillingness, or inability, of successive 
provincial governments to take the necessary risks; the unwillingness of provincial governments to risk giving 
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Winnipeg the autonomy, the financial resources and the responsibilities needed to function as an independent 
level of government. 
The seeds of the problem go back a long time. Much has been written about the reform movements 
at the turn of the century and the distrust of local politicians and the delivery of local services. The proliferation 
of single-purpose boards and agencies, whether they be parks boards, transportation commissions or hydro 
corporations, continues today. But the seeds also were present when the two-tier Metro Winnipeg was 
established in 1960. If local government was to be more like a business with a board of directors and a strong 
administration, then Metro was a good example. Ten councillors were elected in large pie-shaped wards with 
little accountability to their constituents. It was a time of prosperity, growth, generous federal sewer and water 
subsidies-a time of seemingly unlimited funds. It was a time of action and activity-a time when politicians 
and administrators could get things done. Many former participants of Metro reflect on that time with romantic 
nostalgia. 
But within ten years, there was general dissatisfaction with the two-tier metropolitan government. 
Metro had been an administrative success. The modernization of Winnipeg's infrastructure had its foundation 
in Metro. The administrative accomplishments were many. The administrative success of the amalgamation 
in Winnipeg is in no little part the direct result of the administrative amalgamation of services undertaken by 
Metro. But as pointed out by Brownstone and Plunkett in their book, Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and 
Reform of Local Government 
Metro had not been a political success. The Metropolitan Corporation was misunderstood 
and disliked, got little backing from the provincial government, had few political resources of 
its own, and in Mayor Juba confronted a powerful opponent who took every opportunity to 
attack: 
But far too much, in my mind, has been made of Mayor Juba's influences, whether it be on Metro, or whether 
it be on the decision to have the mayor elected at large instead of elected by council, as was originally 
proposed. Of more relevance are the comments in the quote, "little backing from the provincial government, 
and few political resources of its own." 
The province during the time of metro was not prepared to give Metro the autonomy and resources 
it needed to function, just as the province was not prepared to give Winnipeg the autonomy and resources 
it needed to function. This is neither surprising nor unique. Metropolitan areas in the 'sixties and 'seventies 
were faced with rapid urbanization and expansion across the country. Small municipalities and fragmented 
metropolitan areas were not organized to deal with the problems of suburban development and changing 
*Brownstone, M. and T.J. Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and Reform of Local Government 
(Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), p. 32. 
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transportation patterns. Provinces questioned whether municipal governments were mature enough to handle 
the situation. If municipalities are the creatures of the provinces, then the provinces were the parents of the 
municipalities. And the provinces were not prepared, and many would argue rightly so, to give over complete 
control of their offspring. 
There were two forces at work in early Unicity. One was the force for administrative centralization. 
This led to the centralization of political power at city hall. While the stated intention was to centralize the 
delivery of regional services on the one hand, and to decentralize political access on the other, the 
centralization forces dominated at both the administrative and political levels. When the community 
committees were established, their role was unclear, their responsibilities restricted and their influences on 
budgeting and planning limited. The provincial government was ambiguous about political decentralization. 
It was not ambiguous about centralizing power at the city hall. 
The second force was the strong resistance to overt political parties at city hall. The intention, 
apparent in the amalgamation process, was the establishment of a political structure that would encourage 
party politics at city hall. While few will argue that political groupings were absent from city hall after Unicity, 
witness the continued dominance of the ICEC, the Independent Citizens Election Committee, party politics 
in any formal sense were avoided. Policy development, political platforms and strong party leadership were 
left to the individual councillors. The political bargaining necessary to gain advantage for one's ward occurred 
at city hall, not at the community committee. In the absence of parties with coherent policies, the councillors 
focused on projects. The politicians controlled the project agenda. It was left to the administration to control 
the policy agenda. 
While there was a debate over what were the appropriate roles and responsibilities for Winnipeg at 
the time of amalgamation, it was tradition rather than innovation that won out. The City of Winnipeg Act was 
very specific and restrictive in what the city could do. Any new activities the city might want to initiate required 
legislative amendments. The city was dependent on the province for approval. It is interesting to note that 
although Stephen Juba argued for home rule years ago, Alberta is the only province that has moved to give 
municipalities some control over certain spheres of jurisdiction. Other provincial governments still are hesitant 
to provide permissive powers in municipal legislation. Electing the mayor by council, although it does not 
automatically lead to party politics, was intended to encourage political parties. The province, in deciding to 
have the mayor elected at large with limited powers, continued the Canadian tradition of a weak mayor/strong 
council system-a system that works against strong leadership, which makes policy development difficult and 
which tends towards the dominance of parochial interests over city wide interests. 
What is interesting, however, about the past 25 years is that, almost unnoticed by the literature and 
the many commentaries on the Winnipeg experience, there has been a slow but steady evolution of the 
19 
Diamant Unicity: Bureaucratic Success, Political Nightmare 
powers of the mayor. Today, the mayor of Winnipeg has more control over budget and planning issues, more 
power of appointment and more responsibility for the administrative structure than in any other city in Canada. 
It is not the political structure that is the problem. 
There has, over the past 25 years, been an uneasy relationship between the province and the city. 
The province, uncertain of, and worried about, the potential political strength of a strong Unicity, has always 
kept a very close watch over the city. Establishing the Department of Urban Affairs had two goals. It could 
monitor the activities of the city, provide a direct contact and respond to issues as they arose. Its second 
purpose was to act as a buffer-a buffer to ensure that the mayor and council were not perceived to have the 
status of a premier and provincial government-a buffer to confirm that local government was the third and 
subordinate level of government. 
From the very beginning the province has been unsure of how to deal with Winnipeg. On the one 
hand, it has frequently ignored the city's wishes, and on the other hand, it has just as frequently intervened 
in the city's activities. It is not suggested here that provincial intervention is unjustified, unwanted by 
Winnipeggers and unnecessary. But inconsistent intervention, ad hoc and based frequently on political 
imperatives, has created a schizophrenic response at city hall. It has limited council's ability to act on its own. 
Examples of intervention abound: 
The province is constantly changing the political structure. The number of community committees has 
gone from 12 to 6 to 5. Now there is no relationship to administrative divisions or traditional 
community and neighbourhood boundaries. The number of councillors has gone from 50 to 29 to 15. 
At the same time as the province was allowing extensive exurban development and removing the 
city's control of planning in the additional zone, the province tried to force an urban limit line on to the 
city to restrict development within the city boundaries. The province only party succeeded in 
establishing the urban limit line, but it did sour provincial/municipal relations. And exurban 
development is fast becoming a regional problem. In fact, many of the issues raised in 1970 at the 
time of amalgamation are present today in the Winnipeg region. 
The province played its part in pushing the city towards the debt crisis it has today. The province 
forced Winnipeg to stop transferring operating revenues to the capital budget to offset capital 
expenditures. At the time the city was transferring approximately $10 million to capital. Shortly after, 
the city went from a high tax/low debt city to a high tax/high debt city. While the province cannot be 
blamed for the debt problem, the consequences of its intervention in how the city budgeted for capital 
expenditures had an influence. 
Not all the intervention was negative. The province was aware of the potential for a negative backlash 
if amalgamation resulted in higher property taxes. The province took a keen interest in the city's mill 
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rate and was very careful to ensure that provincial operating grants were adequate to keep mill rate 
increases down to a minimum. But it was this paternalistic attitude that persisted into the early 
'eighties and set the tone for Winnipeg/Manitoba relationships. 
Much of this discussion has questioned the role of the provincial government in making Winnipeg's 
amalgamation a success. This does not mean that Unicity was necessarily a failure. Quite the contrary. This 
author believes that the critics of amalgamation in general and of Winnipeg in particular are missing the point. 
The criticism are based on two principles: 
that amalgamation does not bring the promised savings; and 
that there is a loss of local identity, loss of access to local decision-making and decreased 
neighbourhood and citizen participation. 
It is worth taking a look at these criticisms. While short-term savings may not be apparent, the long-
term benefits of an equalized tax base and centralized administration for regional services do exist. When one 
looks at the increases in expenditure of major metropolitan governments in the six years from 1990 to 1995 
inclusive, the figures suggest that expenditures in two-tiered metropolitan systems have increased 
substantially more than in amalgamated cities such as Winnipeg and Calgary. Maybe the problem is that 
two-tiered systems, with their split jurisdictions, competing activities and dual administrations tend to force 
costs up, particularly at the upper level. 
The long-term consequences of fragmented neighbouring jurisdictions with differential tax rates and 
varied assessment bases is not dependent on the short-term savings or costs. In a time when municipalities 
are moving into a global economy, economic development at the metropolitan level in Canada is non-existent. 
Where it has occurred, it has been initiated by provincial rather than metropolitan governments. Municipalities 
in metropolitan areas compete against each other for new economic activity. This may be good for 
businesses, but it can only make the inequities even greater and increase the gap between the have and have 
not municipalities. 
The second criticism is more significant. The initial reaction is that the political decentralization 
envisioned in the original Unicity White Paper has failed. Certainly, the Resident Advisory Groups are almost 
non-existent and Community Committees have little relevance. But does the Winnipeg experience really show 
that neighbourhood involvement and citizen participation have been hindered by Unicity? They have been 
hindered by lack of resources and lack of commitment from both the municipal and provincial governments. 
And certainly the decreased size of council and the increased size of ward now means that each councillor 
represents over 40,000 constituents. But those changes have more to do with the province's tinkering for its 
own political purposes than it does with the principles of amalgamation. Although the size of council is not the 
issue or problem, 15 councillors is too small a council. But even so, the Winnipeg tradition of community and 
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neighbourhood action is still strong. And because of amalgamation and the decision to limit the planning 
responsibilities of the Community Committees, Winnipeg, without a forum at the larger scale, has been forced 
to respond at the neighbourhood level. The neighbourhood characterization analysis done by the Winnipeg 
Planning Department in the late 'seventies and early 'eighties has formed the context for Winnipeg's 
neighbourhood action. 
Neighbourhood Improvement Programs are still active, Business Improvement Zones have been 
successful and interest groups have proved themselves capable of organizing and influencing council. The 
St. Boniface residents took a development case all the way to the Supreme Court and a small group of 
residents in one of the poorest areas of the city saved their Logan community, even though the Core Area 
Initiative recommended its demolition. The urban Aboriginal community is organizing and expanding its 
activities. In fact, one might argue that Unicity, as it has evolved, has changed little. It has neither encouraged 
or discouraged neighbourhoods and interest groups to organize themselves. Certainly, there are few 
councillors who would not respond to a well organized residents' group, no matter how large his or her ward 
might be. Winnipeg's tradition of community action is still alive. A decrease in citizen participation may have 
as much to do with societal changes as it does with changes to local government structures. 
Better mechanisms for the inclusion of citizens in the decision-making process are needed. The size 
of the municipality has little to do with the success or failure of those mechanisms. The commitment to citizen 
involvement by elected provincial politicians through their municipal legislation, and the commitment to citizen 
involvement by municipal politicians through their actions, does have an influence on whether or not there is 
successful participation. To suggest that an amalgamation in a large metropolitan area will automatically 
decrease participation is to confuse the issue. Both governance and participation in a town of 2,000 with a 
council of five is completely different from governance and participation in a metropolitan area, whether it be 
700,000 or 2.4 million residents. 
In conclusion, Unicity may have been a success in accomplishing its goal of equalizing the tax base, 
of centralizing administrative power and of coordinating the delivering of regional services. It has the potential, 
still unrealized, to maintain and improve participation and access to local decision-making. But it has been a 
failure in providing strong local government. And to a great extent this is the result of the unwillingness or 
inability of successive provincial governments in providing Winnipeg with the autonomy and resources to 
function independently in its spheres of influence. The same unwillingness is evident in Nova Scotia with the 
amalgamation of Halifax where there is still a deferential tax base. It will be interesting to see which powers 
are given to the new Toronto and to the proposed Greater Toronto Management Board. 
Provinces are anxious to wrestle more powers and access to resources from Ottawa. The same does 
not seem to be the case when it comes to giving powers and access to resources to municipalities. 
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Amalgamations today are favoured by governments in Nova Scotia and Ontario as a means of effecting 
savings and off-loading delivery of certain services. The results may be political bodies with the potential to 
rival the provinces themselves. These municipalities have to come to grips with how to balance neighbourhood 
and metropolitan wide interests. Fragmented metropolitan areas will have trouble competing economically. 
The future depends on strong municipal governments that have the powers to co-ordinate regional services 
and the sensitivity and mechanisms to respond to local concerns. It will take a new attitude at the provincial 
level to go beyond political restructuring and to provide the autonomy and access necessary to create those 
strong municipalities. 
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UNICITY: PERSONAL REFLECTIONS 
Muriel Smith 
I approach the topic of "Unicity-25 Years Later" from my personal experience. Being of relatively 
"advanced years," l knew the city and other cities long before Unicity was born. My perspectives come from 
that experience. 
I grew up in one-industry mining towns in B.C., Washington State and at Snow Lake in Northern 
Manitoba, the ''first planned town in Manitoba." These were all company towns, although the latter two had 
both a company town section and a privately owned residential and commercial section. The survival of these 
towns was also very tightly tied to the fate of the mine, which was in turn dependent on fluctuating global 
commodity prices. 
There is only a remnant of one town; the core of the other has been preserved as a church retreat, 
and the third had a renaissance when another mine was discovered nearby. What I enjoyed in these towns 
was a sense of community and belonging, although when I look back, I realize my towns had major 
characteristics about which I would not today feel quite as comfortable or complacent. They were "benevolent 
dictatorships" with the labour unions providing some balance of power. As a child of management, I may have 
had some bias. 
My first brush with city living took place in the fall of 1945 when we lived in a rented floor of a home 
at Stradbrook and Wellington Crescent (one of the two removed for the redeveloped system of one-way 
streets in the 1980s). Being strangers to the city, we explored Fort Rouge and Riverview, and attended 
baseball games at the old Osborne stadium-replacing in part the routines we had enjoyed in our mining town 
homes. I still didn't know where young people, particularly young women, could safely go to make friends and 
socialize. 
I was sent to a downtown boarding school (Rupertsland on Carlton and Broadway) because my 
mining parents would soon be moving north. Forced to take two daily half hour walks, we explored that section 
of the inner city, and even found some respite from the cold in the stately Legislative buildings. We were just 
a short walk away through the city's oldest residential area, complete with its own red light district, from the 
Auditorium, that relic of Depression Public Works, where we attended the renowned Celebrity Concert Series 
that brought the world's greatest musical artists to our doorstep. I was gradually discovering the riches of city 
life. 
High school was followed by university, first at Junior Division at Broadway and Memorial Boulevard, 
later at the Fort Garry Campus. I stayed at one home in River Heights for two years, at the Fort Garry 
residence for another two, and in what is now Osborne Village for another one. We were heavy users of public 
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transportation-streetcars and buses-and also covered extensive areas on foot. The frequency of streetcars 
and buses became a matter of deep concern, especially when the temperatures were many degrees below 
zero and trousers were not yet accepted garb for women students. 
After graduating, I spent two years in England. In London, I relied completely on public transit; spent 
many hours prowling around areas being redeveloped after the blitz with huge blocks of publicly subsidized 
and affordable council flats. The impact of the Labour Government's programmes for public health, public 
education and income support were clearly weakening some of the class divisions. Throughout, much of the 
character of London as a series of small villages was being preserved, particularly since the era of the 
mammoth shopping centres had not yet supplanted the friendly (if time consuming) networks of local shops. 
That was also the era of the green belt development that ringed London, and the first efforts to revive the 
Thames and clean the air and prevent those dreadful unhealthy smogs. We actually drove into London the 
day of the infamous fog that killed dozens of cattle at the White City stockyards, and sent many people into 
respiratory crisis. 
My second year was spent in Oxford as a married woman. I discovered the values of getting around 
by bicycle in a crowded urban environment. My bike was my salvation as far as getting to work was concerned 
once I became pregnant and had to cope with morning sickness. I was also an easy captive to the charm of 
this historic English town even as I grumbled along with everyone else about the absence of some of my 
accustomed creature comforts like central heating and refrigerators. 
Back in Winnipeg, I settled down to being wife and mother (4 children in 6 years) in the newest part 
of South River Heights. We had no car, no sidewalks, few neighbours and sparse bus service, but we were 
happy and preoccupied. My beefs about the city arose when I just had to get myself and the four children to 
the dentist or doctor or downtown-too few buses, no bus shelters ... you get the picture. To keep myself 
occupied and in pocket money, I marked essays and city planning theses for their English. The Professor (Joe 
Kostka whom some of you may remember was quite capable of editing but didn't think he was) inadvertently 
gave me a short course in city planning: from a focus on "zoning" and "engineering installations," through the 
fascination with "amenities," to a surprising focus on "rehabilitation" and "people participation." 
Because of that interest, I became a member of the Community Planning Association of Canada 
(CPAC). I took part in a mock trial of city planners and councillors as the suburban woman witness where I 
recounted some of my struggles with buses and the poverty of nearby places within the walking capacity of 
myself and my children which would offer playground activity, natural beauty and some opportunity to socialize 
with other adults. Prospects are mu~h better today but I'm a grandmother and don't have quite the same need 
for that kind of recreational opportunity. 
My awareness of urban issues was further expanded during those years at home through the CBC. 
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That's where I heard discussions about the folly of letting cities develop according to the "doughnut model" 
-with suburban spread and inner city blight, spaghetti-like development of streets and ring belts; the 
concentration of the poor, the ill, the most recent immigrants and the elderly in the older inner city 
neighbourhoods, the predominance of tax systems that stimulated unlimited growth over a better quality and 
more egalitarian form of rehabilitation and development, the tendency of developers and lawyers to win 
elections over social activists and "ordinary" citizens. 
I also heard about Jane Jacobs, that indomitable New York woman who challenged the wisdom of 
warehousing people in huge, identical high-rise apartments rather than through selective infill building and 
general rehabilitation with the local people serving as active participants ... And about Saul Alinsky, that 
Chicago activist who was using unorthodox ways to enable poor people to act collectively on their own behalf 
to improve their neighbourhoods. 
Through my involvement with the YWCA, I rubbed shoulders with people involved in federally 
supported urban housing renewal schemes, and with social and recreational agencies who were trying to add 
so-called "soft" services to the development mix. These were exciting initiatives, but always on a scale that 
fell far short of what was needed to reverse the other more dominant trends. 
About the time when I became active in the NDP, Unicity was being brought in. Arguments within the 
party centred around whether city politics should be partisan or non-partisan. Several city councillors had 
always run under a party label. The question was whether the municipal wing should be fully integrated with 
the provincial party or not. Since it was an NDP Government that had introduced the Unicity legislation, the 
debate was intense. I favoured integration because I thought the issues were value based and involved the 
appropriate role of the "state." I felt that coherent policy approaches at both levels would help advance the 
cause of equity, and later of sustainability. The Premier of the day seemed to prefer a "balance of power" 
approach. The issue of inter-jurisdictional relations continues to affect the well-being of today's Unicity. The 
Winnipeg Free Press editorial page was ardently opposed to party politics at city hall, but by the mid 1990s 
appeared to have done a flip flop. 
The main arguments in favour of Unicity were said to be efficiency and better co-ordination. Emerging 
issues such as energy efficiency, environmental protection of air and water quality, appropriate waste 
disposal, were just beginning to appear on the agenda. On the social and popular participation side, the 
original plan called for social animators/community developers to be assigned to each community committee 
to assist in the distribution of accurate information and to foster wide public participation, but this element was 
never adequately funded or developed. 
In the 'eighties, I saw the issues from the provincial government's perspective. I knew something 
about the history of inter-jurisdictional disputes. The BNA Act's Division of Powers had hardly recognized 
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municipalities, but had set out a provincial-federal division of powers that seemed appropriate in 1867. Since 
then, not only have cities grown that operate under Provincial Acts, but the functions of each level of 
government have undergone considerable evolution. Enormous strains arose during the Depression when 
the responsibilities of municipal and provincial levels of government were in no way matched by their ability 
to raise the necessary funds. These dilemmas were resolved through administrative agreements rather than 
through constitutional amendments. Many tensions remain and will require continual negotiation and 
adjustment. Many have argued that the municipal levels have suffered the most. 
The main tensions I recall from my days on the province-city liaison committee were: different 
philosophies about development: should it be almost exclusively pr:ivate sector driven, with supportive tax 
regimes, or should the "state" set some parameters, e.g., for public transportation and special services for 
seniors and people with disabilities-even for purchase of buses; for public/affordable housing; for 
social/recreational/cultural services; for areas needing special or compensatory services; for the relative 
amount of capital committed to new construction versus that committed to rehabilitation of older homes and 
neighbourhoods. How should tri-level government agreements such as that on the Forks be developed? Who 
should be included? We held out for Aboriginal, cultural and historical elements and participants. Should the 
province play a role in setting social assistance rates or eligibility criteria? Since the province controlled not 
only the City of Winnipeg Act but also the annual grants, these issues were of particular concern to the City. 
They sought complete autonomy, but lacked the financial resources, or even the capacity to go into debt, to 
back up their demands. The inter-jurisdictional tensions involving fiscal responsibility for Manitoba's Aboriginal 
population, many living off the reserves and in Winnipeg, have introduced new, challenging elements to the 
debates. 
The existence and location of the urban limit line was another contentious issue, an issue about which 
the present government took a very different position from the previous government. Currently, this issue has 
been revived in connection with liability for flooding compensation. Environmental issues have more recently 
emerged as critical issues which involve the two levels of government. 
Since then, structural changes driven by economic globalization, and the federal cutback strategy 
chosen to deal with debt and deficit problems, have had fallout impacts on the city. There are new costs 
relating to ecological sustainability, renewal of aging infrastructure, growing unemployment and the resulting 
increase in social costs, the withdrawal of the federal government from providing lower cost housing, the 
tendencies to blame the poor for their difficulties, and the emergence of safety concerns, particularly those 
affecting women, children and seniors; the influx of Aboriginal peoples, greatly accelerated urban sprawl with 
no urban limit line, the enormous costs of dealing with heavy snow falls and the 1997 flood, all these issues 
bedevil Unicity. 
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THE FUTURE 
To sort out my thoughts on priorities for the future of Unicity, I think it is helpful: 
1. To pursue a co-operative approach to the greatest extent possible (others have spoken about the 
structural changes they think would be helpful); 
2. To recognize the different priorities that different political philosophies bring to the table as a first step 
to identifying where consensus can be found; 
3. To identify the tri-partite issues and the options available, short and longer term, for dealing with them; 
4. To experiment with more and more effective ways to inform and involve the public in meaningful 
ways. 
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Figure 2: Steve Juba as Super Mayor after unification of Winnipeg (Credit: Peter Kuch, Source: 
Winnipeg Free Press, October 7, 1971 ). 
REFLECTIONS ON UNICITY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WINNIPEG· 
Bernie Wolfe 
My few notes are based in large part on the publication by Tom Plunkett, whom I consider to be one 
of the best urban planners and urban government specialists of his day.- Tom Plunkett worked for us at the 
Canadian Federation of Mayors. The Canadian Federation of Mayors held three tri-level conferences at which 
the federal government and the representatives of municipal government and all ten provinces attended, 
which is more than you can say today. From that flowed the establishment of the Department of Urban Affairs 
under Bob Andras from Thunder Bay. Thunder Bay was going through the great throes of unification-from 
Fort William and Port Arthur into Thunder Bay. Oddly enough, about five years later, because of pressure 
from the provincial governments, particularly the municipal ministers, the federal government caved in and 
wiped out the Department. That was rather a sad day in the history of municipal government for all of us, 
because we had a direct line of communication to people who were passing federal legislation that affected 
the growth, development and the life of people in urban Canada. 
Before I plunge into my few comments about Unicity, I have a quotation that was made during the 
Canadian Federation meeting in Edmonton, 1968. It puts into perspective the kind of problems we face in 
urban Canada today and faced then, and so help me, not a great deal has changed since: 
We have created in our cities, vast commercial and industrial complexes which increase our 
wealth, but we have created them only to see too many of them blot out the beauty of our 
landscape or pollute our air and water. We hold out to our people the promise and even the 
realization of rising economic opportunity in our urban centres, only to degrade them socially 
and humanly with inadequate housing, lack of open space and impossible transportation 
conditions. 
Now, doesn't that sound familiar. This is 1997, thirty years later almost, and it applies today as much as it did 
then. By the way, some fellow by the name of Pierre Trudeau said that. 
Tom Plunkett put into perspective the objectives Unicity was to try to accomplish. I say try to 
accomplish. He said, "the act places emphasis on the primary responsibilities of the committees [talking about 
the various standing committees of the City] as being the formulation of policy recommendations, and the 
evaluation of policy implementation by the administration." In other words, develop a program, develop a 
policy, give it to the administration and see that it is carried out. And that is what we did back in 1972 in 
Winnipeg. That was one of the best civic administrations in Canada, headed by D.l. MacDonald, who was 
* Luncheon address, October 4, 1997. 
*'Thomas Plunkett, Winnipeg, Canada's Third Largest City: An Explanation of its New Government 
(Winnipeg, 1973). 
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the Chief Commissioner. They were committed, talented, capable administrative professionals who would 
run any city. You do not get too many like that across this country today. "The structure provides the means 
whereby council can focus mainly on policy decision-making, the initiation of which will come primarily from 
the committees." That was the role and function of the elected person. You had to give a thing called 
leadership which is a mighty important ingredient in any level of government. "Under the structure, it is 
anticipated that council, when meeting as a whole, will be expected to act more as the deliberative and 
legislative body concerned largely with issues and policies rather than administrative detail." That should 
strike a chord! Just look at the daily papers which tell you what goes on down on Main Street. "Rather than 
administrative detail as has been the frequent preoccupation of municipal councils in the past." Well so much 
for the past, because it's deja vO all over again. 
It is reminiscent of what Earl Levin and I have often looked at-the change in government across 
Western Canada where you saw the change from an agrarian existence to an urban one as people fled the 
farms and villages, which disappeared. Places like Saskatoon, Regina, Calgary and Edmonton got bigger and 
bigger and bigger and there were fewer towns out in the country. That is a fact of life. 
I want to correct some of the statements made yesterday [in the Keynote Address]-not to correct, 
just to clarify, to be somewhat more accurate, to get the history in proper perspective. When Unicity came 
in, a lot of the municipalities brought a legacy of infrastructure that had been paid for. The storm sewer 
systems in places in St. Boniface, Transcona and St. James were in place and paid for, but when they joined 
Unicity, they suddenly found out they were going to have to pay the bill for the replacement of the inner city 
joint sewer system. So they paid twice. More than that, St. James brought five or six million dollars in cold 
cash. Transcona gave them a beautiful golf course that is probably worth a million bucks. They did not come 
to the marriage of Unicity empty-handed, they brought some legacy. Most of the municipalities did. And quite 
frankly, let us be clear in all our minds collectively: there was not a great demand from the eight or nine 
municipalities that said, yes, we want Unicity! Quite the opposite! You talk to the people in St. Vital, St. 
Boniface, Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, West Kildonan, the last thing they wanted was to lose their identity 
and the closeness of serving their people. Because government is not a business. 
I hear people say, "You have to run city hall like a business." If that was a business, nobody could 
buy shares in it. No one would want to buy shares in it. It is not a business. What it is, is a service delivery 
system for people. You deliver service whether its fire, police, water or streets. So let us not delude ourselves 
and say that government is a business. 
We live in this realm of fantasy land. You say you are going to bring back the whole core by opening 
up Portage and Main. Now that's a classic! Have you been down to Portage and Main lately? There is not 
a store for blocks where you could buy anything. We just finished spending probably $60 or $80 million for 
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two bridges on Main Street to bring traffic where-downtown to Portage and Main. Strange, isn't it, that 
suddenly we discovered that we are going to wave this magic wand and everything is going to change. Well, 
I quit believing in Alice in Wonderland a long time ago. I believe there is a difference between nostalgia and 
reality. 
One of the things I pride myself on is when I had to make decisions, I made them. In the words of 
Harry Truman, if you made a decision, and it's the wrong one, he said what do you do is-you make another 
one. It is that simple. Admit your mistake and make the next decision. That was part of what Unicity was all 
about. Look at Unicity today: One gets the feeling that you are looking at a municipal administration that is 
functioning on steroids. You have to take a good hard look at the reality between the role and the function 
of what they are supposed to be doing, and what they are actually delivering in the way of service. Someone 
said yesterday that the savings forecast for Unicity were never realized. Well I was not one of those that 
forecast savings. I knew it was going to cost more money, because you equalize at the top level. People 
wanted the same service in St. Vital as they got in Tuxedo, like where Bill Norrie used to live on Wellington 
Crescent. So, if there was any illusion that services were equalized, this is again a piece of pure fantasy land, 
because there was no question that it depended on where you came from. When it was a local government, 
you could get to the local engineer and the local councillors and say, "Hey, you're not doing your job." And 
we lost that. 
I have to say that, with respect, and I never speak ill of the dead, you would never have had Unicity 
come into being if someone else was heading the City of Winnipeg other than the incumbent at that time. It 
was an on-going guerilla warfare that was unbelievable! It did not matter what Metro said, the City would know 
it's wrong. It's black, it's white. What a way to run a government! It was fun! 
You hear people say the magic was when we had the Core Area Initiatives. Lloyd Axworthy made 
darn sure he got all the money he could out of Ottawa and poured it into Winnipeg. I guess that's why he is 
where he is today. 
Now we are going through it again with the WDA [Winnipeg Development Agreement] and I would 
like to see some results pretty soon. Seems to me I made representations to that, on behalf of a number of 
organizations about two and half, three years ago. I would like to see some results. Less conversation and 
more action! More decisions and less talk! 
That is what is happening at Unicity. We talked about the initial establishment of community 
committees. Well, by a strange thing it was a contradiction in itself. They established Unicity and then set up 
community committees that were identical to the former municipal units and the three wards in the city. So 
what was changed?-not a great deal. It was a contradiction in the whole concept of unification. 
I will not take time to talk about the assessment fiasco because it is going to be with you for a long 
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time, so get used to it. It is not just going to go away. I wish more people could understand what you do when 
you read a bottom line. If it does not come out black, you're in trouble. If it is in the red, you'd better go down 
to the bank and borrow some more money, because you have a problem. I think one of the problems we face 
with some facets of the present government is they have a tough time reading a balance sheet. Where else 
would you find a government that would spend a million and a quarter to buy a building they could have got 
at tax sale for about two hundred thousand bucks? That is your money and mine we are talking about. And 
I'm not fooling you. They turned down the advice of their own administration when they went ahead and did 
that. 
The legacy that Metro left Unicity was a development plan, the area transportation plan. They are 
still building the bridges where Metro told them to 20 years ago. The last one was the Morray Haney 
extension from Charleswood to St. James. The blueprint that was left, that they inherited, they did follow. At 
least they were able to read that much. You look at the whole concept of sewer and water, that's a 
fundamentally important issue if you are running a city. If you run short of water you have a problem; if you 
cannot get rid of your sewage you have got a bigger problem! 
The difficulty I have in accepting the way they run this city today is the relationship between the 
elected person and the staff. They work on the basis, that what you do, is terrorize your staff. You beat them 
up in public. You say you are going to be fired, your job is finished. In my day, and Steve Juba was no 
different; if we had a difference between a member of the Board of Commissioners or one of the staff, he 
would say can I see you in my office and you close the door. But you do not do it in public, because what they 
have done, they have left this city a legacy of a completely demoralized administration. You cannot get people 
to function when you have not got their loyalty; you do not trust their judgement. When you are elected, that 
does not mean you suddenly become knowledgeable in every phase of government. We use to say to the 
people who went to the House of Commons, the moment you sit in a seat in the House of Commons does not 
suddenly transmit all the knowledge of the people who sat in that seat before you. That is not how information 
flows. 
Again, we go back to that old rural concept of where the councillor said you are going to get gravel 
on your road, and I will clean your ditch, and you had better be nice. That is how we made sure he was re-
elected, the way we use to pave asphalt in Nova Scotia. It was called "political asphalt." Boy, come an 
election everyone got asphalt on their road! 
You cannot run a government that way. You cannot work on the basis that the mayor can hire and 
fire. Now that is ridiculous. First of all, what I find really hard to understand: you are running a billion dollar 
business, almost as big as the Royal Bank (not quite). But do you go out and hire someone who has got the 
experience, who brings the knowledge and understanding of what government is all about? Do you go out and 
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get a bunch of rookies to run the Royal Bank? Like hell you do! You go out and get the best brains you can 
get, who know what competition is all about and know how to make a dollar work. The difficulty is that it is very 
expensive to train people on the job politically. It can lead to all kinds of problems. You should come with 
some background of community service, whether you come through the chairs as Bill Norrie did: he was a 
school trustee; he was a councillor; he was the mayor. I did almost as well, but not quite. But you bring 
something called experience! 
You have to define the role of the politician and the Commissioners and understand how they 
integrate and how they work together. It's a team operation. One of the things that has come out of this whole 
Unicity omelet is the need for leadership. Earl Levin and I got into a discussion one day. He said the two 
ingredients that are needed in any level of government is (a) leadership and (b) money. Well, whatever way 
you have it, you could have the money first and leadership will come. But you cannot run the city and you 
cannot run the business without money. That's why I said last night when you look at the revenue that 
accrues to the province, almost 70 percent of the entire provincial revenue comes from Greater Winnipeg. 
And most of it is in the growth tax area. Saul Cherniack will remember the day he and Saul Miller came to a 
meeting when we had about 130 representatives from some 100 municipalities show up at city hall. To his 
great credit, he went back and he rewrote the legislation. It was the first time in this country you had a growth 
tax sharing with the municipality. Give Saul full credit for that. And that's where you have to get more of that 
kind of thing. 
Another thing is the communication between the city and the provincial government (I won't mention 
the minister). I meet with the minister at least once a month and another one every couple of months to 
exchange ideas and have them pick my brains, and I do the same for them. The line of communication 
between the provincial government and this city is astonishing. I think at times it just does not exist. I find that 
strange, because Gary Filmon used to be Chairman of Works and Operations. Eric Stefanson was the 
Finance Chair. Is there something, some sort of transformation that gets to you when you hit Broadway? You 
forget where Main Street is? In the good old Metro days and the early days of Unicity, when Ed Schreyer was 
there and before him, Duff Roblin, we met every month, at least once a month. We met for lunch, sometimes 
it started at noon and finished at four. It was a long lunch, but we covered a lot of ground. There was an 
understanding, a communication and a sharing of responsibilities and ideas. We worked together. The only 
way you are going to make this city function is to develop that kind of relationship. I do not think it is there. 
John Robarts did a study on the amalgamation of Toronto a number of years ago. He and Ken 
Cameron from the University of Waterloo came out and spent a couple of days in the city. When he got 
through looking at Unicity and the old Metro, he said I will never recommend one city for Toronto. Well, he 
didn't know this guy Harris was coming down the pike. 
35 
Wolfe Reflections on Unicity and Local Government in Winnipeg 
Take a look at the abdication of responsibility and leadership. Let me put it into perspective this way. 
There are some eight or ten if not more, BIZ groups (the Business Improvement Zones); that tells you 
something. It means that people in those areas, particularly in business, and representative of their 
community, aren't getting the kind of leadership or support or direction they want from city council. Why else 
would they come into existence? Some of them have budgets of a couple million bucks because they get it 
off the business tax. And every time we face a problem, we establish another committee. One for North Main, 
one for Portage Avenue, another one CentrePian, another one for Transport 2000. 
This is not the role or function of an elected person. When you're elected, you're responsible. You 
take responsibility for your actions. You lay down the policy guidelines and you live with them. You can get 
all the help and advice you can and need. Fine, because you do not know all the answers, nobody does. But 
for heaven's sake, quit farming out your role as an elected representative. That isn't what you should be 
doing. You can give leadership. It will reach the point in this city (and I have to put it that way): Everybody 
plans. When everybody plans, nobody plans. They react. They don't act. You want to build a hog plant, well 
come on in, we'll sit down. Maybe over here, maybe over there. Well look over there. Well that's fine. You 
want to build an arena, we'll try it here, if not there, over there. Same thing with the stadium. And it's just not 
the way you plan a city. You have a development plan, a blueprint that says this is how you want your city 
to grow. You do not do it on a hit, miss and ad hoc basis as problems arise. 
Worse than that, some of the planning I see coming is not coming even from the advisory groups. 
You know where it's coming from, you pick up the editorial pages. I've got somebody that used to be from 
Thunder Bay telling me how to redevelop Winnipeg. Don't preach to the people of Winnipeg on what they 
should be doing, including tearing up a lane on Portage Avenue and putting a garden on it. That highway or 
roadway has been there since the beginning of time; that's where the oxcarts went from here to Edmonton 
and Regina on the Buffalo Hunt, to bring back hides for the fur trade. More and more of this planning is done 
in bits and pieces in isolation. You get people doing planning who forget the roads were there to move people, 
and they have a role to play. 
Just stop for a minute and look at it. You have the Red River going north and south, parallel to Main 
Street, that takes you from St. Mary's/St. Anne's Road over the bridge down Main and over to North Main and 
up to the Disraeli and out on Henderson Highway. That's the only north-south connection you have there. The 
next one is probably the St. James Bridge. People say, oh well, we're gonna divert the traffic down Broadway. 
Well they better take a good hard look. At the afternoon peak at Portage and Main in one hour, you have to 
move close to 7,000 vehicles. You know what that is, that's 120 cars or vehicles a minute. Somebody said 
put a constable out there on point duty. He would be a nervous wreck in so fast a time, it wouldn't even be 
funny. 
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Let me close on this happy little note. It's difficult to hold elected representatives accountable when 
you do not know what they stand for. Tell me what you believe in and what you stand for. What are you going 
to do for me? Tell me. So that if you don't do it, I'll remind you. I'll remind you in a hell of a hurry too. 
Anyhow I could go on and as I said its pretty tough to take 25 years and pour it into 20 minutes. It's 
been fun. I was glad I was part of it, both at the Metro level and the Unicity level and nationally. And it's even 
been fun being here today. 
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MUNICIPAL DEMOCRACY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
Earl A. Levin 
I understand that I am expected to say whatever it is that I have to say to you this morning in 20 
minutes or less. Our theme of Municipal Democracy and Citizen Participation could not possibly be covered 
adequately in such a short period of time-the scope of the subject lends itself to virtually interminable 
discussion. In order to comply with the time constraint-which is quite reasonable since other speakers also 
have something to say-1 thought it best to touch upon only two aspects of the theme while acknowledging 
that there are many other aspects which are relevant, and I expect that some of those will be touched upon 
in the papers which follow this one. 
The two facets of municipal democracy and citizen participation which I am going to look at are, first, 
the statutory context, and second, the interesting anomaly in citizen participation in municipal and provincial 
elections. 
Let me then begin my remarks on the statutory context with the statement of a simple fact-one which 
I am sure is familiar to all of you, but a fact which cannot be ignored in any discussion of municipal democracy 
and citizen participation because it establishes the jurisdictional limits within which municipal democracy must 
operate and within which citizen participation is contained. That fact is that municipal government has no 
statutory status in the Canadian constitution. Our constitution establishes only two distinct and separate levels 
of government-the federal and the provincial. The only reference in the constitution to municipal government 
is in the section which sets out the powers of the provincial government, among which is the power to legislate 
municipal institutions, that is, the power to create municipalities and to prescribe the terms and conditions of 
the municipal jurisdiction. Municipal government in effect is a creature of the province. Whatever municipal 
government can do, it can only do by virtue of provincial enabling legislation and citizens can only participate 
in our municipal democracy to the extent permitted by the same provincial legislation. 
From the beginning, the province's main purpose in creating municipal governments was to relieve 
the province of the burden of providing municipal services throughout the entire area within the provincial 
boundaries. Far more sensible to place that responsibility in the hands of a local authority on the spot and 
leave the provincial government free to attend to more important matters of provincial concern. Municipal 
services were roads and water supply and sewage disposal and other similar services which were essentially 
services provided directly to land, and through the land indirectly to the residents. Citizen participation in 
municipal governance was simple, even primitive. It did not involve much more than the election of the council 
by a gathering of men-usually merely a handful-who owned property. Elections were frequently by voice 
vote and were not always peaceably conducted. Women did not have the vote, although those who owned 
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property in their own name, in some instances, did have the vote. 
Today, the eligibility to vote in our municipal democracy has been greatly expanded. Apart from 
certain age and residency requirements, everyone is entitled to vote in a civic election. But the realm of 
municipal jurisdiction has barely been changed since the beginning. Municipal services of a physical, land-
oriented nature and the regulation of the use of land still constitute the major elements of the municipal 
mandate. But the problems of municipal government are no longer the simple housekeeping problems of a 
century ago. The issues which confront municipal government have undergone profound changes over the 
last 125 or so years. The major force which has driven those changes has been the growth of the urban 
population. In 1871, five years after Confederation, there were 3,689,000 people in Canada. Of these, about 
18 percent, or some 675,000, lived in urban centres of 5,000 or more people. There were only 38 such places 
in the entire country. The 1996 census of Canada found 28,846,761 people living here. There were 25 
census metropolitan areas each with over 100,000 people, with a total of 17,846,646 people living in the CMAs 
-that is close to two thirds of the population of Canada lives in these metropolises. 
This massive increase in our urban population occurred in the years following the end of the Second 
World War, and it has wrought profound changes in the nature of our society. It has shifted the locus of 
national economic and social dynamism into the major urban centres. The cities are now the place where 
most of us live and work, where most of our material wealth is produced and consumed, where most of our 
new ideas and skills are conceived and applied, where our national culture is created. The post-war urban 
explosion has also produced problems of a type and scale that are unprecedented. Apart from the enormous 
pressures for the development of land and the provision of services, urban growth has been accompanied by 
social, economic and environmental problems of a severity and pervasiveness hitherto unknown. Poverty, 
unemployment, tension, alienation, apathy, hostility, crime, drug abuse, alcoholism are some of the personal 
and societal problems which afflict the inhabitants of our urban world. There are also daunting problems in 
transportation, housing, environmental pollution, urban blight, congestion, and still others. Some of these 
problems have always beset humankind. But in the metropolis of our urban-technological society, they have 
assumed a character and dimension which did not exist and indeed, could not have existed in our agrarian 
past. 
But from the beginning of our formal democratic institutions we have sought solutions to our problems 
through the democratic process. The word "democratic" as all of us are probably aware, comes from the 
Greek demos meaning the people, and the fundamental tenet underlying our democratic political ideology is 
that the people must be involved in their government. 
The election of the government at any of the levels is perhaps the most common occasion for citizen 
participation and the ultimate expression of our democratic form of government. The theme of our panel is 
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"Municipal Democracy and Citizen Participation." However, the linkage between the province and the 
municipality is so close that one cannot look at municipal democracy without at the same time taking into 
account the tightness of the provincial-municipal relationship. Which brings me to the second part of my paper 
-the interesting anomaly in the degree of citizen participation in the provincial and municipal elections. 
It is a commonly held belief that municipal government is the closest to the people. Provincial and 
federal governments are regarded as more remote from the day-to-clay concerns of the population. One 
would think then, that the municipal government would be accorded the greatest attention by the electorate. 
And therein lies the anomaly. It is a very common occurrence-one might even say an invariable occurrence 
-that municipal elections draw a smaller proportion of eligible voters than do provincial elections. For 
example, in the Manitoba provincial election in 1995, 69.2 percent of the eligible voters voted. In the Winnipeg 
civic election in that same year, only 53.8 percent of the eligible voters voted. In the last provincial election 
in British Columbia, held in 1996, 71.5 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots. In the last municipal election 
in Vancouver, the largest city in British Columbia, also held in 1996, only 32.1 percent of eligible voters voted. 
And in the civic election in that same year in Victoria, the capital city of British Columbia, only 21 percent of 
eligible voters voted. 
The question then arises "If municipal government is in fact the closest to the people and touches 
them more immediately and intimately than the other levels of government, why doesn't a larger percentage 
of the eligible voters vote in the municipal elections-at least as large a percentage if not larger than the 
percentage that votes in provincial elections?" My own answer to that question is that although the municipal 
government may still be the closest to the people, it is no longer as relevant as it may have been in an earlier 
era. Among the issues which involve the people in our cities today are still the traditional issues of land 
development and municipal services, but these are no longer the major problems confronting our cities, nor 
are they the problems in the forefront of our urban dwellers consciousness. 
A large proportion of today's city people are more closely and acutely affected by problems of 
economic and social distress than they are by the traditional municipal problems. The demands upon the 
individual in simply trying to live from day-to-day and to cope with the normal but unrelenting challenges of 
personal and family life are what occupy the attention of the vast majority of our urban citizenry. In the course 
of their daily lives, it is only on the infrequent occasion that issues of the municipal governance come to the 
forefront. And even if they are not always at the forefront, they are always present in the background as the 
unseen but intuitively apprehended context of much of their distress. The urban electorate also perceives 
whether intuitively or through overt knowledge that the social, economic and even environmental problems 
which beset the city lie beyond the city council's powers to solve. If they can be addressed at all within the 
context of our constitutional structure, they can only be addressed by the federal or provincial governments. 
43 
Levin Municipal Democracy and Citizen Participation 
This is perhaps the most intractable aspect of the municipal democracy's dilemma. The governments 
which have the empowerment to deal with these problems of the cities are farthest removed from the cities 
and have the least immediacy of contact with them. Each level of government has a genuine interest in these 
problems, but the constraints of the constitution not only limit the nature and extent of their involvement, but 
even determine the way in which each one views the problems. As a result, there is ambiguity of jurisdiction 
and role over every urban issue, and no level of government has a clear mandate to attack the fundamental 
causes of urban malaise on its own authority and initiative. 
We have seen evidence of this jurisdictional ambiguity again and again whenever government has 
tried to address what are essentially city problems. The urban renewal programs of the 1960's, the NIP and 
RRAP programs of the 1970's, the Core Area Initiative, Portage Place, and the Forks development programs 
of the 1980's and the Winnipeg Development Agreement were all attempts to address what were city-based 
and city-generated problems, but they were all initiatives of the federal government with provincial government 
participation. When the municipal government was involved it was only as a junior partner and its role in many 
instances was only administrative. The cities had neither the statutory power nor the financial resources to 
undertake any of these much-needed city improvement programs by themselves. The federal government 
did not have direct statutory access to the municipal sphere-that was the realm of the province-so that all 
of these initiatives required special arrangements between the two senior governments and the municipal 
government was brought along as a junior member. And when the federal government's participation 
terminated so did the program. What is relevant to our panel theme in all this is that in these major city-
focused programs citizen participation played a relatively minor role, and although the process was 
democratic, it could hardly be characterized as a process of municipal democracy. 
And the event which we are commemorating here in this conference-the creation of Unicity-can 
hardly be regarded as a triumph of citizen participation in municipal democracy, at least not in a positive 
sense. The amalgamation of the 13 municipalities was an initiative of the provincial government; it did not 
arise out of the aspirations of the grass-roots citizenry. In fact, there was initially fierce resistance to it from 
the area municipal governments and their constituents. On one occasion, there was even a near riot which 
required police intervention. So here too the senior government-in this case the provincial rather than the 
federal-conceived the plan and implemented it, and the citizens' objections were acknowledged but by-
passed by the provincial power. Today the citizens participate in Unicity in accordance with the provincial 
legislation, and I do believe that most of them are quite happy to do so. 
There are of course other factors which contribute to the lower rate of citizen participation in municipal 
elections than in provincial elections. One could cite the growth of various charitable and volunteer 
organizations which serve a variety of needs of the urban community in the absence of municipal government 
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programs. I think this tends to diminish the interest of citizens in municipal elections. Another possible factor 
is the political party system, which exists at the provincial and federal levels but not at the municipal. The 
coherent structure, policy offerings, vastly greater visibility through media advertising, financial resources and 
deep-rooted tradition of the provincial electoral system, I think, far outshines the municipal system and attracts 
a greater proportion of the eligible voters to the provincial elections than to the municipal. 
One may then ask, "Does it really matter that citizen participation in the municipal democratic process 
is on a lesser scale than it is in the provincial or even the federal? Aren't the municipal governments and the 
senior governments' interventions and the citizens action organizations and volunteer groups at the municipal 
level doing a good enough job for the wellbeing of the municipality and its residents?" I personally think that 
it does matter that citizen participation is as low as it is. And as for the success of the present measures for 
ensuring the well-being of our cities and their residents, I think we have managed to make some adjustments 
to the enormous demands of our contemporary urban society. We could probably stumble along as we are 
for some time to come. But in my moments of fancy, I think we could do much better. Real and substantial 
improvement, however, would require some major reconstruction of our constitution and our system of 
governance. I think a constitutional amendment would be required to give the municipal government the 
scope and the power to deal more effectively with the problems of today's cities. Perhaps those census 
metropolitan areas having a minimum population of 500,000 should be given constitutional status and powers 
equivalent to those of the province with respect to social, economic and environmental issues. Such a 
constitutional change would probably bring forth a system of municipal political parties, but not related to the 
present national parties. Parties rather with a focus on the local municipal issues which the present structure 
cannot deal with effectively. If our system of governance were restructured in some such fashion I think that 
citizen participation in municipal democracy would be greatly enlarged and strengthened and many of the 
social, environmental and jurisdictional problems which beset us, which are essentially city-based and city-
generated could be dealt with more successfully. 
That is not to say that municipal restructuring has not occurred in a significant number of our 
municipalities since the end of World War II. But none of these have effected the transfer of essential powers 
from the province to the municipality. Some of them have substantially re-structured inter-municipal 
relationships but none have involved a substantial re-structuring of the provincial-municipal relationship. They 
have been changes in form without an accompanying change in the statutory mandate. It seems to me that 
without commensurate empowerment, the re-configuration of the municipal structure cannot adequately 
address the urban problems of our times. I might add that it also seems to me that the possibility of a 
constitutional amendment of the kind I am talking about here is even more remote than it is for that other 
constitutional amendment that is being talked about elsewhere. 
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DIAGNOSING THE HEALTH OF CIVIC DEMOCRACY: 
25 YEARS OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT WITH CITY HAll 
Paul G. Thomas 
Back in 1972, Unicity was a bold experiment in political and administrative reform. It constituted a 
"reinvention" of city government, even though that slogan had not been invented back then. If the architects 
of the new city structure had more of a sense of how to market their ideas, they could have become even 
bigger celebrities than Osborne and Gaebler who coined the phrase "reinventing government" two decades 
later. Being ahead of your time can be intellectually rewarding, but with the backing of public relations hype, 
it can also bring significant material rewards. 
Unicity was about much more than simply the amalgamation of municipalities. It was based on a 
"vision" of how city governments should work. Like most vision statements, the conception of Unicity was 
rather vague, based as much on faith as on reasoned analysis and meant to be an inspirational model for 
people to work towards. 
The vision of Unicity was to promote political equality in more meaningful terms than simply the right 
to vote. It was intended to address the problem of the privileged voices of business, particularly those 
interests associated with the land development process within the city. For some time it had been recognized 
that the land-based business community had a degree of access and influence in city decision-making that 
was unmatched by other political interests in the city. Business people had been able to convert their 
institutional position within the economic sphere into substantial power within the political process of the city. 
The suggestion that the business community, especially that segment tied to land development, had 
disproportionate influence is not news; this fact has been widely commented upon over the years. I see the 
history of Unicity as an attempt to weaken the alliance between public officials and land-based business by 
promoting the formation of alternative governing coalitions. Please note that I did not say that the political 
concerns of business people would be displaced. Their voices would continue to be strong and they would 
continue to have disproportionate influence because of the community's concern, reflected on City Council, 
to ensure local economic growth. 
In short, the Unicity vision involved two somewhat contradictory objectives. The first was to promote 
economic development by eliminating the overlap, confusion and frustration for developers who were required 
to deal with the sprawling two-tiered structure of the former Metropolitan Government and its numerous 
special purpose bodies. The Chamber of Commerce and other business interests were convinced that 
governmental fragmentation was hurting development. The second objective was to promote citizen 
involvement and thereby place other political actors representing neighbourhoods, broader communities, 
ethno-cultural groups, non-profits and advocacy groups on a more equal footing with the business interests. 
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I would argue that the evolution of Unicity over the past 25 years reflects the tension between these 
two halves of the original vision. Economic inequality has frustrated the drive for more meaningful, real 
political equality. The drive for efficiency has lead to compromises with the ideal of active citizens engaged 
more continuously with a form of deliberative, local democracy. The developers' concern for growth has led 
to suburban sprawl and inner-city decay. Unicity has not been the mechanism to redistribute economic and 
political power that its founders imagined. 
For me as a political scientist, the evolution of Unicity illustrates the limits of institutional reform as a 
basis for bringing about change within the wider political process. Yet one must have some sympathy for the 
Unicity designers, because structures and procedures were the only tools available. The wider economic and 
political circumstances were and are, basically beyond their control. Even when institutional reforms like 
Unicity are adopted, it is difficult for their designers to predict with certainty how those changes will reverberate 
throughout the political system. 
To illustrate these themes, let me contrast the Unicity of 1972 with the Unicity of today. These facts 
are familiar to this audience; they require little or no elaboration: 
City Council has shrunk from 50 Councillors and a mayor down to 15 Councillors and a mayor; 
The inner city now represents a smaller group of seats on a suburban dominated council; 
The Mayor remains elected at large, but now chooses the Councillors who serve on EPC (in effect 
her cabinet), and this represents a potential centralization of political power; 
Community Committees were originally 13 in number and were given limited powers for local 
decision-making (over community services, parks, libraries). Now there are only five community 
committees and they serve basically an advisory function; 
The Residential Advisory Groups (RAGs) experiment in neighbourhood democracy have disappeared 
or atrophied badly. 
In summary, from the standpoint of formal institutional arrangements there has been a consolidation and 
centralization of power within the city's political system. 
There is plenty of room for debate about why this streamlining of city government took place, and 
whether alternative mechanisms for citizen involvement have replaced the formal institutional features of the 
original Unicity plan. 
It may be that the designers of Unicity-reflecting the animating spirit of participatory democracy of 
the late 'sixties-overestimated the willingness and the capacity of individual citizens to participate on an 
ongoing basis in the city's political process at some level. In 1985-1986, when the second City of Winnipeg 
Act Review Committee did its work, a survey revealed that less than three percent of Winnipeggers had ever 
had any contact with RAGs. Many people may have felt like George Bernard Shaw who said he gave up on 
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socialism when he realized it would take too many Monday evenings. Perhaps all along Winnipeggers were 
content to be mere spectators rather than gladiators in the political arena. 
A related possibility is that the Unicity model reflected the upsurge of democratic sentiment and 
participation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, but that the cultural foundations of that revolution were 
gradually undermined during subsequent decades. Along these lines, it could be argued that the attempt to 
promote citizen participation ran up against the wider forces of declining community norms. Here, I am 
thinking about the writings of people like Francis Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity and Robert Putnam's article called "Bowling Alone" which appeared in the Journal of Democracy, 
January 1995. Both writers emphasize the importance of "social capital" in contributing to both political and 
economic progress. 
Social capital refers to genuine, honest and co-operative behaviour based upon community networks 
and widely-shared norms. Communities blessed with greater amounts of social capital have more effective 
institutions because social capital fosters spontaneous engagement, mutual concern, trust, and creative 
accommodation. In an era when peoples' lives have become increasingly "privatized," when narrow (often 
craven) individualism is the prevalent value and when community-based organizations face difficult times, the 
underpinnings of active citizenship may be missing. 
Some people will continue to offer a structural explanation for the disappointing results with Unicity 
as a vehicle for citizen involvement. They will argue that the Community Committees and the RAGs were 
never given adequate authority and resources to become the focal points for local citizen involvement. They 
were not even allowed to fulfill the limited roles they were assigned under the Unicity model because 
councillors and the bureaucracy did not wish to share power. 
A final possible explanation for why more Winnipeggers did not take advantage of the participation 
opportunities available to them is that they were basically satisfied with the performance of City Hall. They 
looked to the City to provide certain basic services (police, fire, garbage, water, etc.) and they had few 
complaints about the reliability and quality of those services. Empirical surveys tell us that people tend to rate 
services of a more uniform, production nature more highly than more subjective, interactive types of services. 
Since the city government provides more of the predictable, visible services, their performances receive more 
favourable assessments than do the so-called senior levels of government. 
There seems to be some truth in all of these possible explanations and I do not know enough to rank 
them in terms of importance. 
What I do know is that there are other opportunities for public participation which few citizens use. 
I am referring to: the planning process (Plan Winnipeg, TransPian on the commutershed, etc.), appearances 
before Community Committees, the budgetary process, use of the office of the Ombudsman, the access to 
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One other city initiative deserves brief mention because it reflects corporate thinking and is meant to 
deal with voter dissatisfaction with City Hall. This is the city's Continuous Improvement Program, which is 
based upon the total quality management philosophy of the late Edward Deming. The Mayor and the Chief 
Commissioner insist that the customer focus is necessary, faced as the city is with cost pressures, scarce 
resources, taxpayer resistance and a disillusioned public. Focusing on quality service supposedly will 
enhance public perceptions of city government, promote a tolerance of taxation levels, save money over the 
long term and improve the morale of city employees. 
An implicit, symbolic message of adopting the new approach is that individuals become "customers" 
who have rights (such as the right of easy access, to choices, and to the speedy redress of complaints) more 
than they are "citizens" who have both rights and responsibilities to be active in setting the agenda of city 
government and in debating policy options. The customer-service model may lead to a largely reactive role 
for members of the public. Administrators are the actors; they survey clients, empower staff, make services 
convenient, provide appeal mechanisms and decide which programs or services to decentralize or to contract 
out. Such steps may, indeed, improve service delivery, but they do not qualify as promoting active citizenship 
in which members of the public as "shareholders" or "co-investors" help to set the agenda of government. 
During the past two decades, governments have faced three types of deficits: a financial deficit, a 
performance deficit and a democratic deficit. Most of the talk and action has focused on the first two of these 
deficits, since they are seen to relate to efficiency and economic growth. More attention needs to be paid to 
the democratic deficit-the underlying citizen discontent with City Council and the civic administration. 
Restoring public trust and confidence in city government will require greater efforts to foster genuine dialogue 
and a deliberative approach to public judgement. 
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Wayne Helgason 
Good morning, it's a pleasure to be here. I am sure most people are well aware, the City of Winnipeg 
Act (Unicity) came into effect January 1, 1972. 
Briefly, it is my understanding the Act had four clear objectives: 
Achieve financial equity between the 13 municipalities which had existed in the vicinity of the Greater 
Metropolitan Area of Winnipeg; 
Eliminate the conflict between existing municipalities; 
Achieve greater efficiency in municipal services through amalgamation (i.e., fire, police, infrastructure 
etc.); 
Develop and encourage a greater degree of involvement and interest of citizens in local government. 
No doubt, other sessions of this Conference will debate whether Unicity has lived up to its objectives. 
It is clear, however, that almost from its inception Unicity has had to undergo changes. 
For example, the debate regarding efficiency and effectiveness continues to rage on 25 years after 
Unicity. Furthermore, the shift of population to exurban "bedroom communities" just outside of Winnipeg 
remains a major concern. 
Nonetheless, I believe that there is no question Unicity remains, despite its shortfalls, one of the truly 
innovative municipal reorganizations undertaken in Canada. 
What I, and my fellow panellists here today would like to focus on is the question of citizen 
involvement in local government. And I further want to emphasize the issue of Winnipeg's growing urban 
Aboriginal population. 
As an Executive Director of an agency which focuses a lot of our attention on building, encouraging 
and fostering the capacity of inner-city neighbourhoods, I have to echo those who suggest the original promise 
of Unicity failed to materialize for the Central City (old City of Winnipeg). 
The attempt to legislate citizen involvement in local government was perhaps the most innovative 
component of the Unicity experiment. The creation of Community Committees and Resident Advisory Groups 
(RAGs) originally held the promise of allowing local involvement. But many contend that resident participation 
in the form of RAGs has not been particularly successful, nor have the conditions necessary for their success 
been present. 
Given representation by population, perhaps it was inevitable that suburban perspectives would come 
to dominate Council. One of the unintended problems of Unicity is that structural reforms could not eliminate 
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the narrow parochialism of many City Councillors. This often took the form of "City" (Central City) versus 
suburban voting patterns rather than overall policies that benefitted Winnipeg as a whole. 
While local government is readily acknowledged as the level of government in closest contact with 
citizens, most people don't consider municipal politics very important. Voter turnout at the municipal level is 
generally much lower compared to provincial or federal elections. Historically, for Aboriginal people, this has 
been the case. 
Given the history of colonialism and the Indian Act, interaction with government for Aboriginal people 
has been at the federal level. But now, within the last 20 years, cities in Canada, and Winnipeg in particular, 
have had to respond to a growing urban Aboriginal population. 
Winnipeg's Aboriginal population is expected to reach 60,000 when the 1996 Census figures are 
released. And it is anticipated, given the current Aboriginal population age structure, that the Aboriginal 
population in Winnipeg may reach 100,000 within a decade. 
The impact of the urban Aboriginal population will present one of the most significant challenges for 
Winnipeg's municipal structure. Aboriginal people want to be involved. They want a say in decisions that 
affect them. There is ample evidence of this. 
The challenge will be whether the municipal organization can respond. 
At present, the City has made significant strides forward in encouraging and listening to the voices 
of the urban Aboriginal population. But there is a growing realization that the real emphasis for change will 
come not from government but from communities themselves. 
We have examples of communities recognizing their own unique capacities and developing "social 
capital" that in turn drives the movement toward renewed, healthy communities. 
I look at what is happening at the Andrews Street Family Centre and the initiatives in West Broadway 
as examples of community "owned" processes of renewal. 
The Social Planning Council has worked with these neighbourhoods to bring groups and coalitions 
together in an effort to building community from the inside out. 
The barriers that such neighbourhood and community groups face, and certainly the urban Aboriginal 
community, in defining the directions and mechanism of change are interesting. With all due respect to those 
who are in attendance today, I would suggest just two perceived barriers: ( 1) the tireless belief in rhetoric; and 
(2) the illusion of superior thought. With these sensitivities in mind, from a government/dominant power 
perspective, perhaps true and solid partnerships and an atmosphere of co-operation and trust will enable all 
of us to define and deliver a promising future for our city. 
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PART FOUR 
AMALGAMATION IN THE 1990s 

MUNICIPAL AMALGAMATION IN THE 'NINETIES IN QUEBEC 
Robert Cournoyer 
At the outset, I must admit my surprise at being asked to present a Quebec point of view on the 
subject of municipal amalgamation in any decade, since I have always been underwhelmed by our 
performance in that area. Having served in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs for many years, I have despaired 
at the apparent total inability of our political masters to deal with the issue of municipal restructuring. 
Conversations among officials have often centred on the reasons for such inaction. As you may well imagine, 
the theories are many, and I will not even attempt to summarize them here. Since I have given up trying to 
explain why, I will only attempt to describe some of what is happening, and how. 
Before going into that, it may be useful, for those less familiar with the Quebec situation in respect of 
municipal structures, to briefly recall where we started from. In 1855, when the legislation setting out the basic 
outlines of our municipal system was adopted, there were already more than 400 municipal units in Quebec, 
closely following the pattern of parishes. The settlement of "frontier" areas, such as the Lac-Saint-Jean or 
the Abitibi regions, which went on until the 1930s, certainly added many new municipalities. But another factor 
proved to be more important. As villages and towns grew, many people in the surrounding rural areas were 
not willing to be taxed for the services which urbanizing centres wanted to develop. As the municipal 
legislation of the time did not provide for local improvement taxes or allow special levies for capital 
expenditures, the only solution was the incorporation of separate units. As a result of the settlement of new 
areas and the splitting up of municipalities into a village and a rural area, the number of municipalities in 
Quebec culminated at close to 1600 in the early 1950s. 
Today, there are 1400, and I will spend the next few minutes reviewing, at a very fast forward speed, 
the main events that have affected our municipal structures in the past thirty years or so. You may then have 
a better appreciation of why we still have the 1400. 
THE 'SIXTIES: A PARTIAL EFFORT 
The first attempts at modernizing our municipal structures occurred during the 'sixties. First, we saw 
the amalgamation of 14 villages and rural municipalities into the City of Laval, now the second largest 
municipality in Quebec with a population of 330,000. Then, in 1965, came the first legislation offering financial 
incentives to voluntary amalgamation. Finally, the government worked on a grand plan to establish second-
tier regional municipalities throughout the province. We were then in the last days of the Union Nationale 
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government, whose sympathies for rural areas were well known. After much internal wrangling, the 
government introduced its idea only in the three most urbanized areas by creating, in 1970, the Montreal 
Urban Community, the Quebec Urban Community and the Outaouais Regional Community, the last covering 
the Quebec part of the Ottawa-Hull metropolitan area. 
It is worth mentioning that, contrary to what happened at the same time in Ontario with the 
establishment of regional municipalities, the setting up of urban communities in Quebec was not accompanied 
by municipal restructuring within the urban areas concerned. Indeed, the act establishing each urban (or 
regional) community mandated the preparation of proposals for regrouping local units. Some amalgamations 
did occur in the Quebec and Outaouais communities, but none in the largest, the Montreal Urban Community. 
It still has 29 member municipalities, for a population of 1.8 million people. The largest is the City of Montreal, 
with a million people, and the smallest is Dorval Island, which is a cottage community with an official 
population of two permanent residents, according to the 1996 census. 
THE 'SEVENTIES: THE BIG STICK 
In the 'seventies, the government seemed determined to adjust municipal structures, but mostly on 
a case-by-case basis. Several major amalgamations were effected, mainly by special legislation, and most 
of those accompanied large-scale projects such as the Mirabel airport, a national park in the Gaspe Peninsula, 
a major industrial and port development at Becancour, the expansion of the aluminium industry in the 
Saguenay urban area. All in all, well over a hundred municipalities were merged with others during that 
decade, which was otherwise marked by a momentous political event, as far as municipal restructuring goes. 
In 1973, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, in a government headed by Robert Bourassa and newly reelected 
with a huge majority, decided to take on the province-wide restructuring plan originally developed by the 
Ministry in the late 'sixties. Faced with staunch resistance from municipal leaders, and particularly from the 
powerful union of rural municipalities, the government withdrew and the Minister, who was a former mayor, 
not only had to resign but retired from politics. That event was so traumatic for provincial politicians that it was 
still recalled ten years later, when a significant amalgamation case was under discussion. 
That was the famous merger of Baie-Comeau and Hauterive, a result of special legislation in 1982. 
Here we had the case of a relatively isolated northern industrial and rapidly developing community split by two 
municipalities, one enjoying the large tax base of industry, the other, where most of the plant workers lived, 
having to tax its residents to provide them with services. Baie-Comeau's leaders resisted with all the means 
at their disposal and contested the move at every turn, including court actions which went all the way to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
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THE 'EIGHTIES: A LONG PAUSE 
Whether or not because of this unpleasantness, the decade of the 'eighties was very sedate in terms 
of amalgamation. It must be pointed out, also, that while the Baie-Comeau furore was going on, the 
government was pursuing another tack. In 1980, it had brought into effect a new Planning and Development 
Act which gave a new regional plan mandate to a completely revamped county structure, the regional county 
municipality. While it was not presented as one of the explicit goals of this policy, municipal restructuring was 
certainly part of the implicit objectives. It was hoped that having to look at their interdependencies, from a 
planning point of view, many local municipalities would come to realize that they could gain from merging. 
To support that tendency, the legislation was accompanied by other provisions facilitating municipal 
agreements and joint management of services. It was also suggested that the government might later decide 
to enlarge the mandate and powers of regional county municipalities, thus hinting at restructuring possibilities. 
In actual fact, the decade of the 'eighties was the slowest in the amalgamation business. Two other 
issues had the effect of putting it on hold. One was the "regionalization" of government. In 1983, an important 
policy paper (Le choix des regions) was made public, outlining significant initiatives in order to involve regions 
in shaping policies and administering a variety of programs related to regional development. The other issue 
was decentralization, which was also discussed in that policy document. Municipalities, at the county as well 
as at the local level, were to be significantly involved in both these developments, but particularly with 
decentralization. Unfortunately, that part of the policy was outlined in vague terms. The consultations which 
were announced in the policy paper had hardly taken place when the government lost power in the 1985 
general election. 
The new government seemed to be strongly committed to downsizing. It immediately appointed a 
high powered task force, headed by the President of the Treasury Board, to make recommendations for 
"rationalizing" government. The question of decentralization, under the guise of downloading, came back to 
the fore. A large scale provincial-municipal conference was held in 1987, to discuss both decentralization and 
changes in the makeup and functioning of regional municipalities. Urban and rural municipalities were strongly 
divided on these issues, and the conference was essentially devoted to finding a negotiated solution. 
Decentralization was hardly discussed, and the government proposals on that score were still quite vague. 
There was only skimpy information on what responsibilities could be transferred to local government, and even 
less indication about structural changes to be considered. While the issue was rather delicately broached in 
the conference document, everybody was aware, particularly on the government side but also among urban 
municipal leaders, that no significant decentralization could take place if it had to be done on the basis of a 
local government structure comprising more than 1450 units, at the time. 
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THE 'NINETIES: ROUGH SPORT 
If the 'eighties were the decade for talking about decentralization, the 'nineties, so far, have proved 
to be the decade for actually doing it, and sometimes in a rather rough way. The government had been re-
elected in the fall of 1989, again with a strong majority. Its first budget speech, in April1990, immediately 
announced that a substantial transfer of responsibilities to local government would be proposed, and it was 
in December 1990. The rationale was both short term-budgetary pressures due to the recession and the 
scaling down of federal government transfer payments-and long term, seeking a new equilibrium between 
the responsibilities of government and those of local and regional communities. What became to be known 
as "Mr. Ryan's reform" was essentially a downloading of about $400 million worth of responsibilities to 
municipalities, essentially in the areas of public transit and police services and local roads in rural areas. The 
transfer was accompanied by mitigating financial aid measures which reduced its overall net impact to $280 
million, or about three percent of total municipal spending in 1992. 
There were no measures for municipal regrouping, but in the furious debate that surrounded this 
operation, many mayors and some outside observers contended that the government was going about it in 
a devious way by putting enough fiscal pressure on municipalities that they would come to see the merits of 
combining their circumstances. 
The Minister did not strongly deny this. In fact, he admitted that if it were to be an unintended 
consequence of the new charges municipalities had to carry, it might not be a bad thing. Soon after, in 1993, 
he made some changes to the voluntary amalgamation support program so as to increase the financial 
incentives, and the number of voluntary municipal mergers immediately picked up, to about fifteen a year. 
A new government was elected in the fall of 1994, and the Minister decided that he was finally going 
to do something about municipal restructuring. A policy was elaborated and made public in May 1996. While 
it was ostensibly addressed to all municipalities, in fact it contained really practical measures only for the 
smaller ones. 
Here it may be useful to present a few facts about the distribution of municipalities in Quebec. It is 
characterized by two facts: a great many small units in rural areas, where one quarter of the population lives, 
and a concentration of three quarters of the population in only 27 urban centres with a population of 10,000 
or more. Of the 1400 local units, two thirds or about 940 of them, have less than 2000 inhabitants. The 27 
urban centres, on the other hand, comprise over 260 local municipalities, or an average of close to ten local 
municipalities in each agglomeration. This is an average: the Montreal census metropolitan area includes 
111 municipalities, and the Quebec metropolitan area about 45. 
The numerous small rural municipalities and the smaller urban centres fall into two types of situations. 
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One is the "divided community" where a naturally integrated community is divided by two or more municipal 
units, as a result of the historical splits already mentioned. One of these units is the central town or village, 
and the others depend on it for many of the services the whole community needs. There are about 180 of 
these cases, comprising over 415 municipalities. 
The other type of situation is the "one community municipality" where the municipal unit includes a 
nucleus and surrounding rural areas. Although three quarters of those 720 municipalities are quite small, 
having a population of less than 1500, they tend to be self sufficient, and regrouping them would not seem 
to provide benefits that would be easy to realize. On the other hand, merging the two or three separate 
municipalities involved in each "divided community" would achieve a number of goals. The policy document 
outlines them under the headings of improving the administrative and financial capabilities of these 
municipalities, restoring fiscal equity, encouraging more efficient use of community resources and fostering 
more effective communities when it comes to local development. 
THE NEW POLICY: FRIENDLY PERSUASION 
The 1996 policy contained three types of initiatives. The most concrete deal with the 180 divided 
communities and will be detailed shortly. Quite a different sort of initiative was addressed at municipalities 
in the 27 urban centres. It consisted essentially in an invitation to municipal and other community leaders in 
those areas to put forward proposals for municipal restructuring. It was also said that the government would 
itself develop such proposals, in a "second phase" of the policy. Thirdly, as regards the 700 or so "one 
community" municipalities, it was indicated that the best help for them would come from their respective 
regional county municipality, and that measures would be announced to enlarge the powers of regional 
municipalities and improve their capability to serve as regional service co-operatives for small rural 
municipalities. 
Coming back to the divided communities, the real targets of the program, they are essentially faced 
with a choice: merge, or bear the consequences of going it alone. The program is still voluntary, but the 
choice is rather more skewed than under the previous voluntary incentive program. First, and for the first time 
in Quebec municipal history, the government has committed itself by identifying the municipalities to which 
the policy will apply. All municipalities in that list have to complete a study of the conditions for their merger 
before the end of 1998. Those which have taken definite steps towards merging, as defined in the appropriate 
sections of municipal legislation, will benefit, starting with the 1999 budget year, from a variety of financial 
incentives, including better equalization grants, reduced billing for the police services of the SOrete du Quebec 
and better conditions of access to certain aid programs. Municipalities which will not have completed their 
59 
Cournoyer Municipal Amalgamation in the 'Nineties in Quebec 
merger study, or taken no steps to effectively merge by the beginning of 1999, will risk being treated as if they 
had merged for purposes of various government programs, but without the benefits of the incentive program. 
For most of them this would mean that the parameters which define access to various government 
programs (equalization grants, road maintenance grants, charges for police services, etc.) would change 
unfavourably, since most of these programs are designed to help smaller units. I used the expression "risk 
being treated as if they had merged" since the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, in a revised document published 
earlier this year, now indicates that each case will be evaluated on its merits. The original policy was quite 
definite as to the consequences of not merging: municipalities would be considered as being part of a de facto 
larger unit for purposes of program application. 
What are the results? Not convincing so far. Before this new policy, there were two mergers in 1992 
(the year in which Ryan's reform came into effect), nine in 1993, seventeen in 1994 and fourteen in 1995. The 
policy was made public in May 1996. There were eleven mergers that year, and seven so far this year. This 
has reduced the total number of municipalities by 20 in two years. At this rate, sixty years hence, Quebec will 
have reduced its 1400 local units to 800, the same figure as in present day Ontario. 
My former colleagues in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs would consider this forecast quite unfair, and 
they are probably right since a major earthquake is presently diverting everyone's attention from municipal 
restructuring. Last April, the government announced that it was downloading $500 million worth of 
responsibilities to municipalities and that a negotiated settlement of the conditions of the transfer had to be 
concluded by September. 
The government justified its move by its absolute commitment to reach a zero deficit by the 1999-2000 
fiscal year and the fact that substantial cuts had already been made in the education and health sectors, in 
departmental budgets and in the public service itself. A six percent reduction of the total wage bill was 
negotiated with the public service unions last winter, and the government is asking municipalities to do the 
same. This would allow them, it is claimed, to absorb the costs of the new responsibilities without raising 
property taxes. The unions representing municipal employees, whose remuneration levels are 25 percent 
better than in the provincial civil service and the rest of the public sector (schools, hospitals, etc.) are outraged, 
and have already threatened the government with an illegal general strike and other civil disobedience if it 
dares intervene, with special legislation, into the local bargaining process. That process, it must be said, 
generally works to the advantage of union workers, since municipalities provide public services for which there 
is no substitute during a strike but have no power to enforce what they consider to be reasonable 
improvements to working conditions, which the government, as employer, can do when it comes to the rest 
of the public sector. 
It is hard to tell what the outcome will be. Negotiations are disorganized, especially since the 
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municipal union representing urban municipalities has in fact split into three groups, one being the six major 
central cities, the other uniting the suburban municipalities on the Island of Montreal, representing 800,000 
people, and the third, mostly smaller centres and suburban towns in several metropolitan areas. The contents 
of the package have changed several times in the past few weeks. The original proposal had a major virtue, 
that of improving fiscal equity between central cities and suburbs by limiting the financial impact on central 
cities and containing specific measures favourable to them. Mayors representing suburban as well as rural 
areas have raised so much noise that government members of the National Assembly seem impressed 
enough to suggest a new balance. Quebec is no different than the rest of North America, if only on one score: 
the majority of the middle class now lives and votes in the suburbs. 
WHAT PROSPECTS FOR MUNICIPAL RESTRUCTURING? 
The outcome of this rough and tumble exercise will certainly have great impact on the prospects for 
municipal restructuring, both in rural and in urban areas. If the latest versions of the transfer are finally 
retained, municipalities will be comforted in their determination to keep going it alone, as a defensive strategy. 
They will be even less receptive than they are now to exhortations about efficiency, equity and community 
solidarity. If, on the contrary, something closer in spirit to the original proposal is put into effect by the 
government, it will have given a strong signal that it is at last determined to do something significant about 
municipal structures in Quebec. In particular, the road to fiscal equity and better co-ordination of activities in 
urban areas will have been mapped. 
The direction in which the government is going is far from clear, to say the least. Some of its 
members have shown that they view with suspicion the analysis and recommendations of the Task Force on 
Greater Montreal, whose report was published in late 1993. The Pichette report, as it is often referred to by 
the name of the chairman, strongly urged the creation of a form of metropolitan government with major 
responsibilities in the fields of planning, transportation, environment and economic development. The report 
proposed to abolish the present second-tier structures (urban community and regional county municipalities) 
in the metropolitan area and replace them by one co-ordinating structure. 
Rather than that, the government has created the portfolio of Minister of State for Metropolitan 
Montreal and set up a Ministry for Metropolitan Montreal whose mission is both to ensure coherent 
government action with respect to the urban region and support, with a Development Fund, a wide range of 
initiatives for the region. The government has also adopted legislation, last June, establishing a Greater 
Montreal Development Commission, composed both of local and regional elected officials and other 
community leaders from economic and social groups. The Commission will have essentially a consultative 
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role, but it is hoped that its members will themselves develop a metropolitan vision and spirit and inspire others 
to do the same. Its main responsibilities are in the areas of economic development, planning and 
transportation, and it is specifically mandated to make recommendations to the government about changes 
in municipal structures and functions. The project has been severely criticized from both sides. Those who 
thought that it did not go far enough were mainly municipal and community leaders from the central part of 
the region, the Island of Montreal. Those who wanted no part of it, or thought it would be a useless addition 
to an already cluttered institutional scene, were mainly from the suburban rings. Many independent observers 
were also of the view that the government had missed a marvellous opportunity to simplify and rationalize the 
institutional maze in metropolitan Montreal. 
The same could be said about smaller scale urban areas. The report of a Round Table of Central 
Cities was also published in 1993. It documented the problems of intermunicipal competition central cities 
faced within their own urban agglomeration. The report asked for a series of specific measures including 
planning, service co-ordination and municipal restructuring. For two years, the government had responded 
with more study committees, which were unable to reconcile the points of view and issued separate reports. 
Then, to the surprise of many, the government appeared to come down clearly on the side of central cities 
in its original transfer of responsibilities proposal. So far, it has managed to hold on to that position despite 
all the attempts to distract it with other propositions. But it has yet to say anything that would address the 
problem of municipal fragmentation in urban areas. At the same time, it is fiddling with side issues such as 
redrawing the school board map and reducing by half the number of school boards, from about 150 to about 
70. 
There does not seem to be any view of where local government should be going, whether its role and 
functions should be broadened, how it should be structured and financed, what should be its relationships to 
government and to other institutional networks, in the education and social affairs fields for instance, also 
present everywhere in Quebec. In that context, there is a wait and see attitude, the future of municipal 
restructuring having to be peered at in a cloudy crystal ball. 
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Elizabeth Mclaren 
INTRODUCTION 
Some thoughts on governance reform in city-regions: 
First It's difficult! 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Last 
Similar challenges facing city regions in North America 
Different solutions-No one right solution 
It keeps evolving 
It's difficult! 
OVERVIEW 
Biii103-City of Toronto Act, 1997 
Bill 148-City ofT oronto Act 2, 1997 
Greater Toronto Services Board 
BILL 1 03-THE CITY OF TORONTO ACT 1997 
Introduced December 17, 1996--Third Reading and Royal Assent on April 21st 
Foundation Legislation to: 
State Government's intent-to replace the seven existing municipalities (Metro, Toronto, 
North York, Etobicoke, Scarborough, East York and York) with one new city 
Ensure 1997 Municipal Elections could continue as usual 
Provide for an orderly transition 
Creates the new City ofT oronto-January 1, 1998 
56 Councillors, Mayor elected at large 
BACKGROUND 
Culmination of several years of intense discussion about governance issues in the Greater Toronto 
Area 
Work of my office, GTA Task Force Report, and other reports; numerous responses provided many 
possible options 
Two prime conclusions: 
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McLaren Governance Reform in the Greater Toronto Area 
No one was satisfied with the status quo 
There was no consensus on what the solution was 
The Government wanted the reforms in place for the upcoming 1997 Municipal Elections 
Toronto is already in fact one city 
One large contiguous urban area-no change in boundaries, no new population, no merging of urban 
and rural areas 
Decision was to continue the process begun in 1954 by completing the evolution to one municipality 
Any other decision could have resulted in keeping the existing six municipalities or splitting up the 
already amalgamated services into six or four; or setting up special purpose bodies to administer 
those services at a time when special purpose bodies are being eliminated 
WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNIFY TORONTO 
A Improved economic development potential: one unified Toronto would be presented to business 
investors-not six cities competing for the same prospects 
B. One strong Council and one Mayor-not seven competing voices 
C. Better political accountability-Taxpayers will not have to deal with two levels of government, only 
one. 
D. Savings: Taxpayers can save up to $865 million over three years and $300 million every year 
thereafter. Seven to one logically means savings. 
E. An end to duplication and waste-one fire department, not six; one roads department, not seven; one 
parks department, etc. 
F. More than 72 percent of the funds spent on services are already amalgamated. Police, Public 
Transit, Social Services and Ambulances already operate across the whole region. 
G. A solid GTA core. A strong centre to an area that really is Ontario's economic engine. One Toronto 
will have the population, political representation and clout to ensure the GT A continues to thrive and 
grow into the twenty-first century. 
DETAILS 
1. Financial Advisory Board (3 Members) 
Duties: 
1. Consider 1997 operating and capital budgets; 
2. Establish and publish guidelines with respect to Human Resources, Finances and other 
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areas as deemed necessary; 
Section 14 prohibits existing councils from doing certain things during the transition year: 
Buying or selling a property worth over $100,000 
Using Reserve Accounts for other purposes 
Incurring a financial liability that extends into 1998 
Making payments in connection with Termination of Employment 
Hiring new employees 
Board can consider requests for approval to carry out these actions and grant them when the Board 
considers it appropriate. 
Discussion: 
Published guidelines on Human Resources, Finances, Information Technology and long term 
contracts 
FAB commented on the Capital and Operating Budgets 
Concern expressed with respect to Phase I of Budget Review in connection with rate 
of depletion of Reserve and Reserve Funds across all municipalities. ($129 million) 
less at year end 1997 compared to year end 1996. 
Applications Review under Subsection 14{2) of the City of Toronto Act, 1997 
Board received 304 applications; 176 approved; 108 did not require approval or were 
information items; 18 applications under review and two not approved. 
Quarterly Reports (2nd, 3rd and 4th Quarters) 
Second Quarter reports received and no concerns noted by the Board 
Third Quarter reports under review 
Final Report 
Final Report to the Minister in January 1998 
2. Transition Team (6 Members) 
Duties: 
1 . Make recommendations to the Minister on further legislative changes that will be needed to 
implement the new city; 
2. Establish the key elements of the new city's organizational structure; 
3. Hire department heads and other key employees; 
4. Hold public consultations and make recommendations to the new council re: neighbourhood 
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committees, functions to be assigned to the Community Councils and the Executive 
Committee; rationalization and integration of municipal services across the new city, and 
other transitional issues. 
5. Prepare and make recommendations to the new City Council on a Draft 1998 Budget for the 
City. 
6. Make recommendations to the new City Council on remuneration of Mayor, Councillors and 
senior staff. 
Discussion: 
26 Project T earns 
700-800 staff involved 
carried out public consultation on role of Community Councils 
on-going surveys of public opinion 
have completed interviews for new CAO 
starting interviews for other key staff 
Interim Report on all of its recommendations in early October 
Draft 1998 Budget for the new city will be done in November 
3. Community Councils and Neighbourhood Committees 
What Bill 103 provides: 
Six Community Councils-one for each existing lower tier 
Councils composed of local politicians who choose their Chair from among themselves 
Chairs of six Community Councils plus Mayor will form an Executive Committee 
Council may delegate some decision making power to Community Councils, such as local 
recreation facilities and local planning issues 
Council may also establish Neighbourhood Communities to advise the Community Councils 
Council can change the boundaries and the number of Community Councils or abolish them 
altogether 
Council can also empower Community Councils by by-laws 
As I have already noted, Transition Team will provide advice in this regard. 
Why Community Councils? 
Community Councils were not included in the Legislation as originally introduced but were 
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added in response to many comments received during the hearing process regarding local 
identity and access to Councillors. 
Area-based committees of Council are unusual (except here in Winnipeg) and are virtually 
unknown outside Canada. 
What Do We Know about Community Councils and Neighbourhood Committees? 
The Canadian Urban Institute did research funded by GT A office on the subject. Title of 
report-"Community Councils and Neighbourhood Committees: Lessons for Our 
Communities from Around the World." 
Reviewed Winnipeg and Halifax 
Found Community Councils in Winnipeg had received mixed reviews but that they still 
existed, indicating some support 
The Residents' Advisory Groups in Winnipeg have not received the support necessary for 
the long term. 
In Halifax, the Community Council system is promising but relatively untested. 
Some of the lessons drawn from the Report: 
Community Councils, as a vehicle for addressing community concerns over the long 
term, have had uneven results. This may depend on the way in which they are 
structured and the responsibilities they are given. 
The larger the geographic area represented by a Community Council the greater 
should be their responsibility 
Access to the local Councillor is important 
Strong and effective Community Councils may not be compatible with strong and 
independent Neighbourhood Committees 
Every municipality is different with a distinct local identity, but lessons learned in one 
locale will assist others 
There is a need for municipalities to monitor experiences in other jurisdictions in 
order to build a system which best meets local needs. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
The Act (Bill 1 03) was challenged on two grounds: 
1. The Act violates rights guaranteed by SS. 2(8)(0), 7, 8 & 15(1) of the "Canadian Charter of 
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Rights and Freedoms." 
2. The actions of the legislature disregarded the local democratic autonomy of the 
Municipalities and thereby exceeded the powers conferred on it by S.92(8) of the Constitution 
Act, 1967-to enact laws in relation to "Municipal Institutions in the Province." 
Heard-July 7-10, 1997 before Judge Borins. 
JUDGEMENT 
Rejected the first grounds, the Charter Challenge, however, an appeal has been filed and will be 
heard on October 6, 1997. 
I will touch briefly on second ground-the area of most concern to all Provinces 
The Province did not exceed the powers conferred on it by S.92(8) of the Constitution Act 
While in Judge's opinion, the Government did not enter into any meaningful consultation, he stated 
that it is the prerogative of Government 
Confirmed four principles which apply to the constitutional status of Municipal Governments: 
1. Municipal institutions lack constitutional status; 
2. Municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if Provincial legislation 
so provides; 
3. Municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are subject to 
abolition or repeal by Provincial legislation; 
4. Municipal institutions may exercise only those powers which are conferred upon them by 
Statute. 
Municipalities may not like these principles, but they are what the current law provides. 
BILL 148-CITY OF TORONTO ACT 2: COMPANION PIECE TO BILL 103 
Introduced June 26, 1997-replaces Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act 
This Bill, while largely operational in nature, will ensure that the day-to-day services people use will 
still be in place when the new City of Toronto comes into being on January 1, 1998. 
Bill ensures important local boards and commissions continue to exist-TTC, CNE, the Zoo 
Bill continues the services available to all residents of the City ofT oronto such as ambulance services 
and homes for the aged 
The pension and benefits of municipal and local board employees and retirees is protected. 
Specific transitional issues are dealt with. As an example, official plans of former municipalities will 
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continue until Council wishes to adopt a new plan. 
The Bill allows the new Council to examine the financial picture and service levels in existing 
municipalities and take steps to address any imbalances. 
GREATER TORONTO SERVICES BOARD 
WHAT IS THE GREATER TORONTO AREA (THE GTA)? 
Metro Toronto, Halton, Peel, York and Durham 
five regions, 30 lower tier municipalities 
4.2 million people = 42 percent of provincial population-2700 square miles 
Population expected to grow to 6.7 million by 2021 
Roughly half in Metro; other half spread across the regions 
Metro created in 1954-13 municipalities, consolidated in 1967 to six municipalities 
Four regions created between 1971 and 197 4 
Local municipalities reduced from 64 to current 24 
Regions created in a period of strong growth 
Regions were to plan, finance and deliver services in an efficient and timely manner to support growth 
A NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION 
Need for service delivery co-ordination has been acknowledged by successive Provincial 
Governments since the late 1980s 
Office for the Greater Toronto Area set up to promote inter-regional co-operation on issues such as 
macro-level planning and infrastructure co-ordination 
GT A Mayors and Regional Chairs Committee co-ordinates servicing across the GT A but have no 
authority to enforce decisions 
Various studies have indicated the issues that lead to the creation of regional governments have risen 
again over a wider geographic area: 
THE PROCESS 
Growth spilling over local boundaries 
Need to share tax base to extend infrastructure 
Lack of integration of services 
Special Advisor, Milt Farrow was appointed December 17, 1996 
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Asked to undertake a consultation on what GTSB might look like and what it might do 
Discussion Paper released in February 
Written comments submitted 
Final Report, "Getting Together," was released in June 
Comments on Report were to be submitted by July 31st 
Government still considering the Report 
"GETTING TOGETHER" THE GOAL 
A. The Greater Toronto Services Board should be created to: 
sustain and enhance the quality of life in the GT A 
support the GT A as a dynamic, interdependent and vital economic entity 
B. Its primary roles would be to: 
develop an Infrastructure Co-ordination Strategy 
provide a discussion forum and liaison with other levels of Government 
resolve inter-regional disputes 
operate GO Transit 
provide a long-term Waste Management Strategy for GT A 
CONCLUSION 
Reiterate five opening comments about municipal restructuring: 
1. It's difficult! 
2. Cities face similar challenges 
3. No one right solution 
4. Constantly evolves 
5. It's difficult! 
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Richard C. Rounds 
Both single-tier (horizontally fragmented) and multi-tier (vertically fragmented) municipal governments 
are common in Canada. Both structures have advantages and disadvantages. 
Inherent in the single-tier system used in Manitoba are the following attributes: 
1. Relationships among neighbouring municipalities wherein population distribution and different levels 
of service, economic activity and tax revenues create inequities, often create differences between an 
urban centre and surrounding rural areas. 
2. Fragmentation and the need to deliver services on a regional basis has led to proliferation of joint 
agreements and special service agencies and commissions. 
3. Conflict between pressures for consolidation and the desire for accessible and responsible municipal 
government at the local level. 
Single tier systems are most common and widespread in Canada, but the three most populous 
provinces have multi-tier systems (Ontario, Quebec, B.C.). 
When faced with changes in population, economic activity and revenue, municipalities are presented 
with three options: ( 1) maintaining the status quo; (2) consolidation; (3) adopting a modified multi-tiered 
system. The over-riding question, since municipal governments are creatures of provincial governments, is 
"what role does the provincial government see for its municipalities?" This involves questions relating to: 
1. Decentralization of powers 
2. Service delivery responsibilities 
3. Financial independence and viability 
Most change has occurred in large urban centres, and most decisions favour urban centres. Rural 
areas, however, are very resilient, and when left to their own devices, usually find ways to preserve their 
identities and strengthen their situations. Rural depopulation, however, continues to add pressure to rural 
areas everywhere except surrounding major urban centres. These pressures are now being compounded 
by the downloading of responsibilities and costs by senior governments that are seeking fiscal restraints owing 
to debt levels. 
Decreases in conditional, unconditional and capital grants from senior government result in either or 
both increased costs to local government or decreased provision of services to rural people. This creates 
constant pressure for increased efficiency and effectiveness at the municipal level. Purse-tightening at senior 
levels is a pattern that likely will continue for some time, so the reactions required at the local level will 
continue to add pressure to local governments. The search for solutions, therefore, will be on-going. 
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Municipal governments are required by senior governments to keep balanced budgets. Thus, there 
are no staggering debts at the local level. In turn, this limits the entrepreneurial possibilities of local 
governments at a time when they may have to change their ways of doing business in order to be "more 
effective and more efficient." Although some relaxation has been occurring in the limits on borrowing, etc., 
the truth is that fiscal responsibility has served municipal governments well, and most remain viable in spite 
of changing environments. 
In total, however, fiscal responsibility is only one part of the question of change in municipal 
government. Other significant components involved in future municipal government include questions of: 
1. identity 
2. levels of service 
3. local autonomy 
4. tax equity, and 
5. roles within evolving regional structures. 
EVOLVING REGIONALISM 
The last 20 years have brought many changes in the governance of rural Manitoba, if not in structure, 
then certainly in function. Although not an official policy, regionalism has been viewed as the most efficient 
and effective way to deliver some services to expansive rural areas with limited population. Planning Districts 
were formed by two or more municipalities to deal with common concerns related to land-use development 
and other factors. Conservation Districts range from large to small and are based on natural watersheds that 
transcend municipal boundaries and may even include only portions of some municipalities. These deal with 
water, soil and wildlife conservation, and often involve public-private partnerships with even broader 
mandates. School Districts have long involved complex and changing spatial dimensions that involve many 
separate municipal governments. The provision of infrastructure, such as piped water and natural gas are 
increasingly taking on regional dimensions. Currently, Health Districts are being established to deliver 
services to regions. Although many of these responsibilities never did accrue to municipalities, they all have 
fiscal and political dimensions that do involve local government. 
In essence, although little change has occurred in the local government structures in rural Manitoba, 
a complex system of special services agreements has evolved to accommodate changing needs to deliver 
some services to extra-municipal areas. If these continue to increase, there may come a time when a second 
tier of government naturally evolves-be it county or regional. To date, however, rural Manitobans have been 
content to work with partnerships to accommodate change. 
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Should special services agreements continue to increase, however, and citizens view larger units as 
more effective forms of government, there will be a whole new set of issues to face. First, giving up long-
established identities, either as rural areas or small towns and villages, will create a cumbersome "name-
game." Getting past long-established competitiveness among areas will be particularly problematic. Second, 
few of the special services agreements have coincident boundaries, forming a complex set of partnerships 
that best serve a specific purpose. It is doubtful that any combination of current municipal government units 
would form a "natural" larger unit. School divisions, conservation districts and provincial administrative regions 
are expansive, whereas planning districts and water pipeline systems tend to be spatially restricted. The 
issues facing the regionalization of waste management in the last five years reflect these challenges. 
Although cost is a major concern, tradition and convenience also are important. Even the "location" of a 
regional landfill site becomes highly competitive from a community economic development perspective. 
EXAMPLES OF MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION 
Case studies across Canada suggest that there are a variety of reasons why municipalities have 
decided to consolidate. As a working premise, it can be stated that studies do not clearly demonstrate or 
automatically support the argument that consolidation will decrease the costs of delivery of services. In a 
similar vein, no two provinces deal with their municipalities in the same way, and some view decentralization 
of power to local government as the most effective approach, while others are retaining or increasing 
provincial control. 
ALBERTA 
The Village of Wildwood was struggling to remain fiscally viable. With a 1991 population of about 300, 
the Village lacked a sufficient commercial and assessment base, had a declining population, had long term 
debts (at provincial limit), faced major upgrading of infrastructure and equipment and had declining grant 
revenue. Citizens were faced with and concerned about rising taxes and declining services. The villages' 
attendant rural area (Improvement District) had a much better revenue base and much higher population. By 
disincorporating, village residents would reduce their taxes by one third, even with a special debt recovery 
levy. The Improvement District, conversely, was only minimally effected by absorbing the Village. The Village 
voted to dissolve into a hamlet within the ID, but retained its name. The process was rapid and reasonably 
painless, partly because the answer was obvious. 
In Fort Assiniboine, a village·of 216 persons in 1991, some residents petitioned the council to dissolve 
the Village. A study identified: (1) dissatisfaction with the current municipal government; (2) the perception 
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that services would improve with dissolution; and (3) a feeling that taxation might be reduced. The tax levy 
per person was on par with the average for villagers throughout Alberta, the debt per person was below the 
provincial average, and money was available for borrowing. Folding into the surrounding 10 would not 
appreciably change the tax level for villagers, but it also would not impact the 10 negatively. Faced with future 
infrastructure improvement costs, and not supporting the current administration, the Villagers voted to 
dissolve. In both Alberta cases, therefore, the move to change local government was initiated by the 
residents. 
SASKATCHEWAN 
Two very different case studies occurred in Saskatchewan. Two rural municipalities north of the 
Battlefords, Greenfield and Mervin, amalgamated in 1990. Greenfield had substantial debt and problems in 
maintaining services and operations. At the time of consolidation, Greenfield had 480 residents and Mervin 
had 840. Both had a reeve and full councils, and provided necessary services. Both original municipalities 
had declining populations and grants, but Greenfield was in poorer circumstances than Mervin. Joint service 
agreements, a split of Greenfield into halves to join two separate municipalities and the formal consolidation 
of the two existing governments were options. The two councils agreed upon merger. Two councils were 
reduced to one, some reductions were made in administrative staff, and some equipment and labour savings 
accrued. Although substantial economies were not achieved, the new RM of Mervin was able to operate 
without deficit. The consolidation process was initiated by the municipalities, but government played a key 
role in facilitation. 
An early restructuring of local government occurred in the Saskatoon area in 1970. As Saskatoon 
expanded, the tendency was to annex pieces of adjacent land into the city. Three RMs surrounded Saskatoon 
in 1970: Cory, Park and Warman. Cory had a good tax base and low mill rates, but Park and Warman were 
primarily agricultural areas. To avoid being annexed either piecemeal or in one big land/revenue grab, the 
three municipalities decided to consolidate into one government (Corman Park) to effectively deal with 
pressures from the City. Warman actually split in half, with the southern portion adjacent to Saskatoon joining 
Corman Park, and portions of the northern half joining two other municipalities. 
Prior to consolidation the mill rates varied widely (Cory 14 mills, Park 35 mills and Warman 43 mills). 
To avoid dramatic increases in Cory a 15-year, phased-in mill rate formula was devised. A target of 31 mills 
was set for all residents of Corman Park after 15 years. The phase-in differential was supported by using 
existing differences in assets as offset. In essence, therefore, Corman Park was able to negotiate agreeable 
terms with all three original municipalities and establish a position to challenge Saskatoon. 
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ONTARIO 
In 1993, a new municipal government was formed when the Village of Rodney (1000 residents) 
consolidated with the Towns hip of Aldborough (2500 residents). Another village, West Lome ( 1300 residents), 
voted not to join. All these local governments are within the County of Elgin in a two-tier system of local 
government. Population in the area was increasing at about one percent per year. 
The primary drive behind consolidation was the perception that one larger/stronger unit with a broader 
tax base could more effectively attract development. Competition among fragmented governments would be 
reduced. Twenty public meetings were held to discuss the issue, and consensus in Rodney and Aldborough 
was reached without a referendum. 
During the process, a number of duplicated services were identified, and cost efficiencies recognized, 
including savings (primarily legal fees) in negotiating shared services agreements that were in effect. Where 
differential costs occurred among residents of the original municipalities, compromises were offered to 
equalize any major shifts. A provincial grant of $144,000 was provided to assist administrative restructuring. 
A marginal decrease in expenditures was realized following consolidation. 
In a 1991 Ontario example, the Town of New Tecumseth evolved from the former municipalities of 
Alliston, Beeton, Tecumseth and Tottenham. Lying within the Toronto commutershed, this example reflects 
two major differences from all other case studies: ( 1) a large population of more than 20,000 residents; and 
(2) the consolidation was legislated by the province. Development pressures and the proposed expansion 
of a new Honda plant in the municipality forced resolution of five unresolved annexation applications and other 
boundary adjustments. A major study reviewed input and advice from the Town ofTecumseth, villages and 
townships in the area and the County of Simcoe. Land-use conflicts, fringe development, preservation of farm 
land, water and sewer concerns, local government structures, and the location and type of future growth all 
were on the table. 
Once the province ordered consolidation, attention turned to how to make the "forced marriage" work. 
A strategic plan was used to work through the issues and focus concerns on the future. 
OVERVIEW 
Much attention has been given recently to municipal reform, but few actual consolidations have 
occurred. Many provinces have (or are) reviewing and revising their municipal legislation, with the 
government thrust being that of allowing or even encouraging consolidation of the historically fragmented local 
governments across Canada. Although municipalities remain under the control of the provinces, forcing 
change is not viewed as a viable option in all but rare cases. New legislation, however, has loosened control 
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considerably, opening the door for change, offering process assistance, and attempting to work out financial 
arrangements that mitigate real or perceived losses among municipalities involved. 
Manitoba has revised its Municipal Act over the last three years to include most of the general options 
viewed as most important to effecting change. The first formal process is underway with the Town of Killarney 
and its surrounding Rural Municipality of Turtle Mountain actively reviewing the pros and cons of forming one 
local government. A long history of cordial relations between the two municipalities will assist the process. 
Major concerns, however, will revolve around traditional identity, the fact that the RM has only half of the 
population of the Town, and differences in taxation and assets. The first case study in Manitoba may well set 
precedents for future consolidation-whether successful or not. 
77 

PART FIVE 
URBAN GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY -FIRST CENTURY 

URBAN GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Warren Magnusson 
The idea of "urban governance" is an odd one. The term is intended to release us from prior 
assumptions: to break the connections both between "the city" and "the urban" and between "government" 
and "governance." These are-or can be-liberating moves: ones that enable us to think differently about 
old subjects. However, the injunction to think about these matters in relation to the twenty-first century-the 
century to come, rather than the century that is past-is an indicator that we need to be even more sceptical 
about the terms of our thinking than the phrase, "urban governance," actually allows. I want to suggest that 
we have to make at least three other moves, to open our minds to the challenges of the coming decades. 
First, we need to go beyond the old idea that "the urban" can be understood in terms of "metropolitan 
areas," and to recognize that our urban world-unlike the urban world of the 1920s or even the 1960s-really 
is global. Terms like "the nef' or "hyperspace" may help us to conceptualize this new reality; however, these 
terms are rather inadequate metaphors for relations that people experience daily-the business call to 
Germany, the lunch with Japanese visitors at the local Ethiopian restaurant, the jog about the park in one's 
Indonesian (or is that American?) Nikes. We all know that things have changed in ways that Marshall 
Mcluhan had just begun to conceptualize thirty years ago, when I was a university student here in Winnipeg. 
And yet, we cling nostalgically to the idea that "the metropolis"-a term invented more than a hundred years 
ago to make sense of an urban reality that spilled over from the cities into the suburbs and the surrounding 
rural areas-somehow contains the urban world in which we live. The idea that our lives can be understood 
in terms of the geographical containers that enclose them, that what we are and that what we need to do 
collectively can somehow be firmly bounded and thus centred in a place where we can act-this idea is a 
persistent one. It is the idea that informs the dream of the nation-state and (by extension) the dream of 
Unicity. It is an idea that we will have to abandon. 
The second move that we need to make is to go beyond the notion of "governance" to recapture a 
conception of "politics." Politics and politicians are in bad odour now, because people sense that what is on 
offer under these labels is a fraud. Political debate is supposed to be about the direction of our lives, the 
condition of our existence. It is supposed to enable us to determine who we are, what we want, and, most 
importantly, what sort of beings we ought to be, what sort of society or community we ought to have. 
Politicians are supposed to help us clarify our options. In choosing which of our politicians are to lead us, we 
are empowering governments that can take us in the direction that makes most sense to us, in terms of our 
most basic understandings of what we are and what we need to be. Unfortunately, it seems that these 
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governments are largely impotent, and that "politics" mostly consists of a series of marketing efforts for 
products that are never delivered. No wonder that people become cynical. The term "governance" is 
supposed to draw our attention to the fact that the business of commanding and disciplining people is shared 
by many agencies that are not supposed to be "governments." Some of these agencies pass themselves off 
as "businesses," others as "universities" or "hospitals." All of them seem part of a system of "governance." 
It is a system that penetrates our lives in innumerable ways. What we lack are not effective systems of 
governance-the current ones are all too effective-but rather effective political systems that might enable 
us to become other than what we now are. 
The third move we need to make is to recover a sense of ourselves as more than economic beings. 
For much of this century, liberals, socialists, and other progressives dominated political thought. This 
predominance was partly an effect of their successful critiques of crude bourgeois thinking. That was the sort 
of thinking that reduced "man" to an economic actor whose interactions could be regulated by the market. 
Although the development of state management in the twentieth century owed much to the economic failures 
of capitalism (and to the economic inequalities associated with its successes), it was also prompted by a 
sense that a society had to be more than a collection of individuals competing for economic gain. As the hold 
of the traditional religions weakened, it became more apparent that "society" required a moral purpose that 
went beyond any consideration of economic gain. That purpose might be articulated within a dream of 
national or ethnic supremacy, inspired by notions of military virtue and the thrill of violence. Alternatively, and 
more hopefully, it might be articulated in a vision of compassion and solidarity. Thus it was that the old CCF 
held the moral high ground in Canadian politics. However, the failures of state welfare and state economic 
management have allowed for a vigorous re-articulation of the old bourgeois notion that society is nothing but 
a set of economic relations between individuals and that any attempt to make it more than that is ultimately 
pernicious. In turn, this has allowed for the re-assertion of apolitical and sectarian moralisms that fill the 
vacuum left by the collapse of social democracy. These rival moralisms occupy the space for politics in a 
world where political conceptions of self and society have been consistently denigrated in favour of a narrow, 
economistic conception of humanity. The ugliness, violence, and moral self-righteousness of the 
contemporary urban world is a predictable effect of the effort to reduce us to the sort of beings who are 
represented in the economics textbooks. 
What I am suggesting, then, is a three-fold move: away from an economistic conception of self and 
society, away from an apolitical conception of governance, and away from a conception of the urban as a 
mode of containment. Let me relate these ideas to the question of governance in and for Winnipeg. 
Unicity was the product of a social democratic dream. It was an effort to bring down to the level of 
the city or the urban region a conception of governance-and hence of politics-that had been articulated 
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earlier at the level of the nation-state. There was a return to origins involved in this, since many of the early 
social democrats (the Fabians especially) had thought of the welfare state as an ensemble of lesser 
authorities, each rooted in a local or regional community. The dream of rationalizing local government had 
long been a part of the aims of social democracy. Unicity was crucial because it showed how a determined 
social democratic government could bring the appropriate institutions of local government into effect: 
institutions that would enable the people of an entire urban region to decide democratically on the direction 
the region should take. The aim was to establish for the first time real political equality at the local level, by 
removing the main bastions of class privilege (the suburbs) and facilitating the formation of genuine political 
parties. The new politics of Unicity would thus be marked by a struggle between those who sought to extend 
social democracy and those who wanted to restrain it in the name of traditional values. Of course, it did not 
work out this way. The politics of the "new" Winnipeg was very like the politics of the "old" Winnipeg, except 
that the city was bigger and the downtown less significant than it was formerly. What remained of the dream 
was a particular, now heavily institutionalized conception of Winnipeg as an urban region. And, this 
conception was ultimately elided with the notion of Winnipeg as a business corporation. 
The idea that a municipality is just a glorified business is a very old one: We certainly can trace it back 
to medieval times. It is the sort of idea that can be embraced both for purposes of critique and for purposes 
of celebration. I came across it first in the late '60s and early '70s, in the work of critics like Jim Lorimer and 
politicians like John Sewell: people who clearly thought that it was a bad thing for municipalities to act as if 
they were businesses. These critics pointed out that business leaders seemed to think that they "owned" the 
municipalities where they lived or where they operated their businesses, and that the whole point of municipal 
government was just to promote more business. NaTfs that they were, Lorimer, Sewell, and all the other 
"reformers" of that era were shocked by the idea that people could treat democratic governments-which were 
supposed to be for everyone and to serve a whole variety of purposes-as if they were adjuncts of the 
chamber of commerce. Little did they expect that the "traditionalists" would embrace what was supposed to 
be a criticism with such obvious relish, and begin celebrating their own activities with all the chutzpah of 
nineteenth century railway barons. Twenty years later, the marriage of business and government could be 
presented as so natural and necessary that it hardly elicited any comment. 
In this context, the idea of the urban region plays a particular part in legitimating the equation of the 
municipality with the chamber of commerce. The two become one flesh because the "city" is conceived as 
an entrepreneurial entity that occupies a particular space. The "city" is no longer centred downtown, so much 
as it is centred in the board-rooms of the corporations and business associations that work with the 
municipality-conceived as an arms-length public agency belonging to them all, collectively-in articulating 
"strategies" for the region as a whole. Elections are of course important in legitimating this network of power, 
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but they have relatively little impact on the course of events. The system of urban governance is complex, 
and the municipality is but one agency in that system. The public sector as a whole is only a part of the 
system. What the idea-and institutional form-of "Winnipeg" or "Toronto" or "Montreal" does in this context 
is to provide legitimation for activities that have relatively little to do with these idealized "communities" and 
much to do with the aspirations of particular business elites. The three-fold collapse that I have earlier noted 
-of urban reality into a self-contained region, of politics into a model of apolitical governance, and of humanity 
into economic man-is the condition of possibility for this rather pernicious situation. 
I betray my biases when I use a word like "pernicious." However, I do more than that, for I invoke a 
sense of unease that is shared by many who are not nostalgic for the era of social democracy. The 
hollowness of contemporary municipal politics is not unique: We sense the same hollowness elsewhere. 
There are signs of an unsatiated yearning in events as diverse as the response to the death of Diana and the 
sudden, unexpected popular resistance to neo-conservatism, which has been apparent both in opinion polls 
and recent electoral results. Social democrats have been disappointed by the continuing resistance to their 
own attempts to capture this yearning. Gestures at multi-culturalism and the politics of difference seem like 
symptoms of the problem, rather than solutions to it. The sense of a lost centre of secular meaning weighs 
heavily over the politics of our time, and it is by no means only those who have thought of themselves as 
"progressive" who respond uneasily to the situation. "Family values" and "traditional morality" are in the end 
no substitutes for politics. 
To speak of "politics" is to speak of what is not subject to governance, what is beyond the commands 
and the disciplines, what is prior to self and society, prior to religion and morality and "economic man." We 
become what we are politically. We are not such and so by genetic inheritance, nor are we "socialized" into 
our roles: these depoliticized conceptions of how we become what we are, are ideological misreadings that 
mystify our relation to ourselves. That relation is actually a political relation, to which we must bring a political 
understanding. This is not to say that the politics of the self is played out in isolation: on the contrary. The 
politics of the self and the politics of society are inextricable, and indeed it is only in a certain political situation 
that one can make an intelligible distinction between self and society. The point is that what we are, 
individually and socially, is politically determined, and the process of political determination is not something 
that occurs outside us, but rather within and through us. Our politics is what we think, what we do, how we 
are; by being, doing, and thinking in certain ways we enforce particular possibilities on one another. To insist 
that these processes are political and not simply social is to say that they cannot be understood apart from 
the human capacity for creative action. It is this capacity-which is expressed in resistance, indiscipline, and 
innovation; in the unexpected connection and the new possibility; in the moment of declaring that we can be 
other than what we are, and acting upon that declaration-which ultimately distinguishes the political and gives 
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it its place as the primordial human reality: that from which religion, morality, and even economics spring. 
To centre the political is not to centre the state. On the contrary, it is to resist the ideological moves 
that put politics over there, in a neat container safely removed from everyday life. It is to insist on the political 
character of the market and to name as "governmental" those shadowy "businesses" that dominate so much 
of what we do. It is also to insist on the political character of the institutions that incarcerate the young and 
the old, the sick and the "dysfunctional." It is to name as political what passes as governance, but it is also 
to identify much else under the same rubric. It is to resist the naturalization of relations of power that might 
well be other than what they are, and to insist that these relations be brought under the sign of politics so that 
we can examine how they have come to be, how they are sustained, and how and why they might be 
changed. 
So: what are we to make of "the urban" in this context? What is central to it, is in a way what is central 
to politics. We denote by the urban those centres of human activity-more accurately, that mode of human 
activity-that enable the transformation, the humanization of the natural environment. If the ''wild" and the 
"natural" are at one end of a spectrum and the "rural" and the "pastoral" are the middle terms, then the "urban" 
is at the other end. In the domain of the urban, our physical environment is so obviously our own creation that 
we begin to imagine ourselves as in control of nature itself. That this leads to hubris is obvious: The present 
concerns of the environmental movement about the effects of that hubris are largely valid. However, it is only 
through a political process that we can come to grips with the effects of our own arrogance and learn to limit 
ourselves for our own sake and for the sake of other species. The urban is the domain of human self-making 
carried to its logical extreme, and as such it is the domain in which political consciousness is most necessary. 
To be politically conscious in this sense is to be aware that what we are and what we do is the effect of 
political choices: to know, for instance, that the global market is as much a political construct as the nation-
state, and that what we describe as religions or moralities are effects of our political choices. To think 
politically is to politicize the urban, for urbanism is the ultimate expression of our political choices: it is that 
which we make as we exercise our own transformative capacities. 
What is most evident now is that there is no "outside" to the urban. What has been set apart as an 
"outside"-the parks and wilderness reserves, the idyllic villages and farms between the cities-is as 
thoroughly colonized as what is ostensibly within. There is no "outside" outside: even the terrain beyond the 
atmosphere is littered with our satellites, space stations, and unwanted garbage. So: to think of the urban is 
not to think of particular regions, but rather of a mode of human life that extends everywhere on Earth and 
implicates everyone in it. In this urban to which there is no beyond, there are processes of governance that 
we have scarcely begun to identify. The task of naming these processes, questioning these processes, and 
calling ourselves to account in relation to them is the most pressing political task of our time. It is to this 
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task-and not simply to the problems of "economic management" or "service delivery"-that we are called 
when the question of urban governance for the twenty-first century is raised. 
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URBAN GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
WHAT THE UNICITY EXPERIENCE TELLS US 
Greg Selinger 
INTRODUCTION 
As we enter the twenty-first century, effective urban governance will continue to be problematic in a 
federal state such as Canada. Provincial governments are unlikely to yield the authority and resources that 
cities need to address the problems they experience. Federal government spending will be targeted to cash 
credits or transfers directly to individuals and families in order to increase federal government legitimacy with 
Canadians and to bypass provincial governments. The corporate globalization agenda will demand tax 
concessions and greater privatization of services delivered by urban governments. Cities will priorize their 
strained budgets to stimulate economic development by attracting new corporate investment. Technological 
innovations will create job losses as computers displace low-skill workers. Urban issues such as poverty and 
inequality, safety and security, inner-city and downtown deterioration will lead to exurban citizen flight. As a 
consequence, healthy neighbourhoods will be difficult to sustain. 
In the midst of these trends, urban governance has become more centralized and less representative 
of and responsive to citizens. 
This paper will examine how we have arrived at this point by examining the evolution of Winnipeg's 
Unicity from a citizen perspective on urban governance. It will then discuss some of the organizational and 
political challenges that will have to be overcome to enable urban governance to respond to the challenges 
it faces. It will argue for a structure and process of urban governance that addresses regional issues, while 
facilitating civic engagement at the neighbourhood and community level. 
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF WINNIPEG'S UNICITY 
PHASE 1: 1970 TO 1975-THE BLOOM COMES OFF THE ROSE 
When the New Democratic government of Ed Schreyer published its "Proposals for Urban 
Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area" in late 1970, it stated that "almost all of the urban area's 
difficulties stem, in whole or in part, from three main roots-fragmented authority, segmented financial 
capacity, and lack of citizen involvement" (pp. 4-6). 
Consequently, the Unicity legislation sought to remedy these barriers to effective urban government 
by first unifying the authority for the services delivered by the 13 existing municipalities and the metropolitan-
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wide second tier of government; by equalizing the tax mill rates; and by devising several innovative 
institutional features to encourage citizen participation in the new reduced and amalgamated 50-member city 
council (that replaced the 112 elected officials from the previous two-tier system of metropolitan government). 
The Board of Commissioners led by the Chief Commissioner became the new unified administrative 
authority for all the services that were amalgamated under the Unicity legislation. The equalization of the 
municipal mill rates was softened by generous transition payments from the provincial government. This 
minimized any tax disruption from the new Unicity, but also allowed a layered bureaucratic structure to absorb 
all the public employees without any financial pressure for streamlining the public service. 
The governance structure divided City Council into eight Community Committee areas that grouped 
councillors, who each represented some 10-12,000 citizens, roughly along the lines of the former 
municipalities, to govern on local matters such as recreation, local civic works and services within the budget 
and policies set by Council as a whole. As well Community Committees would hear zoning, variance, and 
conditional use applications, and make recommendations to the standing committees of City Council. To 
assist the Community Committees, the legislation provided for Resident Advisory Groups (RAGs) to be 
elected at an annual meeting of the Community Committee. The RAGs were intended to ensure grassroots 
citizen participation in the decentralized Community Committee structure. 
The Standing Committees were the second tier of the Unicity structure. They were legislatively 
required and were intended as a vehicle to hear broader policy matters in particular fields of civic responsibility 
such as planning, finance, recreation and parks, and works and civic operations such as the municipal utilities. 
The third tier for consideration and participation on civic affairs was legislated to be the Executive 
Policy Committee. It was composed of the Deputy Mayor and the Standing Committee chairs, all elected by 
the majority of councillors. The Mayor was an ex-officio member of all committees. 
The fourth and final level of civic decision making and avenue of citizen participation was the City 
Council. Chaired by the Mayor, it made the final decision on all budget, policy and zoning matters coming up 
through the other three levels of governance. The original provincial proposals contemplated that the Mayor 
of Unicity would be elected by the Councillors and therefore accountable to them for the leadership he or she 
provided. 
Compared to a provincial government system where bills are heard in committees, the only official 
access point for citizens, the Unicity governance structure provided four levels for citizens and interest groups 
to intervene on policy and budget matters.1 On zoning matters, hearings were restricted to the Community 
Committee level unless a Standing Committee or Council wished, by majority vote, to hear the, delegation. 
/~~ 
The possibility of a more participatory method of urban governance was aided by legislative provision 
for local action area plans that could be passed as bylaws to guide development of specific neighbourhoods. 
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The legislation also included the option to create community plans to guide the development of broader 
historic community areas. 
The Unicity legislative initiative was championed by Premier Schreyer and his Minister of Finance and 
Urban Affairs, Saul Cherniack. Critical to the initiative was the support of Mayor Juba of the City of Winnipeg 
who represented half of the urban population, while the other nine municipalities represented the remaining 
citizens. Mayor Juba drew his strength from the North End and the same ethnic base as the NDP in the urban 
ridings. Consequently, his continued support for the legislation was crucial, and the price for it was to have 
the Mayor elected at large. Juba was prescient, because upon implementation, Unicity became dominated 
by a suburban-led, centre-right, Conservative-Liberal coalition that could trace its origins to the Committee 
of 1000 that crushed the Winnipeg Strike of 1919 (Masters, 1973). These councillors would not have selected 
Juba to be their Mayor if the provincial government's original proposal had been implemented (Brownstone 
and Plunkett, 1983, p. 89). 
The provincial decision to require the Mayor to be elected at large was seen by many as undercutting 
the ability of political parties to form on City Council. These political parties would have a policy platform and 
be accountable for their performance. 
Nonetheless, even though it denied it was a political party, the centre-right coalition which came to 
be known as the Independent Citizens' Election Committee (ICEC), did control City Council. This coalition 
was not enamoured with either the RAGs or Community Committees and, in addition, they eschewed 
community plans entirely and discouraged action area plans after the first ones developed by citizen initiative 
put limits on developer interests in areas such as Fort Rouge.2 
Thus, in the first five years of Unicity, the bloom came off the rose as the politics of a corporate, pro-
development regime entrenched itself in the governing processes and machinery of the Unicity. The NDP 
municipal party had no resonance outside of traditional North and West End working class and ethnic districts. 
An attempt at a progressive civic reform coalition in 197 4 elected one councillor in an outlying suburban district 
in St. Boniface. 
PHASE 2: THE 1977 UNICITY REVIEW-THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OPTS FOR "EFFICIENCY" 
OVER RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 
In 1977, the provincial government appointed a committee, chaired by Judge Taraska, to review the 
functioning of Unicity. The Taraska report's recommendations attempted to reinforce the intent of the original 
legislation to create a responsible and accountable government and to increase its operating efficiency. The 
committee recommended once again that the Mayor be indirectly elected from within Council and chair the 
Executive Policy Committee (EPC). EPC would be given greater powers as delegated by Council, while the 
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standing committees would have a lesser role as an adviser, holder of public hearings, and undertaker of 
inquiries. The recommendations made the Mayor more like a Premier, with the ability to appoint the EPC from 
among the elected Councillors, thus making it more like a cabinet. Despite these increased powers, the 
Mayor and the EPC still required their recommendations to command a majority of Council votes, but this 
would be made easier as the Taraska report advocated reducing the number of Councillors to 39. EPC was 
further strengthened by making the Board of Commissioners responsible to it. This made the administration 
accountable to the Mayor's cabinet and centralized power in the hands of the Mayor and his cabinet. As an 
offset, the T araska report recommended greater resources and support for the RAGs, but reduced the scope 
of the Community Committees to planning matters, and removed their power to administer local services such 
as recreation, social services, and public works: 
The committee hoped the recommendations would encourage the development of a local 
party system, as well as create an effective, responsible cabinet-type executive as a focus 
for the necessary political leadership, and as the principal link between the council and the 
administration (Brownstone and Plunkett, 1983, p. 138). 
The NDP provincial government, in a complicated set of amendments, accepted the view that fewer 
Councillors would increase the efficiency of governance, and reduced the Council to 30 members and six 
Community Committees. Further, the amendments centralized the administration by making each member 
of the Board of Commissioners, hired by Council, responsible for designated departments, and only 
responsible through the Board to the Executive Policy Committee. The Board of Commissioners thus gained 
centralized power over the entire civic administration. The Board would be accountable to the EPC, but City 
Council would be responsible for hiring and firing. This gave the Board the power to disagree and resist the 
Mayor and EPC if they wished, but retain their authority with the support of a majority of Councillors. This 
hearkened back to the view that professional public administration was a bulwark against political corruption 
of elected officials (Tindal and Tindal, 1990, p. 203). The Board of Commissioners became a highly centralized 
force in the administration of civic affairs, while the power of the Community Committees was reduced. 
This was accentuated when the provincial government did not strengthen the political powers of the 
Council. The Mayor was still to be elected at large, but did not chair or appoint the EPC. Thus, the 1977 
political changes essentially kept a weak-mayor political system, but strengthened the professional 
administration through centralizing power in their hands at the expense of the Community Committees and 
the Standing Committees. 
The 1977 amendments gave the City Council more autonomy in the planning process, and removed 
provincial review of local bylaws on action area plans and zoning matters unless requested by Council. It 
further gave EPC responsibility for the overall plan for the city, but still required approval by the Minister of 
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Urban Affairs. The result was that City Council now could control the day-to-day rezoning procedures as long 
as they were in conformity with the overall plan of the city as approved by the province. 
After 1977, Unicity was a centralized administration with a dominant coalition of the centre-right, but 
without the clear lines and focus for public accountability through a mayor-led majority. The smaller Council 
reduced citizen access and was less representative of Winnipeg's diverse communities. The community 
committees were less powerful, and the RAGs still under-resourced and ignored by most Councillors. The 
RAGs were also questionable in terms of what citizens they represented. 
The post 1977 version of Unicity led to a high level of citizen alienation from their local government. 
This alienation was exacerbated with a loosening of the conflict of interest legislation which allowed those who 
engage in business with Unicity to run for City Council (Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1983). Slowly, a 
perception started to grow that they were there for more than the common good. 
PHASE 3: THE CORE AREA INITIATIVE-SETTING UP A SYSTEM OF PARAllEl GOVERNANCE AND 
CITIZEN ACCESS 
Over the years, the ICEC developed several techniques to circumvent the process designed to give 
citizens a voice in planning and zoning matters. Log-rolling was commonplace. Councillors would make 
informal arrangements to let a Councillor appear to support a community concern, but outvote him or her in 
supporting a development project which residents believed would harm their neighbourhood. This practice 
confused citizens as to the true intentions of their Councillor. Other techniques included a Community 
Committee supporting a community's concerns, but then having the Planning, Executive Policy Committee 
or City Council overturn it. In the case of major projects, EPC would take the matter directly to Council to 
avoid a hearing at the local level. This latter approach was utilized to initiate a major new bridge project that 
would disrupt inner-city neighbourhoods. 
The Sherbrooke-McGregor Overpass issue ignited a broad-based citizen coalition to fight to protect 
the inner city and to call attention to the neglect of all levels of government to its growing social issues. Their 
demand for removal of the CPR marshalling yards to stimulate inner-city renewal became a platform for the 
Liberal, Lloyd Axworthy, to enter Parliament. Subsequently, the mobilization of dissent by the inner-city 
coalition pushed him to respond. Unable to relocate the rails without enormous public expense under the Rail 
Relocation Act, Axworthy came forward with a $25 million package of regional development funds for inner-
city social and economic renewal if matched by the provincial and city governments. Ultimately, the bridge 
project was stopped by a concerted lobby of City Council with the support of suburban citizens engaged 
through the churches. But other rail yard crossings were expedited rather than rail relocation proceeding. 
The $75 million Core Area Initiative (CAl) program established a parallel governance structure to 
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address downtown and core area issues. The policy committee of the CAl consisted of the federal regional 
cabinet minister (Axworthy, followed by Jake Epp), the Minister of Urban Affairs (Mercier, then Kostyra and 
then Ducharme) and the Mayor (Norrie). This tri-level committee of politicians focused and co-ordinated the 
jurisdictions of their respective governments to address the social and economic issues of the inner city. They 
were aided by an intergovernmental management board made up of senior officials from the three levels of 
government and chaired by the CAl manager, as well as similar subcommittees to advise on specific 
components of the agreement. A Core Area Initiative office took responsibility for administering and co-
ordinating the three levels of government in implementing the agreement. Notably absent was a strong citizen 
participation component with a status equivalent to the management board. But citizens were put in charge 
of various programs and development corporations. 
This structure effectively circumvented the machinery of Unicity in addressing downtown and inner-
city concerns. Even though all program approvals passed through the Unicity system, they were rarely over-
turned. This was due to the Mayor's support and the combined prior approvals of the two senior levels of 
government. The three levels of government cost-shared every project with equal one-third contributions. 
In effect, the CAl overcame the divided responsibilities for the community as expressed in the 
constitution by co-operating at the program and policy level. 3 The CAl did not, however, make any long-term 
legislative or policy changes to institutionalize the successful innovations and administrative and policy 
arrangements. 
Notably, the CAl did reintroduce the fragmentation of civic governance by its very existence as a 
parallel decision making body focusing on one part of the city. This was expanded through innovations such 
as the North Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Development Corporation, which was a spin-off 
of the North Portage Development Corporation. 
The CAl was considered by most as a successful mechanism to address inner-city and downtown 
planning, development and social issues. But the shift in decision-making away from City Council led to public 
and Councillor criticism about the lack of accountability of these agencies.4 The vision of Unicity as unifying 
service delivery was unravelling in the face of specific issues that required focused attention, expertise and 
participation by citizens and local business interests that were directly affected. 
PHASE 4: THE CHERNIACK REPORT AND THE 1990 LEGISLATIVE REFORMS-BACKDOOR 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 
The provincial NDP government appointed a City of Winnipeg Act Review Committee in 1984. The 
1986 Cherniack Report (after the Committee Chair, former City Councillor Lawrie Cherniack) made several 
recommendations to improve the responsibility, accountability, and functioning of City Council. 
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Knowing it could not win support to require the Mayor to be elected by Council instead of directly at 
large, the Committee recommended increasing the policy leadership role of the Mayor by making him the 
Chair of the EPC with the power to appoint the Deputy-Mayor and the chairs. A new presiding officer 
(speaker) would then be elected by Council to chair Council meetings. These changes were proposed 
alongside a recommendation to reduce the size of City Council to 24 members while retaining six community 
committees. The Mayor and Councillors would be elected by a preferential ballot (allowing for a second 
choice to be counted to get a majority of votes rather than the current first-past-the-post system). The ward 
system would also be retained. 
The Community Committees were to be given more powers to allocate local budgets for local services 
and resources on a per capita formula adjusted to the level of needs in a Community Committee area. RAGs 
would be retained with a minimum level of access to resources and facilities. 
Thus City Council would be smaller, more responsible and policy driven, while Community 
Committees would be empowered to tailor and allocate local services and be responsible for local planning 
within the overall planning policy of the city. 
The Committee recommended that the planning sections of the City of Winnipeg Act be amended to 
ensure a comprehensive plan was done and that there was better environmental and social impact analysis 
undertaken of planning bylaws, greater procedural justice in the decision-making process, and more 
intergovernmental co-ordination through a Winnipeg Rivers Corporation for the planning and development of 
these resources.5 
Notably, the Cherniack Report recommended the abolition of the Winnipeg Additional Zone which had 
allowed City Council to veto development projects in municipalities contiguous to the city. These 
municipalities argued strongly that this power allowed the City of Winnipeg to interfere in their jurisdictions. 
The planning mechanisms recommended to replace this control of exurban development included criteria for 
boundary adjustments in the City of Winnipeg Act for maintenance of urban development within the city limits, 
as well as a Regional Environmental Advisory Panel to provide recommendations to government on major 
projects and an overall environmental policy for the region in and around Winnipeg. Neither of these 
mechanisms could directly stop exurban development. That power now rested with the provincial government. 
The Cherniack Report recommended several statutory and institutional features to make City Council 
accountable to the citizens and the provincial government. These included: an annual report on the City's 
fulfilment of its statutory obligations, a freedom of information bylaw, better records and public disclosure of 
city activities, improved support for citizen involvement, and a city Ombudsman. The Ombudsman would be 
appointed and accountable to City Council. 
The NDP followed with a White Paper which proposed many of the Cherniack recommendations as 
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reforms to the City of Winnipeg Act. But in 1988, the NDP government was defeated and replaced by a 
minority Conservative government before new legislation was enacted. 
One noteworthy innovation that the NDP legislated in the City of Winnipeg Act was provision for the 
establishment of Business Improvement Zones (BIZ). This allowed a group of businesses to form an 
association and petition the business property owners in their local areas to support a local uniform tax levied 
and collected on the same basis as the business tax (Section 196 to 203 of the City of Winnipeg Act). The 
taxes would finance the activities of an elected board of business representatives who would design plans to 
improve and market their business zone. The BIZ's submitted their annual budgets to City Council for 
approval as a bylaw. Because local businesses, through their elected boards, control the taxes raised on their 
own operations for expenditure on local projects that they have themselves developed, this is the one form 
of taxation that receives strong support from the business community. Accordingly, it is rarely objected to or 
interfered with by City Council. 
The Conservatives, led by Gary Filmon, formed a minority governmentfrom 1988-1990. They initiated 
several piecemeal reforms which followed the Cherniack report. Legislative amendments made the Mayor 
the chairperson of EPC with the power to appoint and remove the Deputy Mayor and the Chairs of the four 
Standing Committees. A new presiding officer was elected from among the Councillors to chair Council 
meetings. This took effect with the new City Council elected in 1989. 
In 1990, the Conservatives, as per the Cherniack Report, legislated the abolition of the eroded 
Additional Zone powers of City Council.6 This allowed the rural municipalities to approve new subdivisions 
unencumbered by the City of Winnipeg. Exurban sprawl could now continue unabated, unless the provincial 
government wished to control rural agricultural land development. To date, no apparent will on the part of the 
Conservative government to protect agricultural land from urban forms of development such as golf courses 
and subdivisions has manifested itself. 
During the period of minority government, the Conservatives attempted !o reduce City Council to 24 
members, but were defeated by the opposition parties. The opposition pushed through changes in the role 
of the auditor-changing it from a traditional accounts verification function to a "value for the money" one. The 
opposition parties also combined to legislate the Ombudsman's office as a feature of the City of Winnipeg Act, 
after lobbying from newly elected Winnipeg In the 'Nineties Councillors. 
PHASE 5: THE CONSERVATIVE REFORMS-SHAPING THE CORPORATE CITY 
Once the Conservatives formed a majority government in 1990, they legislated new rules to transform 
Unicity into a corporate city. This was precipitated in part by the outcome of the 1989 civic election, which 
resulted in a significant challenge to the dominant centre-right coalition tagged by the media as the "gang."7 
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A centre-left coalition of mostly Liberals, New Democrats, some Red Tories, labour, environmental, and 
community groups known as Winnipeg In the 'Nineties (WIN) elected seven members to City Council. They 
defeated some powerful incumbents and in other cases received the support of retiring but disillusioned 
members of the "gang." Picking up support from other incumbents on City Council, the WIN coalition was able 
to consistently move about one third of the votes on any issue coming to a vote on Council, and could win the 
vote through galvanizing the independents. This obvious threat to the long-time dominance of City Council 
by the centre-left was seen by the Conservative provincial government and the old gang members as requiring 
a rewriting of the electoral rules. So the Conservatives abolished the right of political parties to make 
contributions to candidates running for City Council.8 Then, for the first time since Unicity, they legislated the 
legality of donations from corporations and unions. The perversity was now institutionalized that political party 
fund raising for civic elections was illegal, but corporations and unions were officially special status interests 
who could finance civic candidates. The corporatization of civic government was initiated with this change 
in the rules.9 
This agenda was advanced when the Filmon Conservatives, with the support of the Mayor, decided 
to reduce the size of City Council from 30 to 15 members plus the Mayor. Wards would now be larger, almost 
double the size of legislature seats in the city. Meanwhile, rural councils were left untouched. Winnipeg wards 
now represent about 40,000 residents, while rural ones number in the low thousands. 
The combination of corporate and union financing of elections, huge wards and a Mayor elected at 
large makes it very difficult for a grassroots candidate to get elected with the support of only local citizens. 
Local democracy in Unicity has consequently been dramatically downsized and debased from the original 
vision of the framers of the legislation. 
The withering of the role of Community Committees 10 and the Filmon government decision to make 
the RAGs optional11 has left a City Council that is not representative of, nor responsive, to the diversity of 
neighbourhoods, cultures and grassroots organizations that make up Winnipeg. This is particularly so with 
respect to city-wide policy, planning and development matters. On the other hand, the advent of community 
policing has brought this function of community security and law enforcement more closely in touch with local 
concerns. 
The corporatization of the City of Winnipeg has been furthered by the provincial imposition of a single 
rate of business tax which gives a large reduction to banks and insurance companies, among others. As well, 
reassessment reapportioning has resulted in large tax reductions for large landlords, and an increased share 
of the tax burden on single homeowners (Overview, The City of Winnipeg, 1997 and 1998 Preliminary Current 
Estimates, pp. 57-58). 
The continuous pressure on the City to become more privatized and responsive to corporate interests 
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is largely due to the revenue crunch that it is experiencing. Every year since the recession of 1989-90, the 
City has had to cut services or raise taxes, usually both, in an increasingly difficult struggle to bring in a 
balanced budget. Provincial grants and tax credits have been cut (Overview, The City of Winnipeg, 1997 and 
1998 Preliminary Current Estimates). The growth of the capital debt has been difficult to curtail in the face 
of a growing infrastructure deficit and constant pressure to open up new areas in the suburbs for development, 
and then to provide them with proper facilities and transportation links. Debt charges have commanded a 
growing portion of the budget, while market-based reassessment has shifted the tax burden off the downtown 
onto homeowners. Reassessment appeals have eroded the city's reserves. Until recently, real estate growth 
has been slow and revenues flat or declining (Overview, The City of Winnipeg, 1997 and 1998 Preliminary 
Current Estimates, p. 28). Finally there has been strong opposition to tax increases. The result is growing 
pressure to downsize and privatize civic services. 
GOVERNING THE CITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
As we approach the end of the millennium, the original promise of Unicity has been frustrated. The 
unification of services has been eroded by a new generation of special purpose agencies, while old ones have 
survived. Unification, originally supported by generous provincial grants, has, with increasing financial 
stringency, led to greater centralization of civic services and less local responsiveness, in spite of the 
customer service representatives which have been instituted. The exception has been the new community 
policing approach. The municipal tax mill rate has been equalized, but the property assessment system which 
for years overvalued downtown and inner-city properties has just started to be current and more accurate. 
School tax mill rates remain unequal, and the provincial education property tax levy still takes money out of 
the city even while the province cuts support to high need urban school divisions (Patterson, 1996). The lack 
of exurban land controls bleeds residential and industrial development out of the city unless tax breaks and 
other concessions are offered. The province does nothing substantial to address this issue other than 
convene meetings of regional municipalities. 
The largest failure of Unicity has been its degradation of politics and citizen participation. Every 
reform of Unicity has reduced the number of Councillors in the name of efficiency. Citizen participation has 
been a token exercise. There has been a fundamental distorting of urban politics from institutionalizing the 
support of a democratic, participatory, civic culture to a model of exclusive, centralized, corporate governance. 
Nonetheless, citizen interest and engagement persist in spite of the barriers Unicity legislation and 
political practice have created. How this citizen role can be encouraged is a key to the future of urban 
governance in the twenty-first century. 
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After 25 years, Unicity has taken a lot of wear and tear. An overhaul is in order. From a governance 
perspective, three areas need to be focused on: 
Renewing the formal structures and processes of governance; 
Regional services and planning; 
Strengthening and supporting community capacity. 
RENEWING THE FORMAL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES OF GOVERNANCE 
Every single reform of Unicity has resulted in fewer elected officials serving larger and larger wards. 
The equation that fewer politicians equals greater efficiency in the governance of the city is fundamentally 
flawed. It ignores the basic purpose of electing someone to office-representation (Pitkin, 1967). Reformers 
of local government should make the quality of representation the number one priority. This need for quality 
representation is especially important in large, diverse urban areas such as Winnipeg. The better the quality 
and the greater the diversity of representation of elected officials, the better the chance that all the interests 
of the community will be considered in the civic governing processes. The downsizing of City Council has 
ignored this issue without any obvious efficiency gains nor any apparent gains in effectiveness. There are 
fewer elected voices representing fewer elements of the community than ever before. This is a tragedy for 
local democracy. To reverse this situation several reforms would help: 
1. Increasing the number of elected representatives on Council who serve smaller wards. This would 
immediately raise the concern that parochialism will make a dramatic comeback in the governance 
process. 
2. The introduction of urban political formations that publicly bring together elected politicians around 
common policies. There is a long-standing myth that local political parties are bad, particularly when 
they are the same formations as provincial and federal parties. However, distinct urban political 
parties could be a very innovative way to bring new policy configurations to bear on local issues. 
They could cross provincial and federal party loyalties as they always have in Winnipeg. 
3. Currently, the Mayor is elected at large and any challengers from City Council must give up their 
seats to run for this office. This results in an opposition leadership vacuum that has to be filled when 
these candidates lose. One remedy would be to allow Councillors who head an urban political party 
to run for Mayor and a local seat; if they lose but have the second largest number of seats including 
their own, they could form a focused opposition or a negotiated alliance with the Mayor and her party. 
Not every Councillor could run for Mayor and a seat unless they met some agreed upon threshold of 
candidates running with them on a political platform for office. 
4. Increasingly, proportional representation is finding its way into national electoral systems. This or the 
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preferential ballot could increase the chances that those elected represent a greater diversity of 
community views and interests. 
5. A diversity of interests represented on City Council would also be fostered by the abolition of 
corporate and union donations, and an individuals-only donations law with a reasonable tax credit 
should be instituted. This would increase the number of citizens who financially contribute to the 
electoral process. 
6. There needs to be a rewriting of the conflict of interest legislation under the Municipal Act that applies 
to Winnipeg. Present legislation is very porous and allows Councillors or their families to do business 
with the City as long as they do not directly vote on a bylaw that they have a direct interest in 
(Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1983). This constraint is easily overcome through logrolling deals 
among Councillors and overlooks subcontracts that Councillors have a direct interest in. As well, it 
is very difficult to discover and prove conflict of interest due to weak disclosure rules and narrow 
constructions of what constitutes a conflict. 
REGIONAL PLANNING 
With respect to regional planning and services, Unicity is in the same dilemma that led to its creation 
in the first place. It has no effective tools to contain exurban sprawl and has now resorted to offering tax 
breaks for new housing constructed within Winnipeg. Alternative solutions include: 
1. A new layer of regional government which is not likely to be credible these days. 
2. A regional tax to accrue to the City for the amenities it provides for non-tax paying Manitobans who 
work or do business in Winnipeg. 
3. New forms of taxation which allow Unicity to capture rent off the value of their market area and 
economic contribution to the province. Options include: employee taxes which will be attacked like 
all payroll taxes as making job creation more expensive and leading to job flight; a portion of sales 
taxes recognizing that Winnipeg is the single most important retail market in the province; or vehicle 
or gas taxes to recognize the infrastructure requirements of Unicity which contribute to the provincial 
economy. However, taxes do not necessarily lead to good regional planning. Unintended effects 
could result. 
4. Finally, simply giving the City back Additional Zone powers might be the best tool for long-term 
planning. This would recognize the City as the de facto regional planning authority. The issue of City 
intrusion on other municipal jurisdictions could be addressed through an independent appeal 
mechanism with some clear regional, sustainable planning criteria. 
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STRENGTHENING AND SUPPORTING COMMUNITY CAPACITY 
Probably the most important reform of Unicity is to give this level of government the policy tools to 
strengthen and support community capacity. The nation is currently in a national policy mode that has been 
characterized as market liberalism or neoconservativism {Eden and Molot, 1993; Teeples, 1994). The 
elements of this approach include global rules for capital investments, under-investing in public infrastructure, 
and the dramatic withdrawal of federal and provincial support for communities in a wide range of areas from 
social housing to labour market training to health, social services and social assistance. Communities are 
increasingly struggling with the growing inequality and poverty. Winnipeg contends with one or two other cities 
as the child poverty capital of Canada (National Council of Welfare, 1997). 
Local governments with legislative flexibility could institute several programs and supports that would 
enable communities to mobilize citizens to address local issues. It is not sufficient to invoke the spirit of 
voluntarism. Government supports and resources are needed to enable communities in their efforts to 
rehabilitate housing, create employment, run recreational programs, develop leadership and organizations, 
create safe neighbourhoods, get rid of drug dealers, pimps and slum landlords, foster strong community 
schools, recover rivers for community use, and improve public health. Markets and centralized government 
have not proven very effective in addressing these issues. On the other hand, communities that are properly 
supported with expertise and resources have been very successful at tackling these issues. 
We could build on the positive experience of the BIZ's 12 and allow for Neighbourhood Improvement 
Zones where citizens could petition to levy a local tax to undertake their own renewal projects and pull new 
resources into their areas. 
We can institute housing programs with tax support and legislation to expropriate crack, sniff, booze 
or boarded-up houses into the public domain. We can partner citizen groups with police, fire and public health 
staff and foster safe neighbourhoods. 
We can co-produce recreational and job programs with private, government and non-profit 
organizations. We can enable a flourishing of arts and culture groups instead of permitting them into 
frustration. We can promote literacy through active outreach library and community school programs. 
Finally, we can recreate environmental amenities by fixing up the river banks and having affordable, 
convenient, public transportation and bicycle routes. In short, civic bureaucratic expertise combined with 
community initiative can lead to a more dynamic, engaged civic culture and to stronger local democracy and 
government (Rifkin, 1995; Putnam, 1993). If not, the privatization agenda can reduce local government to a 
payer of contracts and collector of taxes while maintaining law and order. 
Many of these changes will, however, require a provincial government willing to make them. And the 
challenge of electing a provincial government with that kind of vision and interest is at least as large as 
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reforming Unicity. In the coming years, these tasks need to be taken up by those who care about the future 
of Winnipeg. How they will be addressed will be a function of the social and political organizing that emerges 
in the years ahead. 
Photo 6: Inaugural meeting of Winnipeg Into the Nineties, October 27, 1989 (Credit: Wayne Glowacki, 
Source: Winnipeg Free Press). 
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NOTES 
1. Even though the formal structure of Unicity decision-making is more open, an argument could be 
made that the very public nature of formal decision-making has the paradoxical effect of driving the 
informal decision-making into the back rooms where deals are struck to avoid the stress and 
exposure of these different levels of public decision-making. 
2. To date, there has never been a community plan, and only five action area plans, now called 
secondary plans. 
3. Under the Constitutional Acts of 1867-1982, the federal government has the spending power under 
section 91, lA, while the provinces have jurisdiction over health (92.7), education (93), social services 
(92. 7), municipal institutions (92.8) and local works and matters (92.1 0 and 92.16). 
4. It should be noted that Unicity did not eliminate the legislation which set up the Winnipeg Enterprises 
Corporation as an arms-length corporation to run the arena and stadium. This corporation drew its 
directors from appointed City Councillors who in turn appointed citizens. It has been the focus of 
controversy over the years for its lack of accountability. City Council also appoints the directors of 
the Convention Centre Corporation, another arm's-length body. Until 1992, the City Council also 
appointed and ran the Municipal Hospitals. The City continues to appoint and fund several municipal 
museums, parking commissions, as well as a municipal housing corporation, a tourism agency and 
an economic development agency. The Winnipeg Police Commission was abolished and the police 
now report directly to the Standing Committee on Parks and Protection through the Commissioner 
of Parks and Protection. 
5. Environmental impact assessments had been a part of the original Unicity legislation, but had been 
deleted. 
6. It should be noted that the Additional Zone powers of the City of Winnipeg could be circumvented by 
two or more municipalities forming a planning district, thereby gaining land-use control powers. By 
1990, only three of seven municipalities in the Additional Zone had not joined planning districts. See 
Government of Manitoba, Technical Advisory Committee on Large Lot Unserviced Residential 
Development in Urban Fringe Areas, Rural Residential Development in the Winnipeg Region, May, 
1990, p. 8. 
7. The ICEC had dispensed with any former title and simply decided to operate as a "no name" caucus 
to avoid visible media scrutiny and responsibility for their decisions. 
8. Some candidates had received donations given to the provincial NDP. As a provincial party, these 
donations were tax deductible under laws covering provincial political parties. 
9. In response to the national unity crisis and the national perception that Manitoba was anti-French, the 
Conservatives also strengthened Part Ill of the City of Winnipeg Act, which required the provision of 
services in French in the historic City of St. Boniface and St. Norbert. Now a plan and annual report 
had to be done by City Council to ensure compliance with the Act. 
10. The Conservatives have reduced the planning responsibilities of Community Committees further by 
removing their responsibility to hear variances and conditional use applications. These are now heard 
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by a Council-appointed Board of Adjustment with an appeal to the Standing Committee of Planning 
and Community Services. Thus local accountability and responsiveness to local planning matters 
have now been re-centralized and removed from direct local influence by citizens on their Councillors. 
11. As well, the Conservatives removed the requirement for a Board of Commissioners in the City of 
Winnipeg Act and allowed for a city manager model of civic administration to be implemented by City 
Council. The latest review of Unicity, known as the Cuff report, after its author, recommends the 
abolition of the Board in favour of a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and five senior managers. 
This report recommends that the Mayor have the increased power to hire and fire the CAO. This 
recommendation, along with Cuff's companion suggestion to abolish Community Committees and 
reorganize the standing committees to include a more powerful treasury committee, would further 
centralize power in the hands of the Mayor and her appointed EPC (Winnipeg Free Press, 11 October 
1997). 
On October 29, 1997, City Council adopted their own version of these recommendations and fired 
the Board of Commissioners. The final stage of the corporatization of the governance process of 
Unicity has thus begun (see Silva Motion on behalf of the Executive Policy Committee for the Special 
Meeting of October 29th). Without any requirement to run as a political formation with a platform, the 
Mayor and the EPC, which is appointed after the election, will concentrate power without public 
accountability. This is compounded by the lack of legislative support for an official opposition and the 
fact that losing candidates for Mayor do not remain on Council to act as opposition leaders. As well, 
City Council has requested that the Province amend the City of Winnipeg Act in order to give the 
Mayor even more powers. These include the authority to appoint all civic committees and have a tie 
breaking vote on Council. Further, City Council wants to abolish Community Committees while having 
the right to hold City Council meetings in camera for certain personnel, legal and land transactions. 
Also requested were increased powers for the Executive Policy Committee to set department head 
job descriptions and to delegate authority to the EPC or standing committees by a majority vote of 
Council. In summary, the requests would further concentrate power in the hands of the Mayor and 
her chosen committees without any requirement to have final approval on their decisions from City 
Council nor any review by local citizen participation vehicles such as Community Committees 
(Winnipeg Free Press, 30 October 1997, p. A3 and Appendix "B", Clause 1 of the Report of the 
Executive Policy Committee dated October 24, 1997). 
12. BIZ's have been generally positive organizations for revitalizing older commercial sectors of older 
neighbourhoods of Winnipeg. They are not, however, universally benign, and depending on their 
leadership, can lead to demands to exclude and remove marginalized citizens from their territory such 
as panhandlers and other street people. 
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URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN A SLOW-GROWTH CITY1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Christopher Leo and Wilson Brown· 
with Kris J. Dick .. 
In North America, growth has long been the Holy Grail of city politics, for reasons that are not entirely 
frivolous. Since it is of the essence of city life, even more than of life generally, that change is constant, some 
growth is necessary to avoid decline. As some people or activities vacate a city, or part of a city, either 
something else must take their place, or decay sets in. A certain amount of growth, therefore, is essential to 
a city's well-being. But where does this desirable level of growth begin and end? 
Growth has especially been associated with the right wing in city politics, both in Canada and the 
United States. Pro-growth sentiments, and the promotion of growth as a central concern are virtually 
synonymous with the urban right wing, or at least the corporate right (Stone, 1987}--the developers and other 
major local corporations that are such an influential element in North American city politics. However, an 
unconsidered acceptance of rapid growth has become common property at all points on the political spectrum. 
In fact, deference to the god of rapid growth has become a virtual given in North American society, a sort of 
mass neurosis, in the sense that virtually everyone is in some way caught up in the belief that "the big 
apple"-New York, Toronto, Los Angeles, or the nearest metropolitan centre, wherever one happens to be-is 
deserving of obsessive attention. 
The attention is not all favourable. Those who make their lives outside the metropole's realm often 
feel resentful of it, decrying it as a breeder of crime and false values, or maintaining that its administration and 
its residents are the favourites of the national or regional government, while perhaps simultaneously nurturing 
a sense of inferiority. But whether the attention is favourable or unfavourable, it bespeaks an obsession with 
growth, a sense that it represents power, importance, legitimacy. The objective of this paper is to put that 
emotional baggage aside and try to think dispassionately about the differences between major cities and 
"lesser" centres. 
Specifically, we want to establish a distinction between the characteristics of slow growth and those 
of rapid growth, and to think about the policies appropriate to each condition. Our argument is that the 
*Department of Economics, The University of Winnipeg. 
**Department of Biosystems Engineering, University of Manitoba. 
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common obsession with rapid growth has lulled us into a failure to make that distinction, with the result that 
we tend everywhere in North America to follow urban policies appropriate to rapid growth, policies that are 
especially damaging to the health of slow-growth cities. Our discussion is primarily theoretical. While there 
is a great deal to be gained from a careful empirical study of a representative sample of the two types of cities, 
the purpose of this paper is to undertake a preliminary exploration of a topic that has apparently been ignored 
altogether. 
However, a theory is not useful if it does not refer to reality. In these pages, the concrete points of 
reference will take the form of examples, primarily from Winnipeg, which is a reasonable example of a slow-
growth city whose growth, we contend, has been flagrantly mismanaged thanks to the unthinking pursuit of 
fast-growth policies. It has become a local cliche, of both the left and the right, that Winnipeg is a city in 
decline. Winnipeg's situation is probably more nearly the rule than the exception in North America. Edmonton 
is sometimes sarcastically referred to as "Deadmonton." Hamilton's inner city is decaying, and the city is 
widely considered to be in decline, and St. John has been struggling with decline for decades, indeed, for 
more than a century. More examples could easily be cited. In the United States, examples are even easier 
to find: Detroit, Duluth, Omaha, Des Moines, Camden, NJ-the list goes on. 
Without trying to generalize about all these examples-and referring now to Winnipeg-it is our 
contention that the decline, which is real enough, has nothing to do with any failure of needed growth. It is 
true of course that Winnipeg is becoming a less important centre in Canada because a number of other cities 
are growing faster, but to say that adds up to decline is to be hooked on growth. Metropolitan Winnipeg's 
population, for a long time, has been growing at about one percent a year. For example, from 1986 to 1991, 
the population of the Winnipeg CMA grew from 625,304 to 652,354, a percentage change of 4.3 percent, a 
little less than one percent a year (Statistics Canada, 1986, 1991 ), and the economy has been growing at a 
rate of perhaps two or three percent.2 For those who are not hooked on growth, that is not decline: It is a 
description of a metropolitan area that is steadily becoming wealthier, in the aggregate. 
In what sense then is the decline real? It is the city of Winnipeg, and especially Winnipeg's inner city 
that is in decline, not the CMA. Between 1971 and 1991, population growth within the city limits crawled along 
at less than one percent a year, while municipalities bordering the city grew at a rate of almost 4 percent, and 
in some instances more than 5 percent. Until recently, new housing starts within the city were about half of 
those in the CMA, despite the fact that much new municipal infrastructure remains underutilized, and older 
infrastructure is deteriorating at an alarming rate. Some of the most alarming deterioration becomes visible 
only when an automobile or truck plunges through a hole that suddenly opens up in the street. This has 
occurred several times in recent years, thanks to deteriorating sewer lines. 
The visible inner city is deteriorating less spectacularly, but possibly at an even more alarming rate. 
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Despite heroic efforts on the part of all three levels of government and the local business community, once-
bustling Portage Avenue is now a problem area, and Selkirk Avenue, the former commercial heart of the North 
End, is moribund. Unoccupied retail premises are a common sight on Portage and are virtually ubiquitous on 
Selkirk. There has been substantial housing deterioration in the inner city, and boarded-up residences are 
becoming an increasingly common sight in some of the worst neighbourhoods. Some neighbourhoods are 
beset by gangs. Much of the inner city has been red-lined by insurance companies, with the result that home-
owners applying for insurance may be refused, or may be required to pay more than the standard premium. 
It is our argument that the glaring disparity between the health of the metropolitan area as a whole 
and that of the city is a result of a set of growth policies based inappropriately on the premise of fast growth-a 
result of the fact that the obsession with growth makes it difficult to think about city development in any other 
terms. Our prescription is to accept slow growth as a reality and rethink our policies accordingly. Once we 
do, it becomes clear that slow growth has advantages, as we will see when we consider alternate policies for 
housing, infrastructure and services, economic development and immigration. 
2. HOUSING 
One of the big advantages of slow growth is that it keeps housing prices down. It is a matter of 
common experience that the "hot" housing market that goes with fast growth-for example in New York, Los 
Angeles, Toronto or Vancouver-tends to produce house prices that escalate more rapidly than they do in 
slow-growth centres. That is no problem for those who are capturing the top jobs, but it produces nightmares 
for the poor. A New Yorker trying to make a living as a cleaner or receptionist in one of the glass towers of 
Manhattan may be forced to choose between a long commute she cannot afford or residence amid warring 
gangs in a decaying neighbourhood. Others, unable to pay for any housing at all, find themselves joining the 
ragged army of the homeless. 
In other words, fast growth produces, not only prosperity, but also poverty, and the cost of housing 
is an important reason for that. It is likely that the proportion of the homeless to the whole population is larger 
in a fast-growing city, although that point would be difficult to prove conclusively. Counts of the homeless are 
notoriously unreliable to begin with, and comparisons between different cities are trickier yet. For what it is 
worth, a comparison of slow-growth Winnipeg with the prosperous, burgeoning Pacific rim city of Portland, 
Oregon, bears out that impression,3 and, in the process, confirms that slow growth has its advantages. On 
the surface, Portland appears to have it all. It has the public transit system Winnipeg city officials have been 
dreaming of for years, but cannot afford, with downtown transit malls for buses and a rapidly-expanding light 
rail system. Aside from transit, the excellent condition of streets and public facilities, the quality, finish and 
design of downtown buildings, the preservation of heritage: all these speak of the prosperity that comes with 
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economic growth. 
The contrast with Winnipeg is striking. Developers are not clamouring to put up office towers, hotels 
and malls in the inner city. City Council finds it hard to say no to questionable development proposals, and 
to demands from prospective developers for public subsidies, while Portland's city government imposes 
daunting conditions, and cheerfully refuses proposals that are deemed unacceptable (Leo, 1998). The streets 
have more pot-holes than those in Portland and there are more buildings boarded up downtown. While much 
of this can be blamed on poor decision-making and gullibility, the reality is that many of the economic 
opportunities of the 1990s are less readily available to Winnipeg than to Portland, Vancouver, Seattle, San 
Francisco, and many other cities. But there is another side to the comparison. 
A visitor to Portland from Winnipeg is bound to be struck by the numbers of homeless people wasting 
away on the benches in the well-kept parks, or aimlessly wheeling their shopping carts past the beautifully-
finished buildings. There are homeless people in Winnipeg too, many of them in shelters, some of them 
sleeping in garbage bins, even in the winter-an awesome comment on the will to survive. But the numbers 
of them are much smaller. That impression is confirmed by figures. According to Susan Emmons, Director 
of the Northwest Pilot Project, a Portland housing advocacy group that has a reputation for careful 
documentation, some 1700 people were homeless in Portland in the summer of 1995. That same summer, 
Darren Lezubski of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg estimated the numbers of homeless in Winnipeg 
at 200 to 300. If those figures are correct, metropolitan Portland, which has about twice the population of 
metropolitan Winnipeg, has perhaps three times as many homeless people per capita as Winnipeg. 
It is no surprise that homelessness is a relatively manageable problem in a city where it is possible 
to buy a house on a relatively pleasant residential street for $40,000 (CAD) or less, and where rents are 
similarly affordable. The fact that housing costs are modest in a city where downtown housing is decaying 
yields a policy opportunity: Government incentives for the provision of housing for those who cannot afford 
it do not come at a high price to the taxpayer, and they can bring the added benefit of stabilizing decaying 
neighbourhoods. In the process, a city that is not notable for its attractiveness to investors can become 
notable, instead, for its agreeable and humane social environment. Paradoxically, that, in turn, is a selling-
point for potential investors. 
It would be relatively easy for Winnipeg to make itself an exception to the rule that cut-backs in public 
spending bring with them the decimation of government-sponsored affordable housing programmes. In 1995 
the governments of Winnipeg and Manitoba spent some $55 million (CAD) in a futile attempt to keep a major-
league hockey team in town.4 Supporters of this quixotic and financially ruinous venture repeated incessantly 
that the Winnipeg Jets put the city "on the map." A mere fraction of that expenditure would have accomplished 
a great deal in the provision of support and incentives for the creation and maintenance of affordable housing. 
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Such a programme could have made inroads on homelessness, revitalized decaying neighbourhoods and 
created jobs. 
In the past, decision-makers have shown their awareness of these realities. Over the past two 
decades a great deal of new housing has been developed in Winnipeg, and older housing renovated, some 
with the help of government grants and loans, some through private initiative, thanks to the much-criticized 
Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, together with a welter of other federal, provincial and local programmes. As 
a result, new and renovated housing for people of all income levels was created throughout the inner city, and 
home-owners renovated their properties with partially forgivable loans from the government. Co-operative 
housing for elderly people, immigrants and others offered the stability of home-ownership, together with a 
sense of community, to people for whom these benefits might otherwise have been out of reach. 
But these housing programmes did far more than just provide needed housing and home repairs. The 
presence of affordable housing for people of all income levels is a priceless asset. It populates the inner city 
and thereby makes it safer. Thus it helps to make inner city residence a live option for better-off people and 
bolsters the stability of neighbourhoods that badly need the boost. In the process, it helps to keep the inner 
city from being abandoned in a flight to the suburbs and provides a crucial support for inner city commerce. 
In the 1980s in Winnipeg, it helped to keep the inner city marginally viable and supported business, as well 
as providing support for people who needed help. Winnipeg's inner city may be in a parlous condition, but 
it would be a great deal worse without the housing that was added, and renovated, in the 1980s. 
Ironically, though, Winnipeg, like both slow- and fast-growing cities elsewhere, is no longer accepting 
the challenge of housing provision. Virtually all the housing programmes that helped to sustain Winnipeg's 
inner city through the past two difficult decades have been discontinued. When the cutbacks of the 1990s 
started to bite, Winnipeg had a historic opportunity to distinguish itself favourably from faster-growing cities. 
It could have found the money to maintain cost-effective programmes for the provision of affordable housing, 
while those in faster-growing centres were being savaged. In the process, it would have made at least some 
inroads into the problem of homelessness, provided a crucial support for the inner city, including inner city 
business, and created much-needed jobs. This could have been one of several planks in an overall 
development strategy designed to keep Winnipeg vital, even in bad economic times. Instead, City Council 
and the provincial government tilted at the windmill of major-city status, wasted $55 million of public money, 
and placed itself on the map as an NHL loser city with empty pockets. That strategy was typical of those 
being pursued by slow-growth centres throughout North America, but clearly there is a better way. 
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3. INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 
In this section, we are concerned with the building and maintenance of all the facilities that are needed 
to serve the city, including roads and public transit, sewerage, water, parks, education, library branches, 
community centres, police and fire protection. But it is useful to begin with roads. The ideas about road 
systems that are being applied in Canadian cities, whether fast- or slow-growth, have two sources that are 
important for our purposes: developer proposals and the norms and conventions of civil engineering. The 
contribution of developers is that they decide on the parcels of land that they think will be suitable for profitable 
development. In Winnipeg and many other cities, they have good reason to expect a sympathetic hearing 
from local government, and, as part of the cost of development, they accept the obligation of building, or 
paying for, the necessary road connections. 
It then becomes the obligation of the city to work out the development of the rest of the city's 
transportation system to accommodate recent and expected future development. For example, a burgeoning 
of new subdivisions at Winnipeg's southern edge in South St. Vital and South St. Boniface contributed to a 
city decision to build an expressway serving that part of the city-Bishop Grandin Boulevard-and occasioned 
the opening up of an under-used and heavily subsidized bus line into Island Lakes, one of the new 
subdivisions. It also eventually stimulated the replacement of the Norwood and Main Street bridges with a 
massive new eight-lane structure. These bridges, located downtown, are part of the road system leading to 
the newer southern subdivisions. 
In all of these respects, Winnipeg was following the conventions of modern North American city-
building: developers decide where they want to locate new development and pay for some of the services 
immediately required by the new subdivisions. The city ensures that they become connected into the city-wide 
service network, and that the city-wide network is expanded as necessary to accommodate them. It is in 
deciding on the character of this expansion that the norms of the engineering profession take over. 
Engineers now in the profession were trained to develop road systems on the assumption of ever-
expanding traffic volumes. They believe in large-capacity roads and bridges, and they have been trained to 
associate their judgements in these matters with their professional integrity and to resent "political 
interference" with those judgements. Their belief-system colours the alternatives they present to politicians. 
It is important to emphasize that we are pointing to a belief-system, not some special penchant for 
the pursuit of narrow self-interest. Indeed, engineers are probably less vulnerable to the charge of feathering 
their own nests at public expense than many other professionals. The Association of Professional Engineers 
of Manitoba, a typical case, are self-consciously protective of the public interest and show no reluctance to 
let colleagues whose professional standards are found wanting feel the full weight of the association's 
censure. The problem is not self-aggrandizement, but a pre-disposition to assume and promote rapid growth, 
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to favour roads over alternative forms of transportation, and sometimes to go to questionable lengths in 
promoting them. 
Many examples could be found (Leo, 1977), but a recent case in point was that of the Norwood 
Bridge, the inner city-suburban link already referred to. When the plans for the Norwood Bridge reconstruction 
were being mooted, city officials presented four alternatives, including the following two: It would cost $78 
million for a six-lane, divided bridge that was pictured as providing a "fair" level of safety, and "poor" traffic 
capacity, accommodation for transit and accommodation of traffic during construction. By contrast, an eight-
lane, divided bridge that was rated "good" in all four categories would cost only $80 million (City of Winnipeg, 
1992). That was an easy decision: only $2 million extra for a vastly superior bridge. Such "easy decisions" 
are standard items in the arsenal of public servants who have made up their minds about which course they 
wish their political masters and the public to pursue. 
Council chose an eight-lane bridge, and it soon became obvious-as it often does in such cases-that 
the "easy choice" was not so easy after all. By the end of 1995, the cost of the new bridge had escalated to 
$100 million.5 And with only one of the two spans built-still less than the six-lane alternative that was 
portrayed as inadequate-traffic line-ups at rush hour had greatly eased. Given the bias, or lack of reliability, 
that is apparent from this course of events, it might well be questioned whether the officials' advice is 
deserving of any trust at all. Was a new bridge necessary in the first place? On the face of it, it is not obvious 
why Canadian bridges are routinely declared to have outlived their usefulness in decades, while European 
bridges last centuries. 
Over-building of bridges and roads exacerbates the dilemmas Winnipeg will face in future. Increased 
road and bridge capacity has two consequences: First, an improved route draws traffic as it becomes the 
route of choice for drivers who previously favoured other routes. Sooner or later, this increases pressure on 
City Council for further road works. For example, traffic line-ups at a bridge entrance may be replaced by line-
ups on the bridge. Such consequences are not unanticipated by engineering staff, and resulting public 
demands for widening of the road leading away from the bridge may be seen by them as long-overdue 
recognition of necessities they understood to begin with. 
A second consequence of increased bridge and road capacity is reduced travel time to the urban 
fringe, which leads to an increase in the economic viability of sprawl and leap-frog development. The upshot 
is intensified political pressure from developers for the approval of subdivisions that will be costly to serve-
pressure the councils of slow-growth cities have frequently shown themselves unable to resist, precisely 
because they are predisposed to see rapid growth as a self-evident virtue. It is a vicious cycle, in which each 
new attempt to solve the "problem" of inadequate road capacity has the ultimate effect of exacerbating the 
problem (Downs, 1992, pp. 27-33). 
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The high priority accorded road projects tends to crowd out alternatives. In Winnipeg, City Council 
has readily agreed to one road project after another, heedless of the fact that each one exacerbates the 
sprawl dilemma. Meanwhile, transit facilities that could contribute to the amelioration of the problems of sprawl 
are postponed indefinitely. Since the mid-1970s, plans have been underway for the construction of the 
Southwest Transit Corridor, a rapid transit line consisting of cost-effective diesel buses running on a concrete 
strip dedicated exclusively to transit. 
This line is considered viable because it connects two population concentrations-downtown and the 
University of Manitoba-along the relatively heavily-populated Pembina Highway corridor. It would ameliorate 
traffic congestion along Pembina Highway-the artery connecting the University of Manitoba with the inner-
city-and encourage cost-effective, compact development along the route, in contrast to road and bridge 
projects' encouragement of sprawl. Estimated total cost for the entire facility would be $70 million (City of 
Winnipeg, 1997)--less than the lower-cost alternative for the Norwood Bridge, which was deemed inadequate. 
However, the estimated cost is a moot point, because postponement of the project has been a routine feature 
of City Council's annual budget deliberations for at least two decades. 
Councils need to reconsider their indiscriminate compliance with road proposals, to the neglect of 
alternatives. Politicians need not accept the norms of civil engineers as the major determinant for the 
extension of transportation infrastructure. As well, instead of, in effect, delegating to developers the right to 
decide where the city will expand, cities could exercise their authority to determine the location, development 
mix, and densities of new subdivisions. 
In theory, that power is being exercised now by city councils through their planning departments, but 
in practice the main influence over those decisions rests with developers. Alternative models are available, 
both for the planning of roads and transit, and for the development of more compact forms of development. 
Ironically, they are beginning to be applied in fast-growing cities (City of Calgary, nd; Oregon Department of 
Transportation, 1995; 1000 Friends of Oregon, 1997), while many such slow-growth centres as Winnipeg 
continue to ape what they imagine to be the winning ways of rapid growth. 
To stick with our main example, Winnipeg could have developed very differently. It seems very likely 
that the Norwood Bridge project could reasonably have been much more modest than it was. With a less 
auto-dependent, more compact form of development, the suburban road system-of which Bishop Grandin 
is only one example-could have been less extensive, and the transit system less of a drain on the treasury. 
Roads are typical of the situation for other services. Governments are allowing their cities to expand rapidly, 
at ever lower densities, primarily in response to developers' calculations about where the profit picture looks 
favourable for them, without serious consideration of how all of these developments will be tied together with 
infrastructure and serviced. 
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When a proposal for a new subdivision is brought to Winnipeg city planners, three cost factors are 
taken into consideration: roads, underground municipal services (sewer and water service) and parks. If the 
subdivision proposal incurs extra costs in any of these areas, the developer is responsible. When negotiations 
are complete, and the subdivision proposal comes before City Council, the typical reaction is delight over the 
"fact" that a sizeable chunk of new tax assessment will be added to the city's coffers "with the developer 
covering all the costs." 
Once the subdivision is in place, however, the new residents rightly argue that, as residents and 
taxpayers of Winnipeg, they deserve services comparable to those other residents enjoy. City politicians have 
no valid answer when they ask: Why is there no conveniently-located library branch and community centre? 
Why are police and fire response times here slower than in other subdivisions? Why do we not have a 
neighbourhood school? City council and school boards have no politically realistic alternative but to spend 
money to fix the problems. 
It is easy to see, therefore, why-with Winnipeg expanding at ever lower densities-residential 
property taxes have reached tax-revolt levels, while downtown infrastructure deteriorates. Indeed, the 
problem is now largely out of the hands of City Council. For some time, residents of the metropolitan area 
have been voting with their feet, and accepting the property tax reductions they can achieve by moving 
beyond the boundaries of the city. Businesses are beginning to follow. With exurban migration underway, 
City Council has lost much of the control it once might have exercised over new development. Developers 
now have alternatives: if the city is not sufficiently generous in dealing with subdivision proposals or 
commercial developments, it is becoming increasingly easy for them to find a parcel of land for a similar 
development in an adjacent municipality. 
Recent studies suggest that these patterns of development are, in the long run, unsustainable, or at 
least dangerously cost-ineffective, in any urban area (Blais, 1995; CUPR Report, 1996; Greater Toronto Area 
Task Force, 1996). Even the wealthiest and fastest-growing metropolitan areas have experienced inner-city 
deterioration in the face of uncontrolled suburban and exurban development. The South Bronx turned, first 
into a jungle and then into something resembling a post-war saturation bombing victim, as Queens and Long 
Island expanded. Most of downtown Detroit became an unoccupied wasteland ringed by older 
neighbourhoods and prosperous suburbs. 
Such decay is a complex phenomenon, and some of its causes can be sought in such disparate 
phenomena as family break-down, crime, welfare dependency, inadequate education and de-industrialization. 
However, there is no doubt that untrammelled suburban expansion is a major cause. In the long run, 
therefore, the typical North American metropolitan development pattern seems likely to be sustainable only 
at the expense of inner-city deterioration, usually followed by deterioration of the first ring of suburbs. 
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That is bad enough, but the problem is even more acute for slow-growth cities. A fast-growing city 
can mask the costliness of sprawl development, at least for a while: A leap-frog subdivision approval may not 
incur an immediate financial penalty if growth potential is strong enough to assure, within the foreseeable 
future, that infill development will help to pay for the needed infrastructure. Downtown decay may not 
occasion immediate alarm when there are proposals for commercial developments to replace decaying 
downtown residential districts, though it is unlikely that, in the longer run, simply filling empty spaces with office 
towers will suffice as a strategy for the prevention of decay. 
Whatever the situation in a fast-growing centre, the piper demands immediate payment when the city 
council of a slow-growth city calls the low-density tune. Here there are no heavy pressures for new 
development, and assurances of growing tax revenues, to cover up mistakes. Politicians in cities like 
Winnipeg, and provinces like Manitoba-in cities like Des Moines and Omaha and states like Iowa and 
Nebraska-need to understand that their mistakes will catch up with them, possibly within their current term 
of office. 
For them, it is important, not only as a substantive matter, but also from the viewpoint of Realpolitik, 
to be conservative in their approvals of subdivisions and new roads, to support infill development and more 
compact forms of development, to seek out viable alternatives to private automobile trips, and to instruct their 
officials accordingly.6 In not doing so, many slow-growth cities have passed up their chance to remain viable 
and attractive places to live. 
4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Like residents of many slow-growth centres, many Winnipeggers are torn between defensive self-
assertion and dyspeptic self-castigation. Local boosterism reflects this mood, and conveys the suggestion 
that Winnipeg lacks some kind of legitimacy. An undercurrent of desperation is palpable, both in advertising 
campaigns on such themes as "Winnipeg: 100 reasons to love it" or "Love me, love my Winnipeg" and in the 
declaration that it is the Jets that kept Winnipeg "on the map." What comes through most clearly are two 
contradictory messages, often asserted simultaneously, the first self-depreciatingly, the second defensively: 
(1) since Winnipeg is not Toronto, or Vancouver, there must be something wrong with It; and (2) there is 
absolutely nothing the matter with Winnipeg. 
Economic development efforts in slow-growth cities often reflect that same mood of ambivalence with 
a hint of desperation. Predictions of economic changes tend to take the form either of pessimistic warnings 
of a clouded future or of declarations that "the big break" is just around the corner: If the Jets go, $50 million 
a year will be lost to the economy; if the Canadian Wheat Board is abolished or relocated, 5000 jobs will be 
lost; Winnipeg is about to become a major North American transportation hub, thousands of jobs will be 
113 
Leo eta/. Urban Development in a Slow-Growth City 
created and millions added to the economy. These recent examples of speculations trumpeted in the local 
media are just samples of what amounts to a steady stream of journalistic manic-depression. Economic 
development efforts are undertaken in a mood akin to that of an addicted gambler, simultaneously desperate 
and hopeful. 
Often, the primary focus of economic development efforts is the attempt to attract new businesses 
or to lure businesses to relocate. Such a strategy is more likely to yield fruit in a fast-growing centre. If a city 
such as Toronto, Boston, San Francisco or Vancouver can offer an attractive environment, good facilities, a 
favourable tax regime and predictable regulations, large companies will consider locating major facilities there, 
because they will find the things they need there: the best talent in corporate law, accounting, engineering and 
financial services, the most reputable universities, and so forth. 
Slow-growth centres are not in a position to match such attractions. To be sure, Winnipeg has much 
to recommend it: a superior park system, a good education system, good recreational facilities in the wider 
region, reasonable commuting times, affordable housing, glorious summer weather, and a transit system that 
-despite excessive low-density development-still runs efficiently and economically. However, for most 
firms, these advantages do not add up to a unique set of attractions. 
When it competes for major firms, Winnipeg generally finds itself having to offer free land, interest-free 
loans and a variety of other incentives-incentives that will reduce the net economic benefit gained. Nor are 
there very good reasons, especially in the economy of the 1990s, for them to spend more than modest 
amounts to attract large companies. The idea that a city has to build its economy on branch operations of 
major corporations is passe. In the economy of the 1990s, small firms can and do prosper, and this is where 
a slow-growth economy is likely to find its best opportunities. 
We can see more clearly why this is the case if we consider some findings in the micro-economics 
literature. Large firms, capable of operating on a national or global scale, have some competitive advantages, 
while small, locally-based enterprises have others, but the balance of those advantages has varied over time 
(Brown, 1992, chap. 11 ). Some sixty years ago, Ronald Coase ( 1937) argued that the activities a firm 
engages in can be co-ordinated either internally, through the firm's own organization, or externally, through 
market mechanisms. 
The large firm raises capital from around the world and provides it to a local facility, but so can the 
private financial market. The large firm provides sales outlets and market networks for the local facility, but 
markets are usually open enough that ownership links to a single large firm are not necessary. The large firm 
can co-ordinate production activities (e.g., preventing the engine from arriving before the chassis), distribution 
systems (ensuring that the goods are on the shelf when they are advertised) and process innovations (the 
winery does not open before the grapevines bear fruit), but, again, private arrangements between independent 
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firms can do the same. 
Whether a particular function is better performed within a large, centralized organization, or by market-
based co-ordination among independent firms depends on the costs involved. Coase and later economists 
have argued that transaction costs arise when firms make contracts (or informal arrangements) with one 
another. Contracts must specify responsibility and action under foreseeable circumstances, provide for 
enforcement, and still cannot eliminate the risks of having one's partner fail to fulfill the contract or having your 
own company forced into an unexpectedly costly fulfilment (Williamson, 1975). 
Handling all aspects of production within a single firm, however, produces administrative costs. 
Management becomes more complex and the decision-makers become isolated from the operations of 
individual units, thereby producing higher management costs, delayed decision-making and increased errors. 
Often, individual units of a large organization are assigned costs to cover the upper management, sales force, 
research and development, and advertising that is disproportionate to what they gain from those activities. 
In the three decades following World War II, many firms found administrative costs more manageable 
than transaction costs, and firms grew increasingly larger and more diverse. Managerial literature, as well 
as practice, made much of the synergies that could come from having complementary products, providing 
different goods to service the same markets, or having a common financial base. The development of new 
corporate structures and financial controls encouraged managers to believe, partially correctly, that they could 
control a highly diverse firm without having a great deal of experience in each of the component parts. Their 
shareholders for the most part were happy to have a firm that was diverse enough to provide a portfolio effect, 
with gains in one part of the organization balancing losses in another, in such a way as to reduce overall risk 
(Chandler, 1997; Lewellen, 1971; Mayd and Myers, 1987; Stultz, 1990; Weston, 1970; Williamson, 1986; 
Vernon, 1977). 
However, a series of interrelated events in the world economy, that began to make themselves felt 
in the 1970s, have reduced transaction costs and increased the advantages of networks of co-ordination 
among smaller firms. Among these are events and changes in markets and technology that tend to favour 
small-batch production of relatively customized products rather than long runs of standardized goods. Also 
among these changes and events are vastly-improved, low-cost systems of communication that operate on 
a global scale, and global-scale market competition that has greatly increased in both intensity and scope 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989; Storper and Walker, 1989; Scott, 1990). 
These developments have made it easier for firms located anywhere to target markets at home or 
anywhere else, secure support services nearby or at a distance, and compete effectively with often unwieldy, 
large-scale organizations. In the financial world, this transformation has been complemented by the growth 
of mutual funds, which provided the portfolio effects that had previously been an advantage of diversified 
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firms. Fund managers, in time, became increasingly convinced that more focused firms produced greater 
returns. Moreover, they found it difficult to assess the financial performance of highly diverse firms, and 
tended to steer away from purchasing their shares (Jensen, 1986; Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997; Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Lamont, 1997; Stein, 1997). 
In short, small, flexible enterprises have, in recent years, been prospering, while the fortunes of large, 
centralized firms have been on the decline. One result has been a great deal of frantic down-sizing of large, 
diverse firms, through "spin-offs"-in which a division is transformed into a separate company-or by selling 
or closing down branches that are no longer an asset to the main organization. For example, in 1993, some 
$17.5 billion (U.S.) worth of spin-offs occurred in Britain and the United States; by 1996 it was over $100 
billion_? The impact of down-sizing has been felt in many communities in the form of branch plant closings or 
moves, with the accompanying loss of jobs. 
However, the fact that a company is divesting itself of a branch is not necessarily a signal that the 
branch is not viable, even if it is being closed down. It may be an "innocent" victim of the parent company's 
response to the fact that a large, diverse company is no longer as competitive as it once was. When the 
parent firm formulates a new, narrower business strategy, a particular local branch may simply not fit the 
strategy. It may be closed down, instead of being sold, because the parent firm lacks the time or opportunity 
to find a buyer, or-in a case where one or more branches manufacture the same product-because the 
parent wishes to limit the number of competitors it will face in future. Such branch plants can often be saved 
if local resources are mobilized. 
For slow-growth cities, there are lessons here. Much of the literature on globalization and the 
expansion of world markets has stressed the disadvantages these changes bring, especially to communities 
that are neither corporate headquarters nor centres of high technology (Noyelle and Stanback, 1983; Smith 
and Feagin, 1987). These arguments are true: rapidly expanding world markets, and the relative decline of 
assembly-line manufacture, have devastated some communities and placed all under intense pressure. Large 
numbers of good blue-collar jobs have been lost; intense competition among communities for branch plants, 
offices and entertainment facilities has made life all too easy for businesses looking for subsidies from the 
public purse; the Hobson's choice between low-wage jobs and welfare has reduced many families to penury, 
and unemployment has left others homeless. 
But few things are all bad, and global markets offer advantages, as well as disadvantages, even to 
slow-growth communities. In many areas of endeavour, locational advantages are not what they once were. 
As we have seen, modern communications make it easier than it has ever been before to find something that 
can be done well locally and market it globally. In Winnipeg, the University of Manitoba, Health Sciences 
Centre, the Institute for Biodiagnostics and a newly-constructed federal virology lab represent concentrations 
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of research expertise in certain areas of medical science which, in turn, have a capacity to attract companies 
. that will create jobs, inciuding good ones. Hog production and processing, while raising serious environmental 
issues, also offers opportunities for the creation of good jobs. A 24-hour airport, if shrewdly-managed, can 
form the nexus for the creation of transportation industry jobs at modestly decent wage levels. 
These and other advantages can be enhanced by local, regional or national government policies that 
make credit available to prospective entrepreneurs; offer assistance to employees who want to take over local 
branch plants that are being shut down and run them as independent businesses; and provide assistance and 
advice to co-operative ventures and local entrepreneurs. There is no need to limit these efforts to the political 
sphere. Leaders in the business community should be encouraged, or pressured, to contribute some of their 
skills and resources. From their perspective, it can be cheap advertising if they get some good publicity for 
it. 
In Winnipeg, these lessons are beginning to penetrate, but it has taken awhile. Indeed, the strategies 
that were tried at first were badly flawed. In the late 1980s, it dawned on Winnipeg business and civic leaders 
that an era of government cut-backs and intensified global competition were presenting the city with a 
changed set of circumstances, and new challenges. In response, a report on the city's economic strengths 
and weaknesses was commissioned and an economic development agency, Winnipeg 2000, was created. 
The report, produced by Price Waterhouse (1990), recommended an economic development strategy typical 
of a slow-growth centre trying to pretend it has a potential for rapid growth. Repeatedly, a heavy stress was 
placed on the attraction of industry to relocate to Winnipeg, as in the following recommendations: 
Attract health care therapy, services, equipment and products manufacturers, and research 
and development centres .... Start approaching firms [in data processing, credit card 
processing, information retrieval, telemarketing, mail order, market research, insurance 
claims and billing, reservation centres and banks] with a view to relocating or opening up new 
facilities. . . . Encourage the existing Manitoba Aerospace Group ... to promote ... the 
creation of new ventures and the attraction of suppliers .... Campaign to attract a prime 
contractor in the computer industry .... Encourage out-of-province suppliers [of high-
technology support goods and services] to set up operations in Winnipeg .... Explore the 
opportunity of developing Winnipeg as a world grain centre (Price Waterhouse, 1990, pp. 93-
97). 
Initially, Winnipeg 2000 tried to follow the consultant's advice, and pursued a policy focusing primarily 
on smoke-stack and glass-tower chasing. But, except in the area of telemarketing-which is appropriate to 
Winnipeg, thanks to a modest cost of living and a relatively well-educated, bilingual population with a widely-
understandable accent in English-these efforts bore little fruit. At the same time, the agency encountered 
opposition on City Council, which began to question its effectiveness. In response, it has gradually moved 
toward a more appropriate strategy, emphasizing the cultivation of local resources, including development of 
the health care, transportation, and aerospace industries; initiatives designed to tap the economic potential 
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of Francophone and Aboriginal communities; and contributions to the fostering of micro-enterprise (Winnipeg 
2000, 1995, pp. 9-14). These ventures have proven more successful than the agency's early initiatives, and 
political opposition to it has waned. 
Initiatives elsewhere in the community also suggest the gradual development of more appropriate 
strategies. For example, the Crocus Fund gets government support to generate local investment for the 
expansion and/or retention of local business. Provincial government "grow bonds" allow for local investment 
in local business ventures. SEED Winnipeg makes micro-credit available for small entrepreneurs and the 
Assiniboine Credit Union has a policy of offering loans to social agencies and businesses in the core area. 
A local branch of CIBC, a major commercial bank, allows Winnipeg Harvest, a food bank, to use its training 
facilities in off-hours to teach job and job-searching skills to its clients. A federal government programme 
provides incentives to banks to make loans to small businesses. 
Such ventures as these are a starting-point in a viable economic development strategy for a slow-
growth centre. A great deal more could be done to improve the level of education and job training-including 
education in the skills necessary for running small businesses-for lower-income people generally and the 
burgeoning population of lower-income Aboriginal people in particular. That allows the building of the local 
economy while addressing the problem of poverty, instead of building the economy, as is so often the case, 
to the accompaniment of the production of poverty. 
The gradual development of more appropriate economic development strategies suggests a groping 
response to experience, rather than a consistent policy change. The recent failed attempt to retain major-
league hockey, as well as public discussion that continues to emphasize the search for "the big break" shows 
that the effort to think through the policy implications of slow growth is, at best, in its infancy. 
5. IMMIGRATION 
Immigration is always a sensitive political issue in Canada, and it has been especially so in recent 
years, as immigration legislation has undergone a series of hotly-contested revisions. Throughout these 
changes, the government has been under pressure to limit immigration, on the basis of fears that immigrants 
will place undue burdens on the social safety net and that they will take jobs from Canadians. The evidence 
that such fears are justified is less than compelling. Indeed, much of the evidence seems to suggest, on the 
contrary, that immigration produces more benefits than costs. 8 
That said, it is also true that immigration is a complex issue, and it is not our intention to attempt a 
contribution to the extensive literature on this subject. Our point focuses on the observation that much of the 
controversy surrounding immigration is centred in major metropolitan areas, notably Toronto and Vancouver. 
In Toronto, much is made of fears that the city will become a magnet for large numbers of immigrants with 
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limited skills many of whom, it is feared, will end up a burden on the state, and perhaps become involved in 
criminal activity. In Vancouver, there is controversy over allegations that Asian immigrants are driving up the 
cost of housing. 
If such arguments have any substance at all, they are not relevant for a city such as Winnipeg, which 
is not in danger of becoming a magnet for large numbers of any population. By the same token, the city is 
an ideal location for people-especially those with limited resources-who are looking for a stable community 
and a chance to make a future for themselves and their families: a large stock of affordable housing; some 
decent schooling at all levels, even in the poorer neighbourhoods; and-for people from any of dozens of 
countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Southern and Eastern Europe, and Asia-a supportive 
community environment. 
Evidence suggests that even in major metropolitan centres, local authorities need not fear that 
immigration will produce adverse consequences. Loveless eta/. (1996, chap. 5) provide a careful calculation 
of the hard-to-measure impacts of immigration on municipal revenues and expenditures in the City of Miami 
and conclude that, over an eight-year period, each immigrant incurs net costs of $25 a year. The authors 
declare this an insignificant finding, considering the relatively small amounts of money involved, as well as the 
difficulties of estimating impacts accurately. 
As insignificant as that cost is, the finding needs to be qualified, and the qualifications tend to 
strengthen the case for immigration in a slow-growth centre. The study wisely made no attempt to undertake 
the probably impossible task of calculating the effect on the economy as a whole of the influx of a new 
population: the jobs that are created, the houses that are renovated, the decaying neighbourhoods that 
become enlivened with commerce and street life imported from another country. In fast-growing Miami, where 
housing is already priced beyond the reach of many, and the existing street life presents a formidable 
challenge to police and social agencies, a fresh influx of immigrants may be seen primarily as a problem, and 
an expense. 
But, in a slow-growth centre, with a large stock of affordable housing going begging, it is possible to 
see immigration in a very different light. In Winnipeg, immigrants could occupy houses that will otherwise 
decay, pay taxes, create jobs, and help to reinvigorate the inner-city. Undoubtedly they would also bring 
social problems with them and find conflicts waiting for them. Any responsible immigration policy needs to 
prepare for such problems, and have counter-measures in place (Loveless eta/., 1996). But it seems more 
than probable that the long-term benefits of encouraging such an influx would greatly outweigh the costs, 
especially in a slow-growing city. 
To a limited extent, this is being recognized, although the case for recognizing it is based on provincial 
economic considerations, rather than concerns with urban development. In 1996, the Canadian federal 
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government permitted Manitoba to nominate a limited number of immigrants in order to increase the numbers 
of workers available for employment in the garment industry. For its part, Manitoba is promoting itself as a 
destination for immigrants, and has set the goal of increasing from about 3,500 in 1995 to 8,000 eventually 
(Barkman, 1997). 
A web-site expounds Manitoba's advantages (http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/immsettl)-and offers 
practical advice-but puts a great deal of emphasis on such things as recreation and leisure, with special 
attention to rural Manitoba. Affordable housing gets the barest of mentions. In short, the attraction of 
immigrants to help build Winnipeg's economy, and rebuild the inner-city, does not appear to have figured 
prominently in the design of the policy. If all concerned can be persuaded of the importance of making policy 
in slow-growth cities that suit their particular circumstances, it would seem that consultation with the city, and 
the city's involvement in developing provincial immigration policy, could produce some important benefits. 
Here, as in the other policy areas we have considered, a glimmering that different policies need to 
be formulated for fast- and slow-growth cities may have dawned, but the idea has not truly penetrated. 
6. CONClUSION 
It is not immediately obvious why the policies characteristically associated with fast growth exert such 
an extraordinary influence on so many people-a pull strong enough often to override what in other 
circumstances might well be seen as ordinary common sense. One does not have to be a genius to puzzle 
out the consequences of stringing infrastructure to the horizon at low densities or to see that different cost 
structures for housing yield different policy opportunities, but the attraction of fast-growth policies seems to 
be strong enough to block such ordinary ideas from entering the minds of many otherwise prudent people. 
An obvious explanation is that all these apparent policy errors are not errors at all, but willful 
subservience to powerful interests-developers who profit from low-density suburban development, ordinary 
people reacting against immigrants out of a combination of xenophobia and fear of competition for jobs, and 
so forth. There is much truth in that explanation: Economically powerful groups and the fears of ordinary 
people always carry a great deal of weight in politics. 
But an explanation resting exclusively on the power of interest groups is not quite good enough. It 
might help explain why an argument for uniform national immigration policies wins the day over advocacy of 
regionally differentiated policies, but it does not explain why the latter argument is not even a serious factor 
in the debate, nor does it explain the extraordinary psychological power-amounting virtually to intimidation 
-of the threat that departure of the Jets will rob Winnipeg of the status that comes with being on the map. 
The fact that the threat of being taken off the major league sport map has produced public subsidies in many 
cities confirms its power. 
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Undoubtedly, at least part of the explanation lies in the realm of psychology, well beyond the scope 
of this paper. What is important for us to notice is that the desire to be in the major leagues or, failing that, 
at least to act as if we are, has an important influence on city politics. At the same time, the analysis in these 
pages suggests that there is a great deal to be gained by overcoming that influence. 
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NOTES 
1. The contributing author has been very helpful in developing this paper, but bears no responsibility for 
any excesses. 
2. Exact figures are hard to find because economic statistics that are taken for granted by analysts of 
the national and provincial economies are often unavailable for census metropolitan areas. Jane 
Jacobs ( 1984) laments the lack of attention paid to urban economies. 
3. This passage draws on Leo, 1996. 
4. A figure in the range of $28-30 million, which is often cited as the cost if the effort (Silver, 1996, pp. 
164-67), is arrived at by deducting the proceeds to the public purse from the sale of the team, which 
was partly publicly-owned. However, the National Hockey League's refusal to agree to revenue 
sharing to benefit smaller teams made it clear that the league was not prepared to support a team in 
a market Winnipeg's size. If government had acted on the basis of a sober recognition of the 
difference between fast-growing and slow-growing cities, the team could have been sold before 
money was spent on trying to keep it in Winnipeg, and there would have been no need to write-off 
losses against that gain. 
5. Winnipeg Free Press, 26 December 1995, p. A4. 
6. Downs (1994) offers an extensive catalogue of alternatives to conventional, low-density development 
patterns. See also Blais 1995, CUPR Report 1996, Greater Toronto Area Task Force 1996. 
7. Noted in The Economist, 5 April 1997, p. 59. 
8. Beach and Green, 1989, Loveless eta/., 1996, Reischauer, 1993, but see also Rao and Kapsalis, 
1982. 
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POST -MODERNIZING UNICITY-THE NEXT 25 YEARS: 
FRAGMENTATION OR TRANSFORMATION? 
lan Wight 
INTRODUCTION 
Unicity was 25 years old in 1997; if it survives another 25, it will be 50 years old in 2022. The "State 
of Unicity" conference mainly focused on the past 25 years; this commentary is pitched more as speculation 
on the next 25 years, trying to anticipate the changing contexts and the interplay of critical factors that might 
conjure up new Unicity manifestations and forms. Inevitably-in this rather personal offering-there will be 
some potentially "stretched" 2020 visions and, admittedly, a considerable measure of "wish-filled" thinking. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the commentary will prompt further reflection by others on the rich lode of 
conference proceedings, to inform the new work that needs to be undertaken, not so much to "modernize" 
Unicity but to effect what might best be described as its "post-modernization." 
The paper is structured in two main parts: a probing, question-based, review of four main contributing 
contexts as far as Winnipeg is concerned-the continental, if not global, perspective; the provincial/national 
jurisdictional mix; the regional setting encompassing Winnipeg's municipal neighbours; and the natural setting 
or ecosystem context. The second part of the paper offers some 2020 visions, and implicit proposals for 
consideration, addressing a revamped Unicity, or more fundamental transformations. 
PART 1: CHANGING CONTEXTS 
1.1 WINNIPEG AND THE AMERICAS/NORTHERN HEMISPHERE 
Will Winnipeg-in the next 25 years-become better positioned to achieve the "world-class" status 
that has exercised, but eluded, many of its seekers in the present century? Compared to its fragmented and 
parochial antecedents, there is little doubt that the Unicity structure has eased the development and pursuit 
of a comparatively grand-scale economic development strategy. Such strategising has come to the fore in 
recent years for all self-respecting city-regions. In Winnipeg's case, the strategy seems to have two themes: 
(i) a North-South surface orientation on a continental ("Pan-Am") scale-capitalizing on its North American 
continental centrality, and seeking better connections with Central and South America; and (ii) an East-West 
air transportation-based orientation on a Northern Hemisphere scale-rooted in the Winnport concept, and 
seeking better connections with Western Europe and the Asia Pacific region. Can such an ambitious strategy 
be realized within the current Unicity structure? Would the prospects for realization be enhanced by a 
"post-modernized" structure? 
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Unicity was formed to deal mainly with smaller scale considerations-metropolitan at the most. It did 
not greatly disturb the provincial scheme of things, and although it attracted national interest at the time, that 
was about the extent of it. The new continental and hemispheric strategising, while city-centred, ranges well 
beyond provincial and national boundaries and jurisdictions. Unicity-in its standard municipal form-seems 
a very inadequate institutional basis for pulling off much of such a grand strategy, especially in the current 
context of poor relations with the Province of Manitoba (see Diamant, 1997) and a retreating Canadian "state" 
(see following section). The new context for any new structural reform obviously involves a global reference 
point, to succeed the initial regional/metropolitan stance. In this respect, it is worth reflecting on some of 
Magnusson's proposals, which hinge on his sense of an emerging single Global City, a highly networked 
system, with contemporary cities functioning as nodes-in a comparatively "flat" network (Magnusson, 1996, 
1997b ). This literally collapses the idea of a vertical hierarchical system of cities; there are no "world-class" 
nor "less-than-world class" cities. All cities-all urbanities-now have a global reach, regardless of size and 
complexity-normalized as global-"village" or "neighbourhood"-nodes in the Global City. 
A successful, continental-contexted, economic development strategy for Winnipeg would seem to 
depend on provincial and federal involvement initially, but the relevance and necessity of such jurisdictions 
would recede as the strategy met with success. Indeed, to become a well-regarded, frequently-exercised 
nodality, Winnipeg may have to optimize its autonomy to operate swiftly and nimbly in the new global 
world-economy-it will need to be welcoming and convivial, very together and fully evolved, with no notable 
dysfunction. This positioning will need to begin with an overhaul of the existing institutional framework-which 
was designed with the needs of the previous century in mind. Much of this has to "give" if Winnipeg is to have 
a chance of "making it" in the coming century. In this way, continentalization and globalization will possibly 
drive a constitutional restructuring of Canada, and of provincial-municipal relationships. 
1.2 WINNIPEG AND MANITOBA/CANADA 
Will there still be a "Manitoba" and a "Canada" to "contain" Winnipeg in 2020? And if they are still 
around, will they mean the same as they do now? Will they mean more, or less, for Winnipeg and 
Winnipeggers? It is tempting to remain seduced by the status quo, inured to the inertia that has characterized 
the Canadian federation for most of this century. The arrival of Newfoundland and the carving out of Nunavut 
appear to be aberrations. Yet, by current European experience-unification and disintegration, new regional 
autonomies and old historic nation revivals-Canada, and the U.S., appear ridiculously rigid, inflexible and 
"out-of-synch" with the post-modern times. And it is not as if there are no templates for change in the political 
map of North America. In a provocative book that preceded his current "Edge City" fame, Joel Garreau 
advanced the idea of "The Nine Nations of North America," replacing the current three nation-states (Garreau, 
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1981 ). As far as Canada is concerned, only Quebec remained intact-the other parts were reconstituted as 
parts of new nations, generally oriented North-South, with their capitals in what is now the U.S. For example, 
Winnipeg was located among the outer reaches of a nation labelled 'The Breadbasket," off-centred in Kansas 
City. Garreau reported this as an emerging reality almost two decades ago; if he revisited the subject now, 
there is little doubt that his case would be much stronger (following the various free trade agreements and 
mid-continent corridor initiatives). Given the current environment of hyper-change, where change itself is 
changing, it now seems not at all unreasonable to anticipate some such change by 2020. 
But even this may amount to minor fragmentation in the overall scheme of things. Garreau may have 
identified the possibility for tripling the number of conventional nation-states in North America, but others see 
as many as "500 Nations" within the current continental frame (Josephy, 1994). This is the Aboriginal 
perspective, and an increasingly relevant reference point for post-modernization projects. It also naturally 
embraces the ecological perspective in the wider sense of the term, with the "500 nations" manifesting what 
might be defined as old "bio-regionalisms" in contemporary parlance. It is perhaps easier for Manitobans than 
for most other Canadians at the present time to begin to appreciate the working out of such potential 
reformulations, as the province provides the setting for the first comprehensive self-government scheme being 
negotiated between the First Nations and the senior governments. Once self-government is achieved, can 
self-determination be far behind? How should this "ascension of the Aboriginal" be factored into the future 
of Unicity, especially when Winnipeg is projected to have-among major census agglomerations-one of the 
highest proportions and largest concentrations of Aboriginals in its population make-up by 2020? It is difficult 
to escape the conclusion that this force cannot but fundamentally re-colour, if not transform, the Unicity 
structure and culture. 
It is also difficult to expect the larger structures of "Canada" and "Manitoba" to hold steady under 
pressure from such forces; an anything but steady "state" for each must be contemplated by 2020, if not 
before. There will be the globalisation pressures from above alluded to in the previous section, and localization 
pressures from below-such as the Aboriginal influence. The latter is also likely to be amplified by a municipal 
push, at least among the country's largest cities-including Winnipeg, for some form of constitutional 
recognition. If there is self-determination for First Nations, it will seem natural and just for the larger 
province-like municipal formations to seek the same arrangements. And if such enhanced status is not 
actively conferred, it may accrue by default, as existing federal nation-states decline in influence. In Canada's 
case the provinces may continue to grow in influence for some time-in some respects we still seem to be 
in a "province-building" (as distinct from nation-building) phase. But how long can this last, especially in 
Manitoba where an unusually large majority of the population resides in one centre? And where Winnipeg 
currently tolerates the dubious status of a "have-not" city in a "have-not" province? Is it not possible that an 
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awakened and mobilized Winnipeg could help lead a new phase of "citistate-building," that might turn the 
situation around for both the city and what would remain of the now province? 
Little of this may make sense unless it is appreciated that the simultaneous operation of globalization 
and localization forces in today's world (sometimes rendered as "glocalization") powers a cascade of 
integrations, dis-integrations and re-integrations at inter-related scales. For every new integration, there is a 
necessary dis-integration, and a re-integration at another scale or in a new form; this has always been the 
pattern, only now it is all happening much faster, the sum total effect being manifested perhaps in what 
Richard Kaplan has termed "the coming anarchy" (Kaplan, 1994). Just as Canada and Manitoba might "break-
down" or be re-constituted under such forces, so might Winnipeg-such as along traditional neighbourhood 
lines, or more modern shopping mall district lines. And internal fragmentation may be accompanied by a new 
external integration, on the way to a citistate formation. There is already much scope for Winnipeg to be better 
integrated with current social and economic times and spaces. For example, Unicity may be regarded as a 
modernist creation, in a pre-modernist construction of provinces and municipalities-now faced with the 
imperative to post-modernize. If it fails in the latter project the current "out-of-synch-ness" and level of 
dysfunction will only become more acute-a node to bypass in the new Global City. 
As a counterpoint to all the globalisation, the prospects are favourable for a new importance for 
localities, if they can get their act together in terms of healthy internal differentiation. In Winnipeg's case, this 
could mean a revival of the old "saintly" parochialities-strung out along the rivers, or, it could mean 
normalization of new convivialities (Theobald, 1997) that embrace-while transcending-the positives in these 
· parochial roots. This could be a way out of the current impasse, where Winnipeg struggles to achieve the 
status of, but is anything but, "one great city-one with the strength of many"-its wishful thinking motto, 
invoked on the coat-tails of Unicity. The city is indeed badly "faulted" along class, language, ethnic, economic 
and political lines (Gerecke and Reid, 1992). It is perhaps expecting too much of "just" Unicity to effect a new 
Elysian fusion. Something will have to "give" at a higher-provincial-level. And here, some parallels emerge 
between the city and the province. Both eschew simplification-they are indeed unusual complexities, 
palpable pluralities, and fundamentally fragmented or "faulted"-almost post-modern before their time, it 
sometimes seems, without acknowledging all this entails. The inherent differences and distinctions in both 
cases also seem more conflicting than complementary-there may be an assumption that they all neatly 
"balance out," but the denial of the differences simply flaws analyses and hobbles solutions in public policy 
contexts. 
Manitoba breaks down too easily into three very distinct parts (albeit with overlapping 
"memberships")-Metro-Manitoba, Agro-Manitoba and Abo(riginai)-Manitoba; it is a tough call for one 
legislature and any one piece of legislation, or the associated administrative machinery, to do justice to this 
129 
Wight Post-Modernizing Unicity-The Next 25 Years 
kind of diversity. No part ends up being well-served, or at best only one does at any particular time-but at 
the expense of the others. For the past decade or so, at least, it seems that Winnipeg-at the heart of 
Metro-Manitoba-has been a loser, and has become estranged from the province. And the estrangement can 
be expected to increase without targeted intervention (see Diamant, 1997; Selinger, 1997). Can Unicity be 
revamped with this in mind, around the notion of a "sub-province" of Metro-Manitoba? Can a restructuring of 
not just Unicity but Manitoba be contemplated? This becomes easier to contemplate as province-building 
peaks, as provinces move towards a form of "retirement," after handing off the economic production and social 
construction responsibilities to their maturing progeny, including a Winnipeg-centred citistate. Levin, 1997 
appears to have this in mind (near the end of his presentation), and Roger Gibbons, in a contribution to an 
Alberta futures seminar, has argued the declining importance of the entity "Alberta," in relation to the entity 
"Calgary" in 201 0 (in CBC Radio Ideas, 1997). Some form of fragmentation of what is now "Manitoba" may 
therefore be a natural as well as necessary part of the post-modernizing positioning of what is now Unicity for 
"citistate" status (Peirce eta/., 1993). 
1.3 WINNIPEG AND ITS REGION 
When Unicity was created, a formal legislated region (the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater 
Winnipeg) was dissolved, and a new informal region, consisting of Unicity and its new municipal neighbours 
was effectively ushered into being. Unification of the "old" region of lower-tier municipalities was effected, but 
the new formation was so different from its new municipal neighbours that the prospects for a new functional 
region, happily encompassing all relevant entities in a new common regional purpose, became slim to none. 
This unfortunate, but almost inevitable, consequence of Unicity's formation has bedevilled Unicity to this day, 
and increasingly so as metropolitan influences have intensified in importance and extended their spatial reach. 
Can Unicity ever be reconciled with its otherwise region? Is Winnipeg doomed to be a city alienated from its 
region, suffering a case of chronic "perimeteritis"? These are indeed scary prospects, especially in the context 
of global competitiveness where excellent city-region collaboration is increasingly a first-base "fundamental" 
(Dodge, 1996). It appears that Unicity has got itself into such a "state," in terms of out-of-reach regional 
relationships, that the only way out entails a radical re-structuring of Unicity itself and its operating 
environment, to the extent of substantially reversing the old unification-while simultaneously effecting a new 
"Metro-Manitoba" provincialization. 
For much of the first half of the twentieth century, Winnipeg's region was fairly uncontentiously 
represented in terms of "Greater Winnipeg." In the earliest decades, Winnipeg seems to have had an ability 
to annex at will, but soon new suburban growth spawned new municipalities, "freezing" the old central city for 
several decades. Single-purpose inter-municipal service agencies proliferated under the "Greater Winnipeg" 
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banner. This appellation could be tolerated by the "lessers" because it entailed no political subordination-of 
any real consequence-to the then City of Winnipeg. The shift from this essentially inter-municipal regionalism 
to a more metropolitan regionalism began around 1950, in a low-key advisory manner initially-until 
institutionalized in 1960 with the formation of the metropolitan tier of municipal government, over 13 lower-tier 
municipal governments, including the then City of Winnipeg. When Unicity was created, metropolitan 
regionalism was effectively killed off, and a distinct vacuum was created. There could be no going back to 
"Greater Winnipeg" labelling-this was now too impolitic, or-in keeping with the new times-too politically 
incorrect. 
Yet regional issues by no means disappeared with the formation of Unicity-they simply shifted to a 
new level, literally and figuratively. The province began referencing the "Winnipeg Region" in an early 1970s 
initiative to address ex-urban sprawl concerns. This actually led to a revamped Planning Act and new 
Provincial Land Use Policies, but it also enabled small planning districts (of two or three rural or small urban 
municipalities) to be formed in Winnipeg's "region," but-perversely-without Unicity participation. The 
determining influence of the province-rather than Unicity-in establishing Winnipeg's region became clearer 
in the late 1980s with its formation of the Winnipeg Region Committee, set up in part to deal with the 
consequences of having eliminated the last vestiges of the "additional zone"-a greenbelt-type planning 
measure, dating from the Metro Winnipeg days, conferring some city control over ex-urban development. This 
Committee, co-chaired by three provincial cabinet ministers and made up of municipal mayors and reeves, 
quickly evolved into the Capital Region Committee, which became jointly responsible, with the Provincial 
Round Table on the Economy and the Environment, for the preparation of the Capital Region Strategy. This 
"strategy" has now progressed to the stage of political and technical deliberations on how to implement the 
policies laid out in an "application" document. However, the whole strategy development process has been 
so suspect that it has garnered virtually no public recognition or credibility (it was not mentioned once during 
the Unicity conference presentations). Nevertheless, the initiative has underlined that the important reference 
has been to Manitoba's Capital Region; it is not Winnipeg's but the province's region. Unicity does not have 
a functioning and functional regional context of its own. 
Can Winnipeg work its way out of this "bind"? In some respects, it now finds itself in roughly the same 
position as the old centre city at the inception of Unicity (see Diamant, 1997), and it is tempting to consider 
another iteration on a larger geographical scale-Unicity Marque II or UniRegion/Metro Marque II. But political 
times as well as geographical spaces have changed in the past 25 years, and even greater changes must be 
anticipated in the next 25. There have already been signs of Unicity fraying at the edges-most notably in the 
secession of Headingley, and similar (but unsuccessful for now) efforts in St. Germaine-Vermette. If the 
Unicity structure is not up to satisfying the folks at Headingley, it is most certainly not up to smoothly 
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incorporating further rural or small town territory in the outer reaches of the Capital Region. It seems that you 
need to be on a par with a province to deal with this kind of diversity. And it is not easy to even begin to 
contemplate such movement until you reframe your problem analysis basis. There are signs, for example, that 
Unicity-as currently constituted-is still regarded by some commentators as "the regional authority" (see 
Selinger, 1997), or that it currently corresponds with a full, and fully-functional, "city-region" (see Artibise, 
1997). The burden of the earlier argument in this section is that such assessments could not be further from 
present reality. 
This regional context is one that Unicity will have to come to terms with, in a much more pro-active 
manner than has been the case in the recent past. Neither the city nor the rest of the province can afford any 
more complacency. The issue requires a fundamental re-strategising on the city's part, to target the province 
as the least necessary level of government as far as Winnipeggers are concerned, but also to appreciate that 
Unicity itself is a very cumbersome structure, too narrowly attentive to business interests while being 
comparatively unfriendly to civic endeavours at the neighbourhood and "community of communities" level. 
New governance initiatives on a regional scale will only be successful in concert with new governance 
initiatives on a neighbourhood or community scale-but the future will require reference to new post-modern 
forms in place of modernist, or warped pre-modernist, interpretations of terms such as region, neighbourhood, 
community and municipality. The "region" replacement in Winnipeg's case may well be something like a 
"collaborative" or "citistate" (Peirce et at., 1993) on a "Metro-Manitoba" scale; the "neighbourhood" may be 
something like a "conviviality" (Theobald, 1997). In between, in place of "municipality" there may be something 
like an "urbanity" or a "rurality," within an umbrella "eco-logicality" or "eco-syndicate." 
The post-modern reality is only now emerging. It will necessarily have a very different feel from what 
has gone before-such as, "governances" superseding governments, networks and webs replacing hierarchy 
and hegemony, "blurs" shading out borders or boundaries, "democratics" topping politics. There will be 
radically new "urbanisms," such as extensions of the inherently contradictory "urban villages," and a greater 
role for "virtual communities." And new "regionalisms"-if they achieve conceptualization-might well make 
a mockery of the root term (region), especially if Magnusson's analysis ("there is no 'outside' to the urban") 
holds: 
So: to think of the urban is not to think of particular regions, but rather of a mode of human 
life that extends everywhere on Earth and implicates everyone in it. In this "urban to which 
there is no beyond" there are processes of governance that we have scarcely begun to 
identify. The task of naming these processes, questioning those processes, and calling 
ourselves to account in relation to them is the most pressing political task of our time 
(Magnusson, 1997a). 
New processes will be paramount in resolving Unicity's regional conundrum. As Magnusson indicates, 
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they may still have to be invented, or perhaps it is more of a case that they have still to be designed, 
inventively-rather than trying to adapt past processes. This is clearly another important dimension of the 
post-modernization of Unicity. At the very least, it could mean making room for more sectors-private and 
non-profit for example, rather than the past public-sector preoccupation, and a truly more inclusive and 
collective initial visioning, then institutional capacity-building, approach. The latter would amount to more 
sensitive sequencing and staging, customized to the situation, rather than resorting too quickly to a 
"one-size-fits-all" structural solution (Wallis, 1994; Dodge, 1996; Paetkau, 1996). The process design would 
be an interesting challenge and focus for a follow-up conference. 
1.4 WINNIPEG AND ITS ECOSYSTEM CONTEXT 
How well has Unicity related to its natural setting? Has its region ever been accorded a bioregional 
dimension (Sale, 1991 ), or an ecological basis (Luccarelli, 1995)? Is Unicity sustainable-not just 
technologically but ecologically (Orr, 1992; Vander Ryn and Cowan, 1996)? Might Unicity aspire to "eco-city" 
status over the next 25 years (Roseland, 1997)? Or are such questions themselves questionable-out of 
place, unnatural, inadmissible-in any discussion of the future of Unicity? At the time of its formation "the 
environment" had nowhere near attained the public policy prominence that emerged later in the 1970s. It was 
not a major concern in its design. If Unicity was being formed now, the situation would possibly be very 
different-ecology has emerged as a competing reference point, but the physical environment-and 
overcoming it-seems to be the new limit of municipal frames of reference. The city's relationship with nature 
is still just something to be engineered-to the city's specifications; the city is perceived separate from, rather 
than integral with, nature. This is not unique to Winnipeg and Unicity-it is a function in part of the almost 
anti-ecological basis of municipal forms of government. It is questionable if these stances can be sustained 
in the next 25 years, without adversely impacting the sustainability of city life as we now know it. 
Winnipeg-in terms of its main sphere of influence-is actually positioned quite favourably in terms 
of ecological diversity at the macro eco-zone level. Slices of the Prairie, Parkland and Boreal Forest eco-zones 
lie in its immediate vicinity-poised to deliver a wide range of what are apt to become increasingly valued 
ecological services if managed responsibly on an ecosystem basis (Tomalty eta/., 1994). Unicity is currently 
cut off from this wider ecosystem context-and in fact could be more accurately represented as being headed 
for an ecological dead-end. The dominant Prairie eco-zone has recently been assessed-somewhat 
dubiously-as being neither clearly unsustainable nor clearly sustainable (Manitoba Environment, 1997). Upon 
close review of the indicators referenced, and the construction of the measurement summary "barometer," 
it seems clear that this highly equivocal outcome has been conveniently manufactured to avoid politically 
unpalatable consequences. Even so, it is apparent that its Winnipeg urban "eco-enclave" cannot be so 
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equivocally assessed; it is clearly not sustainable. And the city's own resulting "ecological footprint" 
(Wackernagel and Rees, 1996) may be conservatively estimated as many (15 to 20) times larger than the 
city's official jurisdiction. Unicity is an exploiter and a despoiler of other areas beyond its borders. 
Will the situation be any different in 2020? Will Unicity's ecological footprint be larger or smaller? Will 
there have been "genuine progress" for a change (Cobb eta/., 1995), or simply more "gross" production? Will 
Unicity have simply "Fioodway-ed" its way to a form of shaky technological sustainability, or will it be well on 
the way to a commendable ecological sustainability, noteworthy on a global scale and the basis of trade in 
ecologically-appropriate technology transfer? While the status quo-as in "more of the same"-does not bear 
thinking about, an alternative course may be worked out in terms of an eco-governance context for the 
transformation of Unicity (Birkeland, 1996). This would be another dimension of the post-modernization 
project-overturning the anti-ecological bias of existing municipal formations (Artibise and Hill, 1993). 
PART 2: 2020 VISIONS 
Based on the preceding review of changing contexts, Unicity is liable to be buffeted by considerable 
changes that will severely challenge the existing structure and force reconsideration of its adequacy in a 
post-modernization context. Much will hinge on an accurate analysis of the existing situation, an informed 
envisioning of alternative forms and a clear appreciation of the shifts in position they might entail. A beginning 
of such an exercise is offered below to round out these musings on the next 25 years of Unicity. 
2.1 FROM CITY CORPORATION TO CIVIC CRUCIBLE 
Unicity is now the (decreasingly public) Corporation of the City of Winnipeg, undergoing an 
accentuated phase of corporatisation (Selinger, 1997), making itself over more thoroughly in the image of any 
large private sector corporation. Sometimes it seems to be still caught in a pre-Panama Canal time-warp, with 
its "world-class city" boosterism and business-driven development agenda. There is a distinct 
"desperately-seeking-development"-and an associated "desperately-accommodating-of-any-develop-
ment"-stance on the part of the city which seemingly leaves little room for, or interest in, much in the way 
of publicly planned intervention-visionary or regulatory. Private pursuits have captured or coloured much of 
the public domain. Unicity, it seems, is primarily a private business or land development service provider, 
driven by business models itself-under the foolish apprehension that a government can be run as a business 
(Jacobs, 1992; Saul, 1995; Mintzberg, 1996). Increasingly a slave to the market-god, "Winnipeg Inc." has 
missed the critical differences between markets and communities (Soros, 1997) and its own critical role in 
underwriting communities before companies. Under the influence of corporate culture, the city is commoditized 
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as a commercial profit-centre-but at the crucial cost of its civics. Unicity can no longer be easily perceived 
as "of' or "for" or "by" the ordinary people of Winnipeg; it is becoming more of a comparatively exclusive club. 
If this analysis holds, Unicity-in the next 25 years-is liable to be fragmented and dissolved by 
market forces and commercial transactions. This is not a pleasant vision-a city/market of individual 
self-seeking consumers rather than citizens looking out for, and looking to serve, their community. The shift 
that needs to be contemplated is from positioning Unicity as a commercial profit-centre to positioning it instead 
as a great people-place, with a rich community life. The vision is one of city as civic citadel or crucible. In 
Winnipeg's case at the present time, this will entail a distinct empowering of neighbourhoods and 
communities-reversing current trends. Steps along the way could include adapting the business 
improvement zone model to be of service to neighbourhoods in general (Selinger, 1997). A strong positive 
statement could also be made by copying the targeted effort represented by the Business Liaison and 
Inter-governmental Affairs Branch of the City of Winnipeg (the only new branch created in the 1994 civic 
restructuring), and establishing an equally focused and influential "Neighbourhoods Liaison and Inter-sectoral 
Affairs" Branch. Such overt "balancing" of the community and business "customer base" would go a long way 
in restoring civic credibility, and strengthening the "citizen base" that will be so important in future inter-city 
"quality of life" stakes. 
2.2 FROM UNICITY MARQUE I TO MARQUE II-OR A "CLASSIC/CIVIC" MODEL? 
Is the Unicity structure basically sound, making the future prescription basically a case of "staying the 
course"(Artibise, 1997)-with only some tinkering here and there to tune up the functioning? Or is there a case 
for more fundamental reform, if not outright transformation? The first position does not appear to have very 
many adherents-on the strength of the conference presentations sample. A few more might settle for some 
reform within the present basic structure (Thomas, 1997), or simply for a rolling back of the regressive 
"deforms" that have been introduced over the past 25 years, perverting the initial vision. Such changes might 
deliver nothing more than a Unicity Marque 11-a new sleeker body perhaps, but with basically the same old 
engine and frame underneath. The main theme of the argument offered here is that such "new modelling" is 
unlikely to engage post-modernization imperatives; the structure will remain dysfunctional in such a context. 
The analysis here indicates the need for a more radical re-modelling. 
Maintaining the metaphor somewhat, the alternative vision recommended for consideration is to 
pursue a Classic/Civic model-picking up on a theme from the previous section, while acknowledging some 
value in past formulations-potentially as far back as early Greek civilization. The (post-)modern version is 
much more inclusive however-essentially all-inclusive, and much less hierarchical-more of a network of 
comparative equals. The vision is one of an integrated network of community interests, and communities of 
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interest-forming a city of simultaneous communitarians and cosmopolitans, where Total Quality Politics 
(Thomas, 1997) rather than TOM would be the modus operandi (see also the burden of the arguments 
forwarded by Magnusson, 1997a and Levin, 1997). 
2.3 FROM UNICITY TO UNIREGION-OR TO CITISTATE? 
There can be little doubt that Unicity has an informal sphere of significant influence well beyond its 
legal boundaries. In some cases this mismatch of functional influence and official jurisdiction can be costly 
and frustrating for Unicity (Yauk, 1995). And it would be easy for such an analysis to lead to a proposal to 
spatially expand Unicity-such as was recently done in the Halifax metropolitan area-from a "compact" to 
a "pick-up truck," from Unicity to a form of UniRegion. However, as was argued in Section 1.3, this would 
appear to be a non-starter-with the Headingley case providing the negative litmus test. A regional spatial 
expansion would also require a balancing "internal differentiation-cum-disintegration" of Unicity as now 
formulated, as well as reversing some of the regressive "deforms" perpetrated in the past 25 years in the 
service of greater administrative and political centralization-at the expense of democratic decentralization. 
The alternative vision emerging from the analysis-as aligned with a post-modernization 
imperative-may be represented as a "citistate" for that part of Manitoba falling under the metropolitan 
influence of Winnipeg. A spatial rendition of this area of influence would be roughly the territory within the 
original Province of Manitoba-when it was known as the "postage stamp" province. A "citistate" is envisioned 
as corresponding more closely with a modern province than a modern municipality, although-when worked 
out under the post-modern paradigm-it could operate quite differently from either contemporary form of 
government (Peirce eta!., 1993). The proposed shift would also be in the direction of that alluded to by some 
conference presenters (Levin, 1997; Magnusson, 1996, 1997a). Steps towards its realization could be taken: 
by an initial reorganization of the present provincial Ministry of Urban Affairs as the Ministry of Capital Region 
Affairs; by progressively transferring more and more of the responsibility for provincial servicing of Capital 
Region residents and businesses to this particular provincial Ministry; by increasing the governance 
responsibilities of Capital Region MLAs for overseeing this streamlined servicing, including all regional-scale 
servicing involving existing municipalities; and by reorganizing the municipal level of government within the 
Capital Region-on the basis of neighbourhood/district collectivities or convivialities-both within and 
surrounding what is now Winnipeg. The end-result would be something like a "sub-province," with companion 
sub-provinces for the other two components of Manitoba. There may also be a need for joint responsibility by 
the three sub-provinces for a distinct "Capitol District"-used and supported by each, in and around the 
current downtown/inner-city of Winnipeg. 
The above may well qualify as one of the more "stretched" 2020 visions in this piece, but it should be 
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placed in the context of an anticipated very different post-modern reality, where Winnipeg and environs have 
become but one of many "nodes" in the Global City (Magnusson, 1996, 1997b ), in a post-( conventional)-city 
age (Savitch and Vogel, 1996 ). This will be a world of simultaneous global/urban villagers/citizens. It outlines 
the kind of program we need to plan and design for-to reinvent Unicity. 
2.4 FROM UNICITYTO ECO-SYSTEM-STATE? 
A final design parameter that has been singled out in this analysis-but which should really be 
seamlessly integrated throughout-revolves around the ecological dimension. An alternative "citistate" might 
indeed constitute some of the necessary progress, but without the ecological dimension being designed in, 
and throughout, it might simply function as the socio-political equivalent of a technological fix-another vehicle 
speeding us towards an ecological dead-end. The alternative vision is therefore one of an eco-citistate 
(Roseland, 1997), full of ecological citizens (New City Magazine, 1997). This "state" may be even 
broader-an eco-system-state, referencing what some call a bio-region-a collective "home-place," for urbans 
and rurals, Aboriginals and others. Perhaps all can rally around a jointly-researched and consensually 
established new name for this place they can all call home and which they all count on to sustain them. This 
research may unearth some sense of the wider Buffalo Commons that used to characterise the prairies and 
plains (Callenbach, 1996) giving new life to Manitoba's bison motif, while reaching further afield across 
provincial and state borders-keeping horizons appropriately broad and long. 
CODA 
Unlike some other cities-such as Toronto (the pre-megacity original) and Portland, 
Oregon-Winnipeg has never been dubbed as "a city that works," despite all the structural innovation. Will 
this change in the next 25 years? Or is Winnipeg going to remain a living reminder of, and slave to, its 
parochial and boosterist past? Will Winnipeg continue to be seen primarily as-at best-a public corporation 
serving private business first and city folks second? Or, will it become clearer that Winnipeg, as a community 
of communities-rather than as a corporation-has indeed worked-seemingly in spite of its formal structure 
and its formal corporate representation. 
Perhaps Winnipeg, and its associated environs, would "work" even better if it was constructively 
"re-fragmented"-not necessarily reverting to the pre-Metro single-tier municipal mosaic, but reconstituted as 
a network of new millennium municipalities, confederated in a provincial/municipal blended citistate of 
sorts-bringing together public authority, private enterprise, and community service in a new post-modern 
governance collaborative. The new form would encompass-while transcending-old "regional" formulations, 
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and would be underpinned by a common conviction to "govern," and be "governed," in accord with ecological 
principles. This could be a configuration that some backward glancers might pooh-pooh as simply re-heated 
modern-style regional government, but others might acknowledge and value as a post-modern 
eco-governance model, attempting-to mesh with the emerging global and ecological realmes. This ~s the model 
elaborated here to explore one possible future for Unicity-over the next 25 years. Time will tell if this has any 
merit; meantime, others are invited to join the debate-Unicity can only be the better for it. 
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Map 3: Winnipeg Region (Source: TransPian 2010). 
138 
Wight Post-Modernizing Unicity-The Next 25 Years 
REFERENCES 
Artibise, Alan F.J. 1997. "Stay the Course-Reflections on Unicity." Paper prepared for the conference, 'The 
State of Unicity-25 Years Later," Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, October 4, 1997. 
Artibise, Alan F.J. and Jesse Hill. 1993. Governance and Sustainability in the Georgia Basin. Background 
Paper prepared for the British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy. 
Birkeland, Janis. 1996. "Ecological Governance: Redefining Democratic lnstitutions"(IEEE)." Technology and 
Society Magazine, 15,2 (Summer 1996): 21-28. 
Callenbach, Ernest. 1996. Bring Back the Buffalo! A Sustainable Future for America's Great Plains. 
Washington, DC and Covelo, CA.: Island Press. 
CBC (Radio) Ideas. 1997. "Alberta 201 0." Transcript ID 9731. First broadcast 16 September 1997; based on 
a two-day community seminar convened and hosted by the Calgary Institute of the Humanities, University of 
Calgary, May 1997. 
Cobb, Clifford, Ted Halstead, and Jonathon Rowe. 1995. Redefining Progress. San Francisco: Redefining 
Progress. 
Dodge, William R. 1996. Regional Excellence: Governing Togetherto Compete Globally and Flourish Locally. 
Washington, DC: National League of Cities. 
Garreau, Joel. 1991. The Nine Nations of North America. New York: Avon Books. 
Diamant, Peter. 1997. "Bureaucratic Success, Political Nightmare?" Paper prepared for the conference, 'The 
State of Unicity-25 Years Later," Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, October 4, 1997. 
Gerecke, Kent and Barton Reid. 1992. "The Failure of Urban Government The Case of Winnipeg." In Henri 
Lustiger-Thaler, ed., Political Arrangements: Power and the City, pp. 123-142. Montreal: Black Rose Books. 
Jacobs, Jane. 1992. Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics. 
New York: Random House. 
Josephy, Alvin. 1994. 500 Nations: An Illustrated History of North American Indians. Knopf. 
Kaplan, Robert D. 1994. "The Coming Anarchy." Atlantic Monthly (February 1994 ). 
Levin, Earl. 1997. "Municipal Democracy and Citizen Participation." Paper prepared for the conference, 'The 
State of Unicity-25 Years Later," Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, October 4, 1997. 
Luccarelli, Mark. 1995. Lewis Mumford and the Ecological Region: The Politics of Planning. New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
Mintzberg, Henry. 1996. "Managing Government, Governing Management." Harvard Business Review 
(May-June 1996). 
139 
Wight Post-Modernizing Unicity-The Next 25 Years 
Magnusson, Warren. 1996. The Search for Polmcal Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban 
Political Experience. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
--. 1 997 a. "Urban Governance for the 21st Century." Paper prepared for the conference, 'The State of 
Unicity-25 Years Later," Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, October 4, 1997. 
--. 1997b. "Politicizing the Global City." Lecture presentation, as part of the Rebuilding Urban Community 
Lecture Series, sponsored by the Department of Political Science and the Institute of Urban Studies, 
University of Winnipeg, October 3, 1997. 
Manitoba Environment. 1997. Moving Toward Sustainable Development Reporting: State of the Environment 
Report for Manitoba 1997. Province of Manitoba. 
New City Magazine. 1997. "Ecological Citizenship in the Bioregional Community-The New City: A 
Statement of Principles (Editorial Position of the NCM)." New City Magazine, 17,3 (Spring 1997): 2. 
Orr, David. 1992. Ecological Literacy: Education and the Transition to a Postmodem World (Part One: The 
Issue of Sustainability, pp. 1-80). Albany, NY: State University of New York. 
Paetkau, Wesley D.P. 1996. "Form Versus Function: A Critique of Manitoba's Capital Region lnitiative-1989 
to 1996." MCP Thesis, University of Manitoba. 
Peirce, Neal R. with Curtis W. Johnson and John Stuart Hall. 1993. Citistates: How Urban America Can 
Prosper in a Competitive World. Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press. 
Roseland, Mark, ed. 1997. Eco-City Dimensions: Healthy Communities, Healthy Planet. Gabriela Island, BC: 
New Society Publishers. 
Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1991. Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision. Gabriela Island, BC: New Society 
Publishers. 
Saul, John Ralston. 1995. The Unconscious Civilization. Concord, ON: House of Anansi Press Ltd. (The 
1995 CBC Massey Lectures). 
Savitch, H.V. and Ronald K. Vogel. 1996. Regional Polmcs: America in a Post-City Age. Urban Affairs Annual 
Reviews 45. Thousand Oaks: London: Sage Publications. 
Selinger, Greg. 1997. "Urban Governance for the Twenty-First Century: What the Unicity Experience Tells 
Us." Paper prepared for the conference, "The State of Unicity-25 Years Later," Institute of Urban Studies, 
University of Winnipeg, October 4, 1997. 
Soros, George. 1997. Atlantic Monthly (February 1997), cited by Bob Weir in CBC, 1997, pp 8-9. 
Theobald, Robert. 1997. Reworking Success: New Communities at the Millennium. Gabriela Island, BC: New 
Society Publishers. 
Thomas, Paul G. 1997. "Diagnosing the Health of Civic Democracy: 25 Years of Citizen Involvement with City 
Hall." Paper prepared for the conference, 'The State of Unicity-25 Years Later," Institute of Urban Studies, 
University of Winnipeg, October 4, 1997. 
140 
Wight Post-Modernizing Unicity-The Next 25 Years 
Tomalty, Ray, Robert B. Gibson, Don H.M. Alexander and John Fisher. 1994. Ecosystem Planning for 
Canadian Urban Regions. Toronto: ICURR Press. 
Vander Ryn, Sim and Stuart Cowan. 1996. Ecological Design. Washington, D.C. and Covelo: CA Island 
Press. 
Wackernagel, Mathis and William Rees. 1996. Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the 
Earth. The New Catalyst Bioregional Series No. 9. Gabriola Island, B.C.: New Society Publishers. 
Wallis, Alan. 1994. Inventing Regionalism. National Civic League (This research monograph is published in 
a series of five articles in the National Civic Review, beginning with the Spring-Summer 1994 issue). 
Yauk, Tom (Commissioner of Planning and Community Services) and (Councillor) Michael O'Shaughnessy 
(Chair, Planning and Community Services Standing Committee). 1995. Presentation on the Capital Regional 
Strategy to the Public Consultation on the Workbook, Winnipeg, June 1, 1995. 
141 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
ABOUT THE KEYNOTE SPEAKER 
Andrew Sancton has taught at the University of Western Ontario since 1977, where he is currently Professor 
of Political Science and Director of the Local Government Program. He is the author and editor of numerous 
academic works, and has been consulted by the federal government, as well as the City of Scarborough, for 
his expertise in local government and electoral redistribution. His most recent book is Governing Canada's 
City Regions: Adapting Form to Function (1994). 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Alan Artibise, former Director of the Institute of Urban Studies, is a Professor in the School of Community 
and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia, and President of the Cascadia Planning Group. 
His research has focused on North American urban development, urban policy, comparative urban systems 
and urban history. He has received numerous fellowships and awards, and has written or edited many 
academic works. 
Robert Cournoyer is Assistant Deputy Minister of the Ministere de Ia M§tropole (Ministry for Greater 
Montreal) of the Province of Quebec, and served many years in the Quebec Ministry of Municipal Affairs. He 
was also a member of the Task Force on Greater Montreal, whose report commonly known as the Pichette 
Report, was published in 1993. He has academic training in urban sociology, demography and economic 
development from the University of Chicago. 
Peter Diamant is an adjunct professor in the City Planning Department at the University of Manitoba, and has 
conducted research for the Institute of Urban Studies and the Rural Development Institute. He was a Winnipeg 
city councillor and a former Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs (Manitoba). His areas of expertise are urban 
planning and local government, including citizen participation, community development, heritage preservation, 
urban finance, government structures, housing policy and design. 
Wayne Helgason is the Executive Director of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg. A member of the 
Sandy Bay First Nation, Mr. Helgason has worked or volunteered in the social services field throughout his 
career, and is involved in a wide variety of community and Aboriginal organizations including the Aboriginal 
Centre of Winnipeg and the National Association of Friendship Centres. 
Christopher Leo is Professor of Political Science at the University of Winnipeg. He began his career as a 
political and legal journalist. He has an extensive knowledge of municipal governments, urban development 
politics, and African Studies. His recent research involves urban development politics in Toronto, Winnipeg, 
Edmonton, Vancouver and Portland, Oregon. 
Earl Levin worked as the Planning Director of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg and was 
Head of the City Planning Department, University of Manitoba. He served on a special committee of the 
Manitoba government dealing with the reorganization of local government in metropolitan Winnipeg, and was 
a member of the Committee of Review appointed by the Manitoba Cabinet to review the City of Winnipeg Act. 
He has a wide background in urban and regional planning, and has worked as a planner for some forty years 
in the public and private sectors. 
Warren Magnusson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria, and is the co-editor, with 
Andrew Sancton, of the influential text book City Politics in Canada. He has written extensively about theories 
of local government organization, including questions of metropolitan reform. His latest book is The Search 
142 
for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Political Experience (University of Toronto 
Press, 1996). 
Elizabeth McLaren is Assistant Deputy Minister of the Office for the Greater Toronto Area, where she has 
been coordinating the development of a growth management strategy for the GT A. She has led the policy 
development process which resulted in the introduction of Bill 103-City of Toronto Act, which replaces the 
seven municipal governments in Metro with one new unified city. She has had a range of experience in the 
provincial public service, most of it involving municipal relations. 
Richard Rounds is the Director of the Rural Development Institute at Brandon University. He holds a Ph.D. 
in Geography, with natural resource management and geo-ecology specialities. He has conducted many 
applied studies that have led to policy review and change relating to natural resources and rural policy. He 
was a Professor in the Science Faculty for almost two decades and is well-published in scientific journals. 
Greg Selinger teaches in the Faculty of Social Work at the University of Manitoba. He is a former community 
development worker in the inner city and a founding executive director of the Community Education 
Development Association. He was a city councillor for St. Boniface and one of the founding members of the 
Winnipeg into the Nineties (WIN) group. On Council, he chaired the Finance Committee. 
Muriel Smith served from 1981-88 in the Cabinet of the Manitoba NDP Government, holding the portfolios 
of Economic Development and Tourism, Community Services and Corrections, Labour, Housing and the 
Status of Women. She is active in a variety of provincial and national voluntary organizations relating to 
women, the environment and international development, including the United Nations Platform for Action 
Committee. 
Paul Thomas is Professor of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba. He is the co-author of the best-
selling textbook Canadian Public Administration (1987), and editor of the journal Canadian Public 
Administration. He has published numerous articles on a variety of topics; his current research deals with how 
public organizations respond to changes in their external environments. In 1985-1986, he was a member of 
the City of Winnipeg Act Review Committee. 
fan Wight MCIP has been an Assistant Professor in the Department of City Planning, Faculty of Architecture 
at the University of Manitoba since 1994. He has also practiced planning in various capacities in Alberta and 
BC since 1974. His main research interests are in the areas of city-region planning (citistates and bioregions), 
placemaking, and professional planning practice. Dr. Wight is a regular contributor to Plan Canada, and has 
served on its Editorial Board since 1993. He was also a moderator of the "Urban Governance for the 21st 
Century" conference panel. 
Bernie Wolfe (luncheon speaker) was a member of the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg from 
1960-1971. Between 1972 and 1977, he served Unicity as Chairman of the Finance Committee, as a member 
of the Executive Policy Committee, and as Commissioner and Deputy Mayor. He is a former Commissioner 
of the Canadian Transport Commission in Ottawa and a founding member of Heritage Winnipeg. He is a 
member and supporter of a wide range of community organizations. 
ABOUT THE MOD ERA TORS 
Marsha Hanen is a Professor of Philosophy and the first female president of The University of Winnipeg. She 
has contributed to the community through her work in education, health organizations and women's groups. 
She has given her time and energy to the City of Winnipeg's CentrePian Committee, the United Way of 
Winnipeg, the Manitoba Arts Council and the Manitoba Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation, and 
currently serves as a Board Member of The Winnipeg Foundation. 
143 
William Norrie, Q.C. was the Mayor of Winnipeg from 1979-1992. He is a graduate of United College (now 
the University of Winnipeg), the School of Law at the University of Manitoba and Queen's College, Oxford, 
where he attended on a Rhodes Scholarship. He was a school trustee on the Winnipeg School Board and 
a city councillor including Deputy Mayor. He has an extensive record of community service and is the 
recipient of many local and national honours. 
Lome Weiss is an Alternate Broker with Century 21 Bachman & Associates and an active member of the 
Board of Directors of the Winnipeg Real Estate Board. On the Board of Directors, he is Vice-Chair of the 
Executive Council, Commercial Division, and Chair of the Civic and Legislative Affairs Committee. Mr. Weiss 
has commercial and residential clients including numerous life-lease projects. 
CONFERENCE COORDINATORS 
Nancy Klos, Institute of Urban Studies 
Mary Ann Beavis, Institute of Urban Studies 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITIEE 
Tom Carter, Peter Diamant, Christian Douchant, Christopher Leo 
144 
